From: Anastasios Papagiannis <tasos.papagiannnis@gmail.com>
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com,
jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, brauner@kernel.org,
viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, jack@suse.cz, ast@kernel.org,
daniel@iogearbox.net, andrii@kernel.org, kpsingh@kernel.org,
matt@bobrowski.net, eddyz87@gmail.com,
tasos.papagiannnis@gmail.com
Subject: [RFC PATCH 1/2] security: Add hook for unresolved pathname opens
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2026 11:48:19 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261120094820.11929-2-tasos.papagiannnis@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261120094820.11929-1-tasos.papagiannnis@gmail.com>
Check the copied pathname against the selected base before traversal or
file changes, including O_PATH and O_TMPFILE.
Pass lookup flags so policy can request a referenced retry. Recheck the
base after each restart and cover kernel opens with an explicit root.
Signed-off-by: Anastasios Papagiannis <tasos.papagiannnis@gmail.com>
---
fs/namei.c | 15 +++++++++++++--
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 ++
include/linux/security.h | 10 ++++++++++
security/security.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 925aeb63bfa1..fde11d36d434 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -749,6 +749,7 @@ struct nameidata {
} *stack, internal[EMBEDDED_LEVELS];
struct filename *name;
const char *pathname;
+ const struct open_flags *open;
struct nameidata *saved;
unsigned root_seq;
int dfd;
@@ -768,6 +769,7 @@ static void __set_nameidata(struct nameidata *p, int dfd, struct filename *name)
p->dfd = dfd;
p->name = name;
p->pathname = likely(name) ? name->name : "";
+ p->open = NULL;
p->path.mnt = NULL;
p->path.dentry = NULL;
p->total_link_count = old ? old->total_link_count : 0;
@@ -2716,7 +2718,7 @@ static const char *path_init(struct nameidata *nd, unsigned flags)
} else {
path_get(&nd->path);
}
- return s;
+ goto out;
}
nd->root.mnt = NULL;
@@ -2726,7 +2728,7 @@ static const char *path_init(struct nameidata *nd, unsigned flags)
error = nd_jump_root(nd);
if (unlikely(error))
return ERR_PTR(error);
- return s;
+ goto out;
}
/* Relative pathname -- get the starting-point it is relative to. */
@@ -2784,6 +2786,14 @@ static const char *path_init(struct nameidata *nd, unsigned flags)
nd->state |= ND_ROOT_GRABBED;
}
}
+out:
+ if (nd->open) {
+ error = security_file_open_name(nd->name, &nd->path,
+ nd->open->open_flag, nd->open->mode,
+ nd->flags);
+ if (error)
+ return ERR_PTR(error);
+ }
return s;
}
@@ -4999,6 +5009,7 @@ static struct file *path_openat(struct nameidata *nd,
struct file *file;
int error;
+ nd->open = op;
file = alloc_empty_file(op->open_flag, current_cred());
if (IS_ERR(file))
return file;
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index 87d9d06710cb..3537f2b73d8c 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -213,6 +213,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, file_set_fowner, struct file *file)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_send_sigiotask, struct task_struct *tsk,
struct fown_struct *fown, int sig)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_receive, struct file *file)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_open_name, const struct filename *name,
+ const struct path *base, int flags, umode_t mode, unsigned int lookup_flags)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_open, struct file *file)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_post_open, struct file *file, int mask)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_truncate, struct file *file)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 40831fab5470..e6c66cf1cd1c 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -498,6 +498,9 @@ void security_file_set_fowner(struct file *file);
int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct fown_struct *fown, int sig);
int security_file_receive(struct file *file);
+int security_file_open_name(const struct filename *name,
+ const struct path *base, int flags, umode_t mode,
+ unsigned int lookup_flags);
int security_file_open(struct file *file);
int security_file_post_open(struct file *file, int mask);
int security_file_truncate(struct file *file);
@@ -1238,6 +1241,13 @@ static inline int security_file_receive(struct file *file)
return 0;
}
+static inline int security_file_open_name(const struct filename *name,
+ const struct path *base, int flags, umode_t mode,
+ unsigned int lookup_flags)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
static inline int security_file_open(struct file *file)
{
return 0;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index f6583d507395..d265f9347791 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2742,6 +2742,33 @@ int security_file_receive(struct file *file)
return call_int_hook(file_receive, file);
}
+/**
+ * security_file_open_name() - Authorize a pathname open before lookup
+ * @name: kernel copy of the unresolved pathname, which may be empty
+ * @base: starting path selected by the lookup
+ * @flags: effective open flags
+ * @mode: creation mode, including the file type, before applying the umask
+ * @lookup_flags: current pathname lookup flags, including LOOKUP_RCU
+ *
+ * Check the original pathname before lookup, creation, or opening the file.
+ * @base is the starting path for this attempt, or the file itself for an empty
+ * pathname. This hook also covers O_PATH and io_uring opens.
+ *
+ * This hook must not sleep. @name and @base are borrowed for the call. With
+ * LOOKUP_RCU, @base is RCU-protected; otherwise it holds path references.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 to allow the open or -EACCES or -EPERM to deny it.
+ * During RCU walk, -ECHILD requests a referenced retry. A cached-only
+ * lookup returns -EAGAIN instead.
+ */
+int security_file_open_name(const struct filename *name,
+ const struct path *base, int flags, umode_t mode,
+ unsigned int lookup_flags)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(file_open_name, name, base, flags, mode,
+ lookup_flags);
+}
+
/**
* security_file_open() - Save open() time state for late use by the LSM
* @file:
--
2.56.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-20 9:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-20 9:48 [RFC PATCH 0/2] security: Add pre-lookup pathname open check Anastasios Papagiannis
2026-11-20 9:48 ` Anastasios Papagiannis [this message]
2026-11-20 10:44 ` [RFC PATCH 1/2] security: Add hook for unresolved pathname opens bot+bpf-ci
2026-11-20 9:48 ` [RFC PATCH 2/2] selftests/bpf: Test pathname open enforcement Anastasios Papagiannis
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