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From: Cai Xinchen <caixinchen1@huawei.com>
To: <mic@digikod.net>, <gnoack@google.com>, <paul@paul-moore.com>,
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Subject: [PATCH -next -v4 02/17] LSM: pass struct path to the inode_setsecctx hook
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2026 23:05:27 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261117150542.1169451-3-caixinchen1@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261117150542.1169451-1-caixinchen1@huawei.com>

The inode_setsecctx hook and its security_inode_setsecctx() caller in
fs/nfsd operate on a dentry even though both have a struct path
available.  Pass a const struct path so that the coming conversion of the
xattr helpers can be reflected in the implementations; for now SELinux
and Smack keep passing path->dentry and &nop_mnt_idmap to
__vfs_setxattr_locked().

Also document in lsm_hook_defs.h what a struct path argument may be used
for: it can be passed to VFS helpers taking a struct path, but nothing is
guaranteed about path->mnt.

Signed-off-by: Cai Xinchen <caixinchen1@huawei.com>
---
 fs/nfsd/vfs.c                 | 2 +-
 include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 9 ++++++++-
 include/linux/security.h      | 5 +++--
 security/security.c           | 6 +++---
 security/selinux/hooks.c      | 7 ++++---
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c    | 6 +++---
 6 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
index 359277716fe8..1c686b82e70a 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
@@ -626,7 +626,7 @@ nfsd_setattr(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp,
 			break;
 	}
 	if (attr->na_seclabel && attr->na_seclabel->len)
-		attr->na_labelerr = security_inode_setsecctx(dentry,
+		attr->na_labelerr = security_inode_setsecctx(&path,
 			attr->na_seclabel->data, attr->na_seclabel->len);
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL) && attr->na_dpacl) {
 		if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index 87d9d06710cb..7d3cd5395365 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -25,6 +25,12 @@
  *   #include <linux/lsm_hook_defs.h>
  *   #undef LSM_HOOK
  * };
+ *
+ * Hooks that take a struct path argument: the VFS only sanctions passing
+ * the path to VFS helpers that take a struct path (e.g. notify_change());
+ * it makes no guarantees with regard to path->mnt, whose layout and
+ * implementation details are subject to change.  Implementations must
+ * not rely on its properties.
  */
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, binder_set_context_mgr, const struct cred *mgr)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, binder_transaction, const struct cred *from,
@@ -313,7 +319,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, secctx_to_secid, const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
 LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, release_secctx, struct lsm_context *cp)
 LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_invalidate_secctx, struct inode *inode)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_notifysecctx, struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
-LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_setsecctx, struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_setsecctx, const struct path *path, void *ctx,
+	 u32 ctxlen)
 LSM_HOOK(int, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode_getsecctx, struct inode *inode,
 	 struct lsm_context *cp)
 
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 40831fab5470..b9cae538b6fc 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -588,7 +588,7 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
 void security_release_secctx(struct lsm_context *cp);
 void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
 int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
-int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
+int security_inode_setsecctx(const struct path *path, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
 int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp);
 int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what);
 int lsm_fill_user_ctx(struct lsm_ctx __user *uctx, u32 *uctx_len,
@@ -1630,7 +1630,8 @@ static inline int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u3
 {
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
-static inline int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+static inline int security_inode_setsecctx(const struct path *path, void *ctx,
+					   u32 ctxlen)
 {
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 4727b8347fc4..7e6a8a2a2ee5 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -4110,7 +4110,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_notifysecctx);
 
 /**
  * security_inode_setsecctx() - Change the security label of an inode
- * @dentry: inode
+ * @path: inode (the VFS makes no guarantees with regard to @path->mnt)
  * @ctx: secctx
  * @ctxlen: length of secctx
  *
@@ -4124,9 +4124,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_notifysecctx);
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
  */
-int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+int security_inode_setsecctx(const struct path *path, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(inode_setsecctx, dentry, ctx, ctxlen);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_setsecctx, path, ctx, ctxlen);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx);
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index da83f4111bdf..6ecb5f9657e6 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -7148,10 +7148,11 @@ static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen
 /*
  *	called with inode->i_mutex locked
  */
-static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(const struct path *path, void *ctx,
+				   u32 ctxlen)
 {
-	return __vfs_setxattr_locked(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
-				     ctx, ctxlen, 0, NULL);
+	return __vfs_setxattr_locked(&nop_mnt_idmap, path->dentry,
+				     XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0, NULL);
 }
 
 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 2192cdcabfe2..f2c34e9ea4f8 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4982,10 +4982,10 @@ static int smack_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
 				       ctxlen, 0);
 }
 
-static int smack_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+static int smack_inode_setsecctx(const struct path *path, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
 {
-	return __vfs_setxattr_locked(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, XATTR_NAME_SMACK,
-				     ctx, ctxlen, 0, NULL);
+	return __vfs_setxattr_locked(&nop_mnt_idmap, path->dentry,
+				     XATTR_NAME_SMACK, ctx, ctxlen, 0, NULL);
 }
 
 static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp)
-- 
2.18.0.huawei.25


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-11-17 14:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-17 15:05 [PATCH -next -v4 00/17] landlock: Add READ_METADATA and WRITE_METADATA access rights Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 01/17] fs: pass struct path to notify_change() Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 18:30   ` Al Viro
2026-11-17 18:34     ` Al Viro
2026-11-18  9:17       ` Cai Xinchen
2026-11-18  9:13     ` Cai Xinchen
2026-11-19  5:23       ` Al Viro
2026-11-17 15:05 ` Cai Xinchen [this message]
2026-11-17 18:43   ` [PATCH -next -v4 02/17] LSM: pass struct path to the inode_setsecctx hook Al Viro
2026-11-18  0:16     ` Al Viro
2026-11-18  8:51       ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-19  5:51         ` Al Viro
2026-11-18  8:59       ` Cai Xinchen
2026-11-18  9:35         ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-19  3:46           ` Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 03/17] fs: pass struct path to xattr helpers Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 04/17] fs: pass struct path to POSIX ACL helpers Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 05/17] LSM: pass struct path and struct file to the inode xattr hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 06/17] LSM: pass struct path and struct file to the inode posix acl hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 07/17] LSM: pass struct path and struct file to the inode fileattr hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 08/17] LSM: rename inode_setattr to path_setattr and pass struct path and file Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 09/17] LSM: rename inode_getattr to path_getattr and pass struct file Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 10/17] LSM: rename the inode xattr hooks to path_xattr hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 11/17] LSM: rename the inode posix acl hooks to path_*_acl hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 12/17] LSM: rename the inode fileattr hooks to path_file_* hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 13/17] LSM: rename inode_setsecctx to path_setsecctx Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 14/17] landlock: Add READ_METADATA and WRITE_METADATA access rights Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 15/17] selftests/landlock: Add tests for metadata " Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 16/17] samples/landlock: Add metadata rights to sandboxer Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 17/17] Documentation: Update landlock doc for metadata rights Cai Xinchen

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