[PATCH for-next v3 7/7] mm/slab: call debug_locks and KCSAN checks in kfree_nolock()

["Harry Yoo (Meta)" <harry@kernel.org>]

kfree_nolock() skips free hooks that may acquire spinlocks because it
can be called from any context. debug_check_no_locks_freed() and
__kcsan_check_access() are skipped as well.

However, they acquire a spinlock only when they report a bug.
debug_check_no_locks_freed() disables interrupts and walks
current->held_locks, and reaches printk only when a held lock is inside
the freed object. KCSAN takes report_lock only when it observes a race.

Just like KASAN, take the risk of potential deadlock for bug reporting.
Call debug_check_no_locks_freed() and __kcsan_check_access() regardless
of allow_spin.

Signed-off-by: Harry Yoo (Meta) <harry@kernel.org>
---
 mm/slub.c | 25 ++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
index fd3de3bee1de..fad19ec6af4b 100644
--- a/mm/slub.c
+++ b/mm/slub.c
@@ -2708,19 +2708,25 @@ bool slab_free_hook(struct kmem_cache *s, void *x, unsigned int free_flags)
 
 	kmsan_slab_free(s, x);
 
+	/*
+	 * debug_locks, KCSAN, KASAN may acquire a spinlock to report a bug,
+	 * but otherwise cannot deadlock. Take the risk of deadlock for
+	 * reporting.
+	 */
+	debug_check_no_locks_freed(x, s->object_size);
+
+	/* Use KCSAN to help debug racy use-after-free. */
+	if (!still_accessible)
+		__kcsan_check_access(x, s->object_size,
+				     KCSAN_ACCESS_WRITE | KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT);
+
 	/* Hooks that acquire locks or kmalloc_nolock() skips alloc hook counterpart */
 	if (likely(allow_spin)) {
 		kmemleak_free_recursive(x, s->flags);
-		debug_check_no_locks_freed(x, s->object_size);
 
 		if (!(s->flags & SLAB_DEBUG_OBJECTS))
 			debug_check_no_obj_freed(x, s->object_size);
 
-		/* Use KCSAN to help debug racy use-after-free. */
-		if (!still_accessible)
-			__kcsan_check_access(x, s->object_size,
-					     KCSAN_ACCESS_WRITE | KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT);
-
 		if (kfence_free(x))
 			return false;
 	}
@@ -2728,13 +2734,6 @@ bool slab_free_hook(struct kmem_cache *s, void *x, unsigned int free_flags)
 	/*
 	 * Give KASAN a chance to notice an invalid free operation before we
 	 * modify the object.
-	 *
-	 * If KASAN finds a bug it will do kasan_report_invalid_free() which
-	 * will call raw_spin_lock_irqsave() which is technically unsafe from
-	 * NMI, but take chance and report kernel bug. The sequence of
-	 * kasan_report_invalid_free() -> raw_spin_lock_irqsave() -> NMI
-	 * -> kfree_nolock() -> kasan_report_invalid_free() on the same CPU
-	 *  is double buggy and deserves to deadlock.
 	 */
 	if (kasan_slab_pre_free(s, x))
 		return false;

-- 
2.54.0