* [PATCH net v2 1/2] tcp: initialize ir_rmt_addr and ir_loc_addr in cookie_v6_check()
2026-11-16 2:37 [PATCH net v2 0/2] tcp: initialize missing request_sock fields in syncookie path Thaison Phan
@ 2026-11-16 2:37 ` Thaison Phan
2026-11-16 2:37 ` [PATCH net v2 2/2] tcp: accecn: initialize AccECN fields in syncookie path Thaison Phan
1 sibling, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Thaison Phan @ 2026-11-16 2:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Eric Dumazet, Neal Cardwell, Kuniyuki Iwashima, David S . Miller,
David Ahern, Jakub Kicinski, Paolo Abeni
Cc: Simon Horman, Ilpo Järvinen, Olivier Tilmans, Chia-Yu Chang,
Stan Iliev, netdev, linux-kernel, Thaison Phan
Commit a3a128f611a9 ("inet: consolidate inet_csk_clone_lock()") moved
the LOOPBACK4_IPV6 initialization for passive IPv6 TCP sockets from
tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock() to tcp_v6_init_req().
IPv6 SYN cookie connections allocate a fresh request_sock without
__GFP_ZERO and call tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock() without tcp_v6_init_req(),
leaving ireq->ir_rmt_addr and ireq->ir_loc_addr uninitialized in
cookie_v6_check(). inet_csk_clone_lock() then copies uninitialized slab
bytes into sk_daddr, sk_rcv_saddr, and inet_saddr, exposing them to
tracepoints and bpf_sock and causing inet_daddr != LOOPBACK4_IPV6 checks
(such as IP_OPTIONS in do_ip_setsockopt()) to misclassify native IPv6
child sockets as IPv4-mapped.
This was originally noticed via an out-of-tree socket hook observing
inet_sk(sk)->inet_saddr != LOOPBACK4_IPV6 on KASAN test runs. KASAN
enables SLUB_RCU_DEBUG by default, introducing an RCU grace period that
prevents cookie_v6_check() from reusing the warm request_sock initialized
during the initial SYN. Upstream, with tcp_syncookies=2,
SLUB_RCU_DEBUG=y, and slub_debug=P, sock:inet_sock_set_state shows slab
poison instead of 127.0.0.6:
... sock:inet_sock_set_state: family=AF_INET6 protocol=IPPROTO_TCP \
sport=59839 dport=41050 \
saddr=90.90.90.90 daddr=90.90.90.90 \
saddrv6=::1 daddrv6=::1 \
oldstate=TCP_LISTEN newstate=TCP_SYN_RECV
Initialize ireq->ir_rmt_addr and ireq->ir_loc_addr to LOOPBACK4_IPV6 in
cookie_v6_check() to match tcp_v6_init_req(). Tested against a QEMU
reproducer checking inet_sock_set_state and IP_OPTIONS, as well as the
packetdrill syncookie selftests.
Fixes: a3a128f611a9 ("inet: consolidate inet_csk_clone_lock()")
Signed-off-by: Thaison Phan <thaisonphan@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>
---
v2:
- clarify how KASAN (via SLUB_RCU_DEBUG) exposed the uninitialized
request_sock, how the issue was observed, and include the
inet_sock_set_state trace line (Eric Dumazet)
- add Reviewed-by tag from Eric Dumazet
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20261114161248.3428695-2-thaisonphan@google.com/
net/ipv6/syncookies.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/ipv6/syncookies.c b/net/ipv6/syncookies.c
index b581cb1ee2e8..b33011b71fff 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/syncookies.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/syncookies.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
#include <net/ipv6.h>
#include <net/tcp.h>
#include <net/tcp_ecn.h>
+#include <net/transp_v6.h>
#define COOKIEBITS 24 /* Upper bits store count */
#define COOKIEMASK (((__u32)1 << COOKIEBITS) - 1)
@@ -205,6 +206,8 @@ struct sock *cookie_v6_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr;
ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr;
+ ireq->ir_rmt_addr = LOOPBACK4_IPV6;
+ ireq->ir_loc_addr = LOOPBACK4_IPV6;
if (security_inet_conn_request(sk, skb, req)) {
SKB_DR_SET(reason, SECURITY_HOOK);
--
2.56.0.611.g1030f0b940-goog
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread* [PATCH net v2 2/2] tcp: accecn: initialize AccECN fields in syncookie path
2026-11-16 2:37 [PATCH net v2 0/2] tcp: initialize missing request_sock fields in syncookie path Thaison Phan
2026-11-16 2:37 ` [PATCH net v2 1/2] tcp: initialize ir_rmt_addr and ir_loc_addr in cookie_v6_check() Thaison Phan
@ 2026-11-16 2:37 ` Thaison Phan
1 sibling, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Thaison Phan @ 2026-11-16 2:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Eric Dumazet, Neal Cardwell, Kuniyuki Iwashima, David S . Miller,
David Ahern, Jakub Kicinski, Paolo Abeni
Cc: Simon Horman, Ilpo Järvinen, Olivier Tilmans, Chia-Yu Chang,
Stan Iliev, netdev, linux-kernel, Thaison Phan
cookie_tcp_reqsk_alloc() and bpf_sk_assign_tcp_reqsk() allocate struct
request_sock without __GFP_ZERO, leaving saw_accecn_opt,
accecn_fail_mode, syn_ect_rcv, and syn_ect_snt uninitialized. When
accecn_ok is negotiated in cookie_{v4,v6}_check(),
tcp_ecn_openreq_child() reads all four fields to initialize the child
socket's AccECN state.
In addition, because the temporary request_sock used to send a cookie
SYN-ACK is immediately freed, treq->syn_ect_snt is lost. If the listener
marks ECT (e.g. DCTCP), failing to record syn_ect_snt causes
tcp_accecn_third_ack() to flag TCP_ACCECN_ACE_FAIL_RECV when the peer
reflects ECT, disabling ECT for the rest of the connection.
Initialize saw_accecn_opt, accecn_fail_mode, and syn_ect_rcv in
cookie_tcp_reqsk_init() to match tcp_openreq_init(), and set syn_ect_snt
from the listener's TOS/tclass in cookie_{v4,v6}_check() to match
tcp_{v4,v6}_send_synack().
Found by AI-assisted code inspection comparing tcp_openreq_init() and
cookie_tcp_reqsk_init() while investigating the cookie_v6_check()
LOOPBACK4_IPV6 bug. Reproduced in a QEMU VM with tcp_syncookies=2,
tcp_ecn=3, SLUB_RCU_DEBUG=y, and slub_debug=P, observing bogus
tcpi_accecn_fail_mode and tcpi_accecn_opt_seen values in TCP_INFO on the
accepted child socket (and tcpi_accecn_fail_mode=0x2 on ECT(0)
listeners), and tested with packetdrill AccECN and syncookie selftests.
Fixes: 3cae34274c79 ("tcp: accecn: AccECN negotiation")
Fixes: b40671b5ee58 ("tcp: accecn: AccECN option failure handling")
Signed-off-by: Thaison Phan <thaisonphan@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>
---
v2:
- drop redundant treq->syn_ect_snt = 0 in cookie_tcp_reqsk_init()
(Eric Dumazet)
- clarify how the bug was discovered and observed via TCP_INFO
(Eric Dumazet)
- add Reviewed-by tag from Eric Dumazet
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20261114161248.3428695-3-thaisonphan@google.com/
net/ipv4/syncookies.c | 4 ++++
net/ipv6/syncookies.c | 1 +
2 files changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/syncookies.c b/net/ipv4/syncookies.c
index 4e0ff3b82062..1a837ed6efa0 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/syncookies.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/syncookies.c
@@ -290,6 +290,9 @@ static int cookie_tcp_reqsk_init(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
*/
treq->txhash = treq->snt_isn;
treq->syn_tos = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ip_dsfield;
+ treq->saw_accecn_opt = TCP_ACCECN_OPT_NOT_SEEN;
+ treq->accecn_fail_mode = 0;
+ treq->syn_ect_rcv = 0;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MPTCP)
treq->is_mptcp = sk_is_mptcp(sk);
@@ -502,6 +505,7 @@ struct sock *cookie_v4_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
ireq->rcv_wscale = rcv_wscale;
ireq->ecn_ok &= cookie_ecn_ok(net, &rt->dst);
treq->accecn_ok = ireq->ecn_ok && cookie_accecn_ok(th);
+ treq->syn_ect_snt = READ_ONCE(inet_sk(sk)->tos) & INET_ECN_MASK;
ret = tcp_get_cookie_sock(sk, skb, req, &rt->dst);
/* ip_queue_xmit() depends on our flow being setup
diff --git a/net/ipv6/syncookies.c b/net/ipv6/syncookies.c
index b33011b71fff..7435ebcc366c 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/syncookies.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/syncookies.c
@@ -276,6 +276,7 @@ struct sock *cookie_v6_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
ireq->rcv_wscale = rcv_wscale;
ireq->ecn_ok &= cookie_ecn_ok(net, dst);
tcp_rsk(req)->accecn_ok = ireq->ecn_ok && cookie_accecn_ok(th);
+ tcp_rsk(req)->syn_ect_snt = READ_ONCE(np->tclass) & INET_ECN_MASK;
ret = tcp_get_cookie_sock(sk, skb, req, dst);
if (!ret) {
--
2.56.0.611.g1030f0b940-goog
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread