From: Cai Xinchen <caixinchen1@huawei.com>
To: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Subject: Re: [PATCH -next -v4 02/17] LSM: pass struct path to the inode_setsecctx hook
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 16:59:29 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <bdc22808-9f22-46f7-b42d-e6bd8e1eeaca@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261118001641.GA1669148@ZenIV>
Sorry, this is a major issue. I checked the current state of the patchset
- fs/attr.c, fs/open.c, fs/inode.c, fs/utimes.c, fs/namei.c,
fs/coredump.c, drivers/block/loop.c: nd->path or file->f_path (in loop.c:
the f_path of the backing file, where file == NULL is intentional).
- drivers/base/devtmpfs.c: the mount point of the parent directory,
which contains a directory entry that was just created or is about to be
deleted.
- fs/cachefiles/xattr.c: cache->mnt, under which a directory entry is
searched.
- fs/ecryptfs: ecryptfs_lower_path(), which is the mount point of the
lower-level directory entry itself.
- fs/nfsd: exp->ex_path.mnt, which contains fh_dentry, a value decoded via
exportfs_decode_fh_raw(exp->ex_path.mnt,...), or exp->ex_path.dentry.
- fs/overlayfs: ovl_upper_mnt(ofs), which contains the actual
upper-level directory entry.
There are two places that violate (1), both introduced by this series of
patches in ksmbd:
smb2_parent_compressed() and smb_inherit_dacl() pair the directory entry
returned by dget_parent()
with path->mnt, and problems arise once that directory entry becomes the
root of its mount point.
I will fix these issues in v5 and ensure this invariant.
If you find any place where (1) still does not hold, please point it
out, and I
will fix it.
On 11/18/2026 8:16 AM, Al Viro wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 17, 2026 at 06:43:42PM +0000, Al Viro wrote:
>> On Tue, Nov 17, 2026 at 11:05:27PM +0800, Cai Xinchen wrote:
>>> The inode_setsecctx hook and its security_inode_setsecctx() caller in
>>> fs/nfsd operate on a dentry even though both have a struct path
>>> available. Pass a const struct path so that the coming conversion of the
>>> xattr helpers can be reflected in the implementations; for now SELinux
>>> and Smack keep passing path->dentry and &nop_mnt_idmap to
>>> __vfs_setxattr_locked().
>>>
>>> Also document in lsm_hook_defs.h what a struct path argument may be used
>>> for: it can be passed to VFS helpers taking a struct path, but nothing is
>>> guaranteed about path->mnt.
>> No, with the side of Hell, No.
>>
>>> + * Hooks that take a struct path argument: the VFS only sanctions passing
>>> + * the path to VFS helpers that take a struct path (e.g. notify_change());
>>> + * it makes no guarantees with regard to path->mnt, whose layout and
>>> + * implementation details are subject to change. Implementations must
>>> + * not rely on its properties.
>> NAKed-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
>>
>> If that kind of stuff actually does get passed to any existing hooks, we need
>> to fix that ASAP. If not, consider that a blanket NAK on any patch series
>> that would introduce such.
>>
>> We are not going there. At all. "Must not rely on its properties" ==
>> "must make sure that no existing functions with struct path * arguments
>> ever have such malformed instances passed to them". Which is not going
>> to be feasible to enforce. And yes, that very much includes any VFS helpers.
> To elaborate a bit: correctness of quite a few places does depend upon the
> following invaraint:
> path->mnt->mnt_sb == path->dentry->d_sb (1)
> for all struct path pointers they might possibly run into. _Some_
> functions might _currently_ be safe to call with that constraint violated;
> there's neither a list of such functions nor any promise whatsoever that
> call that is currently safe in such conditions will remain safe at any
> later point.
>
> _IF_ you can guarantee that (1) is not violated, we have something to
> talk about; otherwise, don't call your object struct path and don't
> pass it to anything that expects to deal with struct path.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-18 8:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-17 15:05 [PATCH -next -v4 00/17] landlock: Add READ_METADATA and WRITE_METADATA access rights Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 01/17] fs: pass struct path to notify_change() Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 18:30 ` Al Viro
2026-11-17 18:34 ` Al Viro
2026-11-18 9:17 ` Cai Xinchen
2026-11-18 9:13 ` Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 02/17] LSM: pass struct path to the inode_setsecctx hook Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 18:43 ` Al Viro
2026-11-18 0:16 ` Al Viro
2026-11-18 8:51 ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-18 8:59 ` Cai Xinchen [this message]
2026-11-18 9:35 ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 03/17] fs: pass struct path to xattr helpers Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 04/17] fs: pass struct path to POSIX ACL helpers Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 05/17] LSM: pass struct path and struct file to the inode xattr hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 06/17] LSM: pass struct path and struct file to the inode posix acl hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 07/17] LSM: pass struct path and struct file to the inode fileattr hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 08/17] LSM: rename inode_setattr to path_setattr and pass struct path and file Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 09/17] LSM: rename inode_getattr to path_getattr and pass struct file Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 10/17] LSM: rename the inode xattr hooks to path_xattr hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 11/17] LSM: rename the inode posix acl hooks to path_*_acl hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 12/17] LSM: rename the inode fileattr hooks to path_file_* hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 13/17] LSM: rename inode_setsecctx to path_setsecctx Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 14/17] landlock: Add READ_METADATA and WRITE_METADATA access rights Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 15/17] selftests/landlock: Add tests for metadata " Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 16/17] samples/landlock: Add metadata rights to sandboxer Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 17/17] Documentation: Update landlock doc for metadata rights Cai Xinchen
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