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* [PATCH] Bluetooth: L2CAP: check security before completing a deferred BR/EDR accept
@ 2026-11-18 21:33 Mohammed Alquraini
  2026-11-18 23:04 ` Luiz Augusto von Dentz
  2026-11-19 10:01 ` kernel test robot
  0 siblings, 2 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Mohammed Alquraini @ 2026-11-18 21:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-bluetooth
  Cc: Marcel Holtmann, Luiz Augusto von Dentz, linux-kernel,
	Mohammed Alquraini

A BR/EDR L2CAP service that listens with BT_DEFER_SETUP asks the kernel to
enforce its BT_SECURITY level and only decides which peer to admit. The
deferred-accept completion path does not honour that.

The child channel is placed on the parent's accept queue at CONN_REQ time and
is reported pollable (bt_accept_poll() returns EPOLLIN for a BT_CONNECT2 child
on a BT_DEFER_SETUP listener) before the link security procedure resolves.
When userspace recvmsg()s the deferred child in that window, l2cap_sock_defer()
moves the channel to BT_CONFIG and __l2cap_connect_rsp_defer() replies
L2CAP_CR_SUCCESS with no security check. If the security procedure then fails,
l2cap_security_cfm() has no branch that matches a failed result on a BT_CONFIG
channel, so the channel is never torn down: a peer that failed the service's
required security level keeps a connected, data-passing channel.

The sibling setsockopt(BT_SECURITY) path already rechecks with
l2cap_chan_check_security(), and the non-deferred incoming path denies with
L2CAP_CR_SEC_BLOCK; only the BR/EDR basic/ERTM deferred-accept path was
missed. This is the BR/EDR counterpart of commit 522e9ed157e3 ("Bluetooth:
l2cap: Check encryption key size on incoming connection").

Gate the deferred completion on the security state. In l2cap_sock_defer(),
before completing a BR/EDR deferred accept, call l2cap_chan_check_security();
if the level is not yet met, mark the socket BT_SK_ACCEPTED, leave the channel
in BT_CONNECT2 and send nothing. l2cap_security_cfm() then resolves it: on
failure the existing BT_CONNECT2 branch denies with L2CAP_CR_SEC_BLOCK; on
success, a channel the daemon already accepted is completed through the same
path a non-deferred accept takes (state -> BT_CONFIG, CONN_RSP SUCCESS +
CONF_REQ) rather than re-signalling an accept already made, so exactly one
CONN_RSP is sent per channel and the on-air sequence stays strictly monotonic
(AUTHEN_PEND, then AUTHOR_PEND for a not-yet-accepted channel, then SUCCESS).

Validated on an arm64 QEMU rig with a BR/EDR peer emulated over /dev/vhci:
with the patch, an early accept followed by a genuine Authentication_Complete
failure is answered with CONN_RSP result=3 (SEC_BLOCK) and no data is ever
delivered, identical to the non-deferred control; an early accept followed by
a successful (keyless) auth completes only after the security chain finishes,
with exactly one CONN_RSP SUCCESS and no trailing PEND; a deferred listener
that accepts only after the security resolves goes through the designed
CR_PEND -> recvmsg -> SUCCESS path with the link at the required level.

AI assistance was used in finding and preparing this patch.

Fixes: f66dc81f44d9 ("Bluetooth: Add support for deferring L2CAP connection setup")
Signed-off-by: Mohammed Alquraini <mohammed.saad.alquraini@gmail.com>
---
 include/net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h |  1 +
 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c        | 10 +++++++++-
 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c        |  7 +++++++
 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h b/include/net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h
--- a/include/net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h
+++ b/include/net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h
@@ -407,6 +407,7 @@
 	BT_SK_SUSPEND,
 	BT_SK_PKT_STATUS,
 	BT_SK_PKT_SEQNUM,
+	BT_SK_ACCEPTED,
 };

 struct bt_sock_list {
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
--- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
@@ -8011,7 +8011,15 @@
 			__u16 res, stat;

 			if (!status && l2cap_check_enc_key_size(hcon, chan)) {
-				if (test_bit(FLAG_DEFER_SETUP, &chan->flags)) {
+				bool deferred = test_bit(FLAG_DEFER_SETUP, &chan->flags);
+				struct sock *sk = chan->data;
+
+				/* Complete inline if the daemon accepted early. */
+				if (deferred && sk &&
+				    test_and_clear_bit(BT_SK_ACCEPTED, &bt_sk(sk)->flags))
+					deferred = false;
+
+				if (deferred) {
 					res = L2CAP_CR_PEND;
 					stat = L2CAP_CS_AUTHOR_PEND;
 					chan->ops->defer(chan);
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
--- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
@@ -1274,6 +1274,13 @@
 			release_sock(sk);
 			__l2cap_le_connect_rsp_defer(chan);
 		} else {
+			/* Defer completion until security resolves. */
+			if (!l2cap_chan_check_security(chan, false)) {
+				set_bit(BT_SK_ACCEPTED, &bt_sk(sk)->flags);
+				release_sock(sk);
+				l2cap_chan_unlock_conn(chan, have_conn);
+				return err;
+			}
 			sk->sk_state = BT_CONFIG;
 			chan->state = BT_CONFIG;
 			release_sock(sk);
--
2.43.0

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] Bluetooth: L2CAP: check security before completing a deferred BR/EDR accept
  2026-11-18 21:33 [PATCH] Bluetooth: L2CAP: check security before completing a deferred BR/EDR accept Mohammed Alquraini
@ 2026-11-18 23:04 ` Luiz Augusto von Dentz
  2026-11-19 10:01 ` kernel test robot
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz @ 2026-11-18 23:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Mohammed Alquraini; +Cc: linux-bluetooth, Marcel Holtmann, linux-kernel

Hi Mohammed,

On Wed, Nov 18, 2026 at 4:34 PM Mohammed Alquraini
<mohammed.saad.alquraini@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> A BR/EDR L2CAP service that listens with BT_DEFER_SETUP asks the kernel to
> enforce its BT_SECURITY level and only decides which peer to admit. The
> deferred-accept completion path does not honour that.
>
> The child channel is placed on the parent's accept queue at CONN_REQ time and
> is reported pollable (bt_accept_poll() returns EPOLLIN for a BT_CONNECT2 child
> on a BT_DEFER_SETUP listener) before the link security procedure resolves.
> When userspace recvmsg()s the deferred child in that window, l2cap_sock_defer()
> moves the channel to BT_CONFIG and __l2cap_connect_rsp_defer() replies
> L2CAP_CR_SUCCESS with no security check. If the security procedure then fails,
> l2cap_security_cfm() has no branch that matches a failed result on a BT_CONFIG
> channel, so the channel is never torn down: a peer that failed the service's
> required security level keeps a connected, data-passing channel.
>
> The sibling setsockopt(BT_SECURITY) path already rechecks with
> l2cap_chan_check_security(), and the non-deferred incoming path denies with
> L2CAP_CR_SEC_BLOCK; only the BR/EDR basic/ERTM deferred-accept path was
> missed. This is the BR/EDR counterpart of commit 522e9ed157e3 ("Bluetooth:
> l2cap: Check encryption key size on incoming connection").

That is encryption key size, not security level, and why is it
mentioned here and doesn't have a Fixes tag if that was missed?

> Gate the deferred completion on the security state. In l2cap_sock_defer(),
> before completing a BR/EDR deferred accept, call l2cap_chan_check_security();
> if the level is not yet met, mark the socket BT_SK_ACCEPTED, leave the channel
> in BT_CONNECT2 and send nothing. l2cap_security_cfm() then resolves it: on
> failure the existing BT_CONNECT2 branch denies with L2CAP_CR_SEC_BLOCK; on
> success, a channel the daemon already accepted is completed through the same
> path a non-deferred accept takes (state -> BT_CONFIG, CONN_RSP SUCCESS +
> CONF_REQ) rather than re-signalling an accept already made, so exactly one
> CONN_RSP is sent per channel and the on-air sequence stays strictly monotonic
> (AUTHEN_PEND, then AUTHOR_PEND for a not-yet-accepted channel, then SUCCESS).
>
> Validated on an arm64 QEMU rig with a BR/EDR peer emulated over /dev/vhci:
> with the patch, an early accept followed by a genuine Authentication_Complete
> failure is answered with CONN_RSP result=3 (SEC_BLOCK) and no data is ever
> delivered, identical to the non-deferred control; an early accept followed by
> a successful (keyless) auth completes only after the security chain finishes,
> with exactly one CONN_RSP SUCCESS and no trailing PEND; a deferred listener
> that accepts only after the security resolves goes through the designed
> CR_PEND -> recvmsg -> SUCCESS path with the link at the required level.
>
> AI assistance was used in finding and preparing this patch.
>
> Fixes: f66dc81f44d9 ("Bluetooth: Add support for deferring L2CAP connection setup")
> Signed-off-by: Mohammed Alquraini <mohammed.saad.alquraini@gmail.com>
> ---
>  include/net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h |  1 +
>  net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c        | 10 +++++++++-
>  net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c        |  7 +++++++
>  3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h b/include/net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h
> --- a/include/net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h
> +++ b/include/net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h
> @@ -407,6 +407,7 @@
>         BT_SK_SUSPEND,
>         BT_SK_PKT_STATUS,
>         BT_SK_PKT_SEQNUM,
> +       BT_SK_ACCEPTED,
>  };
>
>  struct bt_sock_list {
> diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
> --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
> +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
> @@ -8011,7 +8011,15 @@
>                         __u16 res, stat;
>
>                         if (!status && l2cap_check_enc_key_size(hcon, chan)) {
> -                               if (test_bit(FLAG_DEFER_SETUP, &chan->flags)) {
> +                               bool deferred = test_bit(FLAG_DEFER_SETUP, &chan->flags);
> +                               struct sock *sk = chan->data;
> +
> +                               /* Complete inline if the daemon accepted early. */
> +                               if (deferred && sk &&
> +                                   test_and_clear_bit(BT_SK_ACCEPTED, &bt_sk(sk)->flags))
> +                                       deferred = false;

I read this thru a couple of times and I still don't get how can you
get !status when security hasn't completed? Are you perhaps forcing
invalid behavior from the controller or something similar?

> +                               if (deferred) {
>                                         res = L2CAP_CR_PEND;
>                                         stat = L2CAP_CS_AUTHOR_PEND;
>                                         chan->ops->defer(chan);
> diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
> --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
> +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
> @@ -1274,6 +1274,13 @@
>                         release_sock(sk);
>                         __l2cap_le_connect_rsp_defer(chan);
>                 } else {
> +                       /* Defer completion until security resolves. */
> +                       if (!l2cap_chan_check_security(chan, false)) {
> +                               set_bit(BT_SK_ACCEPTED, &bt_sk(sk)->flags);
> +                               release_sock(sk);
> +                               l2cap_chan_unlock_conn(chan, have_conn);
> +                               return err;
> +                       }

Why wouldn't we do it earlier? This is too late, the userspace has
been awaken by the likes of l2cap_sock_defer_cb when the client socket
should really have been rejected not accepted.

>                         sk->sk_state = BT_CONFIG;
>                         chan->state = BT_CONFIG;
>                         release_sock(sk);
> --
> 2.43.0



-- 
Luiz Augusto von Dentz

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] Bluetooth: L2CAP: check security before completing a deferred BR/EDR accept
  2026-11-18 21:33 [PATCH] Bluetooth: L2CAP: check security before completing a deferred BR/EDR accept Mohammed Alquraini
  2026-11-18 23:04 ` Luiz Augusto von Dentz
@ 2026-11-19 10:01 ` kernel test robot
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: kernel test robot @ 2026-11-19 10:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Mohammed Alquraini, linux-bluetooth
  Cc: llvm, oe-kbuild-all, Marcel Holtmann, Luiz Augusto von Dentz,
	linux-kernel, Mohammed Alquraini

Hi Mohammed,

kernel test robot noticed the following build warnings:

[auto build test WARNING on bluetooth/master]
[also build test WARNING on bluetooth-next/master linus/master v7.4-rc3 next-20261116]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch#_base_tree_information]

url:    https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Mohammed-Alquraini/Bluetooth-L2CAP-check-security-before-completing-a-deferred-BR-EDR-accept/20261119-003322
base:   https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bluetooth/bluetooth.git master
patch link:    https://lore.kernel.org/r/20261118213322.60067-1-mohammed.saad.alquraini%40gmail.com
patch subject: [PATCH] Bluetooth: L2CAP: check security before completing a deferred BR/EDR accept
config: loongarch-defconfig (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20261119/202611191741.wWf1jeoY-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: clang version 24.0.0git (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project 3b14d7c370558b46e5f0c6494a05c492e59bf32c)
reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20261119/202611191741.wWf1jeoY-lkp@intel.com/reproduce)

If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of
the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
| Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202611191741.wWf1jeoY-lkp@intel.com/

All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>):

>> net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1256:14: warning: acquiring mutex 'sk->chan->conn->lock' that is already held [-Wthread-safety-analysis]
    1256 |         have_conn = l2cap_chan_lock_conn(chan);
         |                     ^
   net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1256:14: note: mutex acquired here
>> net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1281:5: warning: mutex 'sk->chan->conn->lock' is not held on every path through here [-Wthread-safety-analysis]
    1281 |                                 l2cap_chan_unlock_conn(chan, have_conn);
         |                                 ^
   include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h:1016:2: note: expanded from macro 'l2cap_chan_unlock_conn'
    1016 |         ({                                                              \
         |         ^
   net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1256:14: note: mutex acquired here
    1256 |         have_conn = l2cap_chan_lock_conn(chan);
         |                     ^
   2 warnings generated.


vim +1256 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c

ce60b9231b66710 Sebastian Urban        2024-05-01  1241  
32d86e048d8efed Pauli Virtanen         2026-08-29  1242  static int l2cap_sock_defer(struct sock *sk)
6898325923f9571 Gustavo Padovan        2011-02-04  1243  {
32d86e048d8efed Pauli Virtanen         2026-08-29  1244  	struct l2cap_chan *chan = l2cap_pi(sk)->chan;
32d86e048d8efed Pauli Virtanen         2026-08-29  1245  	bool have_conn;
32d86e048d8efed Pauli Virtanen         2026-08-29  1246  	int err = 0;
6898325923f9571 Gustavo Padovan        2011-02-04  1247  
32d86e048d8efed Pauli Virtanen         2026-08-29  1248  	/* Fast path check */
32d86e048d8efed Pauli Virtanen         2026-08-29  1249  	lock_sock(sk);
32d86e048d8efed Pauli Virtanen         2026-08-29  1250  	if (sk->sk_state != BT_CONNECT2) {
32d86e048d8efed Pauli Virtanen         2026-08-29  1251  		release_sock(sk);
32d86e048d8efed Pauli Virtanen         2026-08-29  1252  		return 0;
32d86e048d8efed Pauli Virtanen         2026-08-29  1253  	}
32d86e048d8efed Pauli Virtanen         2026-08-29  1254  	release_sock(sk);
11770f41b8a7e12 Pauli Virtanen         2025-03-18  1255  
32d86e048d8efed Pauli Virtanen         2026-08-29 @1256  	have_conn = l2cap_chan_lock_conn(chan);
6898325923f9571 Gustavo Padovan        2011-02-04  1257  	lock_sock(sk);
6898325923f9571 Gustavo Padovan        2011-02-04  1258  
c5daa683f2d3315 Gustavo Padovan        2012-05-16  1259  	if (sk->sk_state == BT_CONNECT2 && test_bit(BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP,
c5daa683f2d3315 Gustavo Padovan        2012-05-16  1260  						    &bt_sk(sk)->flags)) {
32d86e048d8efed Pauli Virtanen         2026-08-29  1261  		err = 1;
32d86e048d8efed Pauli Virtanen         2026-08-29  1262  
32d86e048d8efed Pauli Virtanen         2026-08-29  1263  		if (!have_conn) {
32d86e048d8efed Pauli Virtanen         2026-08-29  1264  			release_sock(sk);
32d86e048d8efed Pauli Virtanen         2026-08-29  1265  			err = -ENOTCONN;
32d86e048d8efed Pauli Virtanen         2026-08-29  1266  		} else if (chan->mode == L2CAP_MODE_EXT_FLOWCTL) {
15f02b91056253e Luiz Augusto von Dentz 2020-03-02  1267  			sk->sk_state = BT_CONNECTED;
32d86e048d8efed Pauli Virtanen         2026-08-29  1268  			chan->state = BT_CONNECTED;
32d86e048d8efed Pauli Virtanen         2026-08-29  1269  			release_sock(sk);
32d86e048d8efed Pauli Virtanen         2026-08-29  1270  			__l2cap_ecred_conn_rsp_defer(chan);
32d86e048d8efed Pauli Virtanen         2026-08-29  1271  		} else if (bdaddr_type_is_le(chan->src_type)) {
3831971355d901c Johan Hedberg          2013-05-17  1272  			sk->sk_state = BT_CONNECTED;
32d86e048d8efed Pauli Virtanen         2026-08-29  1273  			chan->state = BT_CONNECTED;
32d86e048d8efed Pauli Virtanen         2026-08-29  1274  			release_sock(sk);
32d86e048d8efed Pauli Virtanen         2026-08-29  1275  			__l2cap_le_connect_rsp_defer(chan);
3831971355d901c Johan Hedberg          2013-05-17  1276  		} else {
e9a22bfeb7fdd1c Mohammed Alquraini     2026-11-19  1277  			/* Defer completion until security resolves. */
e9a22bfeb7fdd1c Mohammed Alquraini     2026-11-19  1278  			if (!l2cap_chan_check_security(chan, false)) {
e9a22bfeb7fdd1c Mohammed Alquraini     2026-11-19  1279  				set_bit(BT_SK_ACCEPTED, &bt_sk(sk)->flags);
e9a22bfeb7fdd1c Mohammed Alquraini     2026-11-19  1280  				release_sock(sk);
e9a22bfeb7fdd1c Mohammed Alquraini     2026-11-19 @1281  				l2cap_chan_unlock_conn(chan, have_conn);
e9a22bfeb7fdd1c Mohammed Alquraini     2026-11-19  1282  				return err;
e9a22bfeb7fdd1c Mohammed Alquraini     2026-11-19  1283  			}
8c1d787be4b62d2 Gustavo Padovan        2011-04-13  1284  			sk->sk_state = BT_CONFIG;
32d86e048d8efed Pauli Virtanen         2026-08-29  1285  			chan->state = BT_CONFIG;
32d86e048d8efed Pauli Virtanen         2026-08-29  1286  			release_sock(sk);
32d86e048d8efed Pauli Virtanen         2026-08-29  1287  			__l2cap_connect_rsp_defer(chan);
32d86e048d8efed Pauli Virtanen         2026-08-29  1288  		}
32d86e048d8efed Pauli Virtanen         2026-08-29  1289  	} else {
32d86e048d8efed Pauli Virtanen         2026-08-29  1290  		release_sock(sk);
3831971355d901c Johan Hedberg          2013-05-17  1291  	}
3831971355d901c Johan Hedberg          2013-05-17  1292  
32d86e048d8efed Pauli Virtanen         2026-08-29  1293  	l2cap_chan_unlock_conn(chan, have_conn);
32d86e048d8efed Pauli Virtanen         2026-08-29  1294  	return err;
6898325923f9571 Gustavo Padovan        2011-02-04  1295  }
6898325923f9571 Gustavo Padovan        2011-02-04  1296  

-- 
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2026-11-19 10:02 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2026-11-18 21:33 [PATCH] Bluetooth: L2CAP: check security before completing a deferred BR/EDR accept Mohammed Alquraini
2026-11-18 23:04 ` Luiz Augusto von Dentz
2026-11-19 10:01 ` kernel test robot

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