* [PATCH v2 2/4] KEYS: trusted: Open code tpm2_buf_append_auth()
2026-11-15 23:31 [PATCH v2 0/4] Unsorted tpm2-sessions improvements Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-15 23:31 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] tpm2-sessions: Drop TPM2_NAME_SIZE Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2026-11-15 23:31 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-15 23:31 ` [PATCH v2 3/4] KEYS: trusted: Remove dead branch from tpm2_unseal_cmd Jarkko Sakkinen
` (2 subsequent siblings)
4 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2026-11-15 23:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Howells
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen, keyrings, linux-integrity, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module, Alec Brown, Daniel P. Smith, Eric Biggers,
James Bottomley, James Morris, Jason Gunthorpe,
Jonathan McDowell, Matthew Garrett, Mimi Zohar, Paul Moore,
Peter Huewe, Roberto Sassu, Ross Philipson, Serge E. Hallyn
tpm2_buf_append_auth() has a single call site and most of its parameters
are redundant. Open code it to the call site so that less cross-referencing
is required while browsing the source code.
Reviewed-by: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@earth.li>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
---
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 40 ++++-------------------
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
index 30188a0ec676..563997600636 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -197,36 +197,6 @@ int tpm2_key_priv(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
return 0;
}
-/**
- * tpm2_buf_append_auth() - append TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND to the buffer.
- *
- * @buf: an allocated tpm_buf instance
- * @session_handle: session handle
- * @nonce: the session nonce, may be NULL if not used
- * @nonce_len: the session nonce length, may be 0 if not used
- * @attributes: the session attributes
- * @hmac: the session HMAC or password, may be NULL if not used
- * @hmac_len: the session HMAC or password length, maybe 0 if not used
- */
-static void tpm2_buf_append_auth(struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 session_handle,
- const u8 *nonce, u16 nonce_len,
- u8 attributes,
- const u8 *hmac, u16 hmac_len)
-{
- tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, 9 + nonce_len + hmac_len);
- tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, session_handle);
- tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, nonce_len);
-
- if (nonce && nonce_len)
- tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, nonce_len);
-
- tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, attributes);
- tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, hmac_len);
-
- if (hmac && hmac_len)
- tpm_buf_append(buf, hmac, hmac_len);
-}
-
/**
* tpm2_seal_trusted() - seal the payload of a trusted key
*
@@ -537,9 +507,13 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
* could repeat our actions with the exfiltrated
* password.
*/
- tpm2_buf_append_auth(buf, private->policyhandle,
- NULL /* nonce */, 0, 0,
- private->blobauth, private->blobauth_len);
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, 9 + private->blobauth_len);
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, private->policyhandle);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, 0);
+ tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, 0);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, private->blobauth_len);
+ tpm_buf_append(buf, private->blobauth, private->blobauth_len);
+
if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT,
NULL, 0);
--
2.47.3
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread* [PATCH v2 4/4] tpm2-sessions: Re-orchestrate tpm2_read_public() use
2026-11-15 23:31 [PATCH v2 0/4] Unsorted tpm2-sessions improvements Jarkko Sakkinen
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2026-11-15 23:31 ` [PATCH v2 3/4] KEYS: trusted: Remove dead branch from tpm2_unseal_cmd Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2026-11-15 23:31 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-15 23:43 ` [PATCH v2 0/4] Unsorted tpm2-sessions improvements Jarkko Sakkinen
4 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2026-11-15 23:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Howells
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen, keyrings, linux-integrity, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module, Alec Brown, Daniel P. Smith, Eric Biggers,
James Bottomley, James Morris, Jason Gunthorpe,
Jonathan McDowell, Matthew Garrett, Mimi Zohar, Paul Moore,
Peter Huewe, Roberto Sassu, Ross Philipson, Serge E. Hallyn
Move TPM handle name resolution out of tpm_buf_append_name(), so that
callers resolve object names explicitly before constructing HMAC-protected
commands:
1. Export tpm2_read_public(), so that trusted_tpm2 can resolve handle
names, and store non-object handles in big-endian byte order matching
the TPM 2.0 handle Name definition.
2. Call tpm2_read_public() explicitly in tpm2_seal_trusted(),
tpm2_load_cmd(), and tpm2_unseal_cmd() before starting the auth
session, and pass the pre-resolved name and size to
tpm_buf_append_name().
3. Rework tpm_buf_append_name() and tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session() to use
the caller-supplied name and size directly.
This reduces fallible exits from tpm2_buf_append_name().
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
---
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 9 +-
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 122 +++++++---------------
include/linux/tpm.h | 10 +-
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 33 +++++-
4 files changed, 84 insertions(+), 90 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
index 4b2bb2ddc321..9c7e8b9aff4d 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
@@ -194,11 +194,12 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx,
tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_PCR_EXTEND);
if (!disable_pcr_integrity) {
- rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, pcr_idx, NULL);
- if (rc) {
- tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
+ __be32 pcr_idx_be = cpu_to_be32(pcr_idx);
+
+ rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, pcr_idx,
+ (u8 *)&pcr_idx_be, sizeof(pcr_idx_be));
+ if (rc)
return rc;
- }
tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, 0, NULL, 0);
} else {
tpm_buf_append_handle(buf, pcr_idx);
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
index 94c11135beb3..fa107719b4f9 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
@@ -136,8 +136,8 @@ struct tpm2_auth {
* handle, but they are part of the session by name, which
* we must compute and remember
*/
- u32 name_h[AUTH_MAX_NAMES];
u8 name[AUTH_MAX_NAMES][TPM2_MAX_NAME_SIZE];
+ u16 name_size_tbl[AUTH_MAX_NAMES];
};
#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
@@ -163,7 +163,17 @@ static int name_size(const u8 *name)
}
}
-static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, void *name)
+/**
+ * tpm2_read_public() - Resolve TPM name for a handle
+ * @chip: TPM chip to use.
+ * @handle: TPM handle.
+ * @name: Buffer for returning the name blob. Must have a capacity of at
+ * least %TPM2_MAX_NAME_SIZE bytes.
+ *
+ * Return: Size of the TPM handle name on success, or a negative errno when
+ * TPM2_ReadPublic fails.
+ */
+int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, void *name)
{
u32 mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle);
off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
@@ -172,7 +182,7 @@ static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, void *name)
if (mso != TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT && mso != TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE &&
mso != TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) {
- memcpy(name, &handle, sizeof(u32));
+ put_unaligned_be32(handle, name);
return sizeof(u32);
}
@@ -189,7 +199,8 @@ static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, void *name)
return tpm_ret_to_err(rc);
/* Skip TPMT_PUBLIC: */
- offset += tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset);
+ rc = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset);
+ offset += rc;
/*
* Ensure space for the length field of TPM2B_NAME and hashAlg field of
@@ -212,39 +223,34 @@ static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, void *name)
memcpy(name, &buf->data[offset], rc);
return name_size_alg;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm2_read_public);
#endif /* CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC */
/**
- * tpm_buf_append_name() - add a handle area to the buffer
- * @chip: the TPM chip structure
- * @buf: The buffer to be appended
- * @handle: The handle to be appended
- * @name: The name of the handle (may be NULL)
+ * tpm_buf_append_name() - Append a handle and store TPM name
+ * @chip: TPM chip to use.
+ * @buf: TPM buffer containing the TPM command in-transit.
+ * @handle: TPM handle to be appended.
+ * @name: TPM name of the handle.
+ * @name_size: Size of the TPM name.
*
* In order to compute session HMACs, we need to know the names of the
- * objects pointed to by the handles. For most objects, this is simply
- * the actual 4 byte handle or an empty buf (in these cases @name
- * should be NULL) but for volatile objects, permanent objects and NV
- * areas, the name is defined as the hash (according to the name
- * algorithm which should be set to sha256) of the public area to
- * which the two byte algorithm id has been appended. For these
- * objects, the @name pointer should point to this. If a name is
- * required but @name is NULL, then TPM2_ReadPublic() will be called
- * on the handle to obtain the name.
+ * objects pointed to by the handles. For permanent and PCR handles this is
+ * the 4-byte big-endian handle; for volatile objects, persistent objects
+ * and NV areas this is the name resolved with tpm2_read_public().
*
* As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure
* will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a
* kernel message.
*
- * Ends the authorization session on failure.
+ * Return: 0 on success, or -EIO when the authorization area state is
+ * malformed.
*/
int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
- u32 handle, u8 *name)
+ u32 handle, u8 *name, u16 name_size)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
- enum tpm2_mso_type mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle);
struct tpm2_auth *auth;
- u16 name_size_alg;
int slot;
int ret;
#endif
@@ -263,45 +269,26 @@ int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
}
auth = chip->auth;
if (auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) {
- dev_err(&chip->dev, "session state malformed");
+ dev_err(&chip->dev, "session state malformed\n");
+ ret = -EIO;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (name_size > TPM2_MAX_NAME_SIZE) {
+ dev_err(&chip->dev, "name too long: %u\n", name_size);
ret = -EIO;
goto err;
}
tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle);
auth->session += 4;
-
- if (mso == TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT ||
- mso == TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE ||
- mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) {
- if (!name) {
- ret = tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]);
- } else {
- ret = name_size(name);
- }
-
- if (ret < 0)
- goto err;
-
- name_size_alg = ret;
- } else {
- if (name) {
- dev_err(&chip->dev, "handle 0x%08x does not use a name\n",
- handle);
- ret = -EIO;
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- auth->name_h[slot] = handle;
- if (name)
- memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size_alg);
+ memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size);
+ auth->name_size_tbl[slot] = name_size;
#endif
return 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
err:
tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
- return tpm_ret_to_err(ret);
+ return ret;
#endif
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_name);
@@ -629,22 +616,8 @@ int tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf)
attrs = chip->cc_attrs_tbl[i];
handles = (attrs >> TPM2_CC_ATTR_CHANDLES) & GENMASK(2, 0);
+ offset_s += handles * sizeof(u32);
- /*
- * just check the names, it's easy to make mistakes. This
- * would happen if someone added a handle via
- * tpm_buf_append_u32() instead of tpm_buf_append_name()
- */
- for (i = 0; i < handles; i++) {
- u32 handle = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_s);
-
- if (auth->name_h[i] != handle) {
- dev_err(&chip->dev, "invalid handle 0x%08x\n", handle);
- ret = -EIO;
- goto err;
- }
- }
- /* point offset_s to the start of the sessions */
val = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_s);
/* point offset_p to the start of the parameters */
offset_p = offset_s + val;
@@ -705,23 +678,8 @@ int tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf)
/* ordinal is already BE */
sha256_update(&sctx, (u8 *)&head->ordinal, sizeof(head->ordinal));
/* add the handle names */
- for (i = 0; i < handles; i++) {
- enum tpm2_mso_type mso = tpm2_handle_mso(auth->name_h[i]);
-
- if (mso == TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT ||
- mso == TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE ||
- mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) {
- ret = name_size(auth->name[i]);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto err;
-
- sha256_update(&sctx, auth->name[i], ret);
- } else {
- __be32 h = cpu_to_be32(auth->name_h[i]);
-
- sha256_update(&sctx, (u8 *)&h, 4);
- }
- }
+ for (i = 0; i < handles; i++)
+ sha256_update(&sctx, auth->name[i], auth->name_size_tbl[i]);
if (offset_s != tpm_buf_length(buf))
sha256_update(&sctx, &buf->data[offset_s],
tpm_buf_length(buf) - offset_s);
diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h
index 84c8fe226235..a9fd53363dc4 100644
--- a/include/linux/tpm.h
+++ b/include/linux/tpm.h
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ static inline struct tpm2_auth *tpm2_chip_auth(struct tpm_chip *chip)
}
int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
- u32 handle, u8 *name);
+ u32 handle, u8 *name, u16 name_size);
void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase,
int passphraselen);
@@ -314,6 +314,7 @@ int tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf);
int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
int rc);
void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip);
+int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, void *name);
#else
#include <linux/unaligned.h>
@@ -337,6 +338,13 @@ static inline int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip,
{
return rc;
}
+
+static inline int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle,
+ void *name)
+{
+ put_unaligned_be32(handle, name);
+ return sizeof(u32);
+}
#endif /* CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC */
#endif
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
index 22d27e2512db..f7a0a312a652 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -211,9 +211,11 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
struct trusted_key_options *options)
{
struct trusted_key_tpm *private = options->private;
+ u8 parent_name[TPM2_MAX_NAME_SIZE];
off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = NULL;
struct tpm_buf *sized __free(kfree) = NULL;
+ u16 parent_name_size;
int blob_len = 0;
int hash;
u32 flags;
@@ -230,6 +232,12 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
if (rc)
return rc;
+ rc = tpm2_read_public(chip, private->keyhandle, parent_name);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto out_put;
+
+ parent_name_size = rc;
+
rc = tpm2_start_auth_session(chip);
if (rc)
goto out_put;
@@ -253,7 +261,8 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
tpm_buf_init_sized(sized, TPM_BUFSIZE);
- rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, private->keyhandle, NULL);
+ rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, private->keyhandle, parent_name,
+ parent_name_size);
if (rc)
goto out;
@@ -358,7 +367,9 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
{
u8 *blob_ref __free(kfree) = NULL;
struct trusted_key_tpm *private = options->private;
+ u8 parent_name[TPM2_MAX_NAME_SIZE];
struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = NULL;
+ u16 parent_name_size;
unsigned int private_len;
unsigned int public_len;
unsigned int blob_len;
@@ -409,6 +420,12 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
if (blob_len > payload->blob_len)
return -E2BIG;
+ rc = tpm2_read_public(chip, private->keyhandle, parent_name);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ return rc;
+
+ parent_name_size = rc;
+
rc = tpm2_start_auth_session(chip);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -422,7 +439,8 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE);
tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_LOAD);
- rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, private->keyhandle, NULL);
+ rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, private->keyhandle, parent_name,
+ parent_name_size);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -467,11 +485,19 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
u32 blob_handle)
{
struct trusted_key_tpm *private = options->private;
+ u8 blob_name[TPM2_MAX_NAME_SIZE];
struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = NULL;
+ u16 blob_name_size;
u16 data_len;
u8 *data;
int rc;
+ rc = tpm2_read_public(chip, blob_handle, blob_name);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ return rc;
+
+ blob_name_size = rc;
+
rc = tpm2_start_auth_session(chip);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -485,7 +511,8 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE);
tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_UNSEAL);
- rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, blob_handle, NULL);
+ rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, blob_handle, blob_name,
+ blob_name_size);
if (rc)
return rc;
--
2.47.3
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread