* [PATCH v8 0/2] crypto: caam - Fix RSA error-path unmap and unaligned dst buffers
@ 2026-11-20 12:37 Changwei Zou
2026-11-20 12:37 ` [PATCH v8 1/2] crypto: caam - Fix wrong unmap operations Changwei Zou
2026-11-20 12:37 ` [PATCH v8 2/2] crypto: caam - Use bounce buffer for unaligned RSA destination buffers Changwei Zou
0 siblings, 2 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Changwei Zou @ 2026-11-20 12:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: herbert, sahil.malhotra
Cc: davem, horia.geanta, pankaj.gupta, gaurav.jain, jeffbarnes,
stephane.debusne, iuliana.prodan, martin.kepplinger-novakovic,
lukas, sahil.malhotra, changwei.zou, linux-crypto, linux-kernel
This series fixes two issues in the rsa-caam driver.
Patch 1 fixes wrong unmap operations where rsa_pub_unmap() was called
regardless of the key type.
Patch 2 adds a bounce buffer to handle unaligned RSA destination
buffers on DMA-incoherent hardware such as i.MX8, fixing intermittent
-EKEYREJECTED errors when loading signed kernel modules.
AI assistance disclosure (per Documentation/process/generated-content.rst):
the OpenCode agent (claude-sonnet-4.6) was used to help analyse the code
paths, draft parts of the changes and the changelogs.
Changes in v8:
- Patch 2: Add Fixes: 8c419778ab57 ("crypto: caam - add support for RSA
algorithm").
Changes in v7:
- Rebase onto the current tree; v6 no longer applied after the upstream
caam_rsa_set_priv_key_form() changes (a91d9346a70b, 828c3b265b6d). No
code changes.
- Drop the non-standard "Assisted-by:" trailer from both patches; it is
not a recognised trailer (and fails checkpatch), and the AI assistance
is disclosed in this cover letter instead.
- Pick up Reviewed-by from Sahil Malhotra on both patches.
Changes in v6:
- Patch 1: Factor the priv_form switch into rsa_priv_unmap(), shared by
rsa_priv_f_done() and rsa_pdb_unmap(), removing the duplicated switch.
- Patch 2: Hoist req_ctx to function scope in set_rsa_priv_f{1,2,3}_pdb(),
removing the duplicate block-local declarations in the src/dst branches.
Changes in v5:
- Patch 1: Factor the public/FORM1/FORM2/FORM3 error-path unmap dispatch
into rsa_pdb_unmap(), so akcipher_do_one_req() and akcipher_enqueue_req()
no longer open-code it twice (Sahil).
- Patch 2: Do not overwrite the caller's req->dst. Use req_ctx->fixup_dst
for the DMA side (mirroring fixup_src) and drop the orig_dst/restore
logic (Sahil). Expand the commit message to identify the caller that
hands in the misaligned dst (rsassa_pkcs1_verify() /
crypto_akcipher_sync_prep()) and why the DMA API does not bounce it.
Changes in v4:
- Patch 2: Describe the bounce scatterlist with the aligned allocation
size (ALIGN(dst_len, dma_get_cache_alignment())) instead of the
possibly-unaligned dst_len. Otherwise, on
CONFIG_DMA_BOUNCE_UNALIGNED_KMALLOC systems, dma_map_sg() evaluates
sg->length and can treat the already aligned bounce buffer as
unaligned, bouncing it again via swiotlb or failing with -ENOMEM.
Changes in v3:
- Patch 1: Dispatch the error-path unmap on the operation (the completion
callback rsa_pub_done vs rsa_priv_f_done) instead of key->d, so the
unmap always matches the map.
- Patch 2: Bound the bounce-buffer copy-back to the RSA output size
(key->n_sz) instead of the full dst_len, so the trailing capacity of
the caller's destination buffer is left untouched; add Tested-by from
Stephane Debusne.
Changes in v2:
- Patch 1: Add Fixes: tag; pick up Reviewed-by from Sahil Malhotra.
- Patch 2: Move the !bounce_buf check out of do_rsa_bounce_buf() into
the caller rsa_bounce_buf_done() so the helper is only entered when a
bounce buffer actually exists; add Reported-by/Closes and Tested-by
from Martin Kepplinger-Novakovic.
Link to v7:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/20261120110525.1170175-1-changwei.zou@canonical.com/
Link to v6:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/20261114060032.872141-1-changwei.zou@canonical.com/
Link to v5:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/20261113113650.63038-1-changwei.zou@canonical.com/
Link to v4:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/20261111230221.40297-1-changwei.zou@canonical.com/
Link to v3:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/20261020025426.955531-1-changwei.zou@canonical.com/
Link to v2:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/20261004210200.290119-1-changwei.zou@canonical.com/
Link to v1:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/20260821045555.806471-1-changwei.zou@canonical.com/
Changwei Zou (2):
crypto: caam - Fix wrong unmap operations
crypto: caam - Use bounce buffer for unaligned RSA destination buffers
drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c | 177 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.h | 7 ++
2 files changed, 142 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v8 1/2] crypto: caam - Fix wrong unmap operations
2026-11-20 12:37 [PATCH v8 0/2] crypto: caam - Fix RSA error-path unmap and unaligned dst buffers Changwei Zou
@ 2026-11-20 12:37 ` Changwei Zou
2026-11-20 12:37 ` [PATCH v8 2/2] crypto: caam - Use bounce buffer for unaligned RSA destination buffers Changwei Zou
1 sibling, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Changwei Zou @ 2026-11-20 12:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: herbert, sahil.malhotra
Cc: davem, horia.geanta, pankaj.gupta, gaurav.jain, jeffbarnes,
stephane.debusne, iuliana.prodan, martin.kepplinger-novakovic,
lukas, sahil.malhotra, changwei.zou, linux-crypto, linux-kernel
Since priv_form only takes values FORM1/FORM2/FORM3 with no distinct
public key enumerator, rsa_pub_unmap() was not called correctly in
akcipher_do_one_req() and akcipher_enqueue_req().
Use the completion callback (rsa_pub_done vs rsa_priv_f_done) to
distinguish public from private key operations, then dispatch to the
correct unmap function based on key->priv_form. Factor the priv_form
switch into rsa_priv_unmap() and the public/private dispatch into
rsa_pdb_unmap(), so rsa_priv_f_done() and both error paths share one
implementation.
caam_rsa_set_priv_key_form() implicitly relies on zero-initialization
for priv_form. Set priv_form = FORM1 explicitly at the head of the function
for clarity and robustness.
Fixes: bf53795025a2 ("crypto: caam - add crypto_engine support for RSA algorithms")
Signed-off-by: Changwei Zou <changwei.zou@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Sahil Malhotra <sahil.malhotra@nxp.com>
---
drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++--------------
1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c
index 2082adaae585..4b5397f2ca64 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c
@@ -119,6 +119,23 @@ static void rsa_priv_f3_unmap(struct device *dev, struct rsa_edesc *edesc,
dma_unmap_single(dev, pdb->tmp2_dma, q_sz, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
}
+static inline void rsa_priv_unmap(struct device *dev, struct rsa_edesc *edesc,
+ struct akcipher_request *req,
+ struct caam_rsa_key *key)
+{
+ switch (key->priv_form) {
+ case FORM1:
+ rsa_priv_f1_unmap(dev, edesc, req);
+ break;
+ case FORM2:
+ rsa_priv_f2_unmap(dev, edesc, req);
+ break;
+ case FORM3:
+ rsa_priv_f3_unmap(dev, edesc, req);
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
/* RSA Job Completion handler */
static void rsa_pub_done(struct device *dev, u32 *desc, u32 err, void *context)
{
@@ -168,16 +185,7 @@ static void rsa_priv_f_done(struct device *dev, u32 *desc, u32 err,
edesc = req_ctx->edesc;
has_bklog = edesc->bklog;
- switch (key->priv_form) {
- case FORM1:
- rsa_priv_f1_unmap(dev, edesc, req);
- break;
- case FORM2:
- rsa_priv_f2_unmap(dev, edesc, req);
- break;
- case FORM3:
- rsa_priv_f3_unmap(dev, edesc, req);
- }
+ rsa_priv_unmap(dev, edesc, req, key);
rsa_io_unmap(dev, edesc, req);
kfree(edesc);
@@ -192,6 +200,22 @@ static void rsa_priv_f_done(struct device *dev, u32 *desc, u32 err,
crypto_finalize_akcipher_request(jrp->engine, req, ecode);
}
+static void rsa_pdb_unmap(struct device *jrdev, struct rsa_edesc *edesc,
+ struct akcipher_request *req,
+ void (*cbk)(struct device *jrdev, u32 *desc,
+ u32 err, void *context))
+{
+ if (cbk == rsa_pub_done) {
+ rsa_pub_unmap(jrdev, edesc, req);
+ } else {
+ struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
+ struct caam_rsa_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx_dma(tfm);
+ struct caam_rsa_key *key = &ctx->key;
+
+ rsa_priv_unmap(jrdev, edesc, req, key);
+ }
+}
+
/**
* caam_rsa_count_leading_zeros - Count leading zeros, need it to strip,
* from a given scatterlist
@@ -391,7 +415,8 @@ static int akcipher_do_one_req(struct crypto_engine *engine, void *areq)
return ret;
if (ret != -EINPROGRESS) {
- rsa_pub_unmap(jrdev, req_ctx->edesc, req);
+ rsa_pdb_unmap(jrdev, req_ctx->edesc, req,
+ req_ctx->akcipher_op_done);
rsa_io_unmap(jrdev, req_ctx->edesc, req);
kfree(req_ctx->edesc);
} else {
@@ -670,9 +695,6 @@ static int akcipher_enqueue_req(struct device *jrdev,
struct akcipher_request *req)
{
struct caam_drv_private_jr *jrpriv = dev_get_drvdata(jrdev);
- struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
- struct caam_rsa_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx_dma(tfm);
- struct caam_rsa_key *key = &ctx->key;
struct caam_rsa_req_ctx *req_ctx = akcipher_request_ctx(req);
struct rsa_edesc *edesc = req_ctx->edesc;
u32 *desc = edesc->hw_desc;
@@ -691,19 +713,7 @@ static int akcipher_enqueue_req(struct device *jrdev,
ret = caam_jr_enqueue(jrdev, desc, cbk, req);
if ((ret != -EINPROGRESS) && (ret != -EBUSY)) {
- switch (key->priv_form) {
- case FORM1:
- rsa_priv_f1_unmap(jrdev, edesc, req);
- break;
- case FORM2:
- rsa_priv_f2_unmap(jrdev, edesc, req);
- break;
- case FORM3:
- rsa_priv_f3_unmap(jrdev, edesc, req);
- break;
- default:
- rsa_pub_unmap(jrdev, edesc, req);
- }
+ rsa_pdb_unmap(jrdev, edesc, req, cbk);
rsa_io_unmap(jrdev, edesc, req);
kfree(edesc);
}
@@ -993,6 +1003,8 @@ static int caam_rsa_set_priv_key_form(struct caam_rsa_ctx *ctx,
unsigned aligned_size;
int ret;
+ rsa_key->priv_form = FORM1;
+
rsa_key->p = caam_read_raw_data(raw_key->p, &p_sz);
if (!rsa_key->p)
return -ENOMEM;
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v8 2/2] crypto: caam - Use bounce buffer for unaligned RSA destination buffers
2026-11-20 12:37 [PATCH v8 0/2] crypto: caam - Fix RSA error-path unmap and unaligned dst buffers Changwei Zou
2026-11-20 12:37 ` [PATCH v8 1/2] crypto: caam - Fix wrong unmap operations Changwei Zou
@ 2026-11-20 12:37 ` Changwei Zou
1 sibling, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Changwei Zou @ 2026-11-20 12:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: herbert, sahil.malhotra
Cc: davem, horia.geanta, pankaj.gupta, gaurav.jain, jeffbarnes,
stephane.debusne, iuliana.prodan, martin.kepplinger-novakovic,
lukas, sahil.malhotra, changwei.zou, linux-crypto, linux-kernel,
Martin Kepplinger-Novakovic
The rsa-caam driver directly DMA-maps the destination buffer supplied by
the caller via req->dst without checking whether it meets the cacheline
alignment requirements of DMA-incoherent hardware such as i.MX8.
On CPUs with non-coherent DMA caches, if the destination buffer shares a
cacheline with other data (i.e. it is not cacheline-aligned), cache
writeback/invalidation during DMA can corrupt adjacent memory or cause
stale data to be read back. This manifests as intermittent -EKEYREJECTED
errors when loading signed kernel modules.
Such a destination is produced in the module-signature verification path
by rsassa_pkcs1_verify() (and crypto_akcipher_sync_prep()), which place
the I/O buffer right after the request context in a single kmalloc()
allocation; the buffer therefore starts at an offset into a larger
allocation and shares a cacheline with that context. The DMA API does not
cover this: on CONFIG_DMA_BOUNCE_UNALIGNED_KMALLOC systems
dma_kmalloc_needs_bounce() only considers the buffer size, not its offset,
so a buffer that is size-wise DMA-safe but starts at a non-cacheline-
aligned offset is not bounced. The driver must detect and bounce it.
When any segment of req->dst is not cacheline-aligned in either its start
offset or length, allocate a single contiguous aligned bounce buffer
(dst_len rounded up to a cacheline multiple) and run the operation on it
via req_ctx->fixup_dst, leaving the caller's req->dst untouched. The RSA
output (key->n_sz bytes) is copied back to req->dst once the hardware has
completed successfully.
Introduce a helper sg_is_dma_aligned() that checks both sg->offset and
sg->length for cacheline alignment. Checking sg->offset suffices for
the start address since physical pages are always page-aligned and
PAGE_SIZE is a multiple of dma_get_cache_alignment(). sg->length is
also checked to ensure the buffer end does not share a cacheline with
adjacent memory.
The bounce scatterlist is described with the aligned allocation size, not
the possibly-unaligned dst_len, so that dma_map_sg() does not re-bounce or
reject it on CONFIG_DMA_BOUNCE_UNALIGNED_KMALLOC systems.
The intermittent error 'Key was rejected by service' on i.MX8 with CAAM
can be triggered when loading signed kernel modules:
for i in $(seq 1 100); do
sudo modprobe xfs 2>&1 && echo "SUCCESS on attempt $i" \
&& sudo rmmod xfs || echo "FAILED on attempt $i"
done
Fixes: 8c419778ab57 ("crypto: caam - add support for RSA algorithm")
Reported-by: Martin Kepplinger-Novakovic <Martin.Kepplinger-Novakovic@ginzinger.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/6029acc0f0ddfe25e2537c2866d54fd7f54bc182.camel@ginzinger.com
Signed-off-by: Changwei Zou <changwei.zou@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Martin Kepplinger-Novakovic <martin.kepplinger-novakovic@ginzinger.com>
Tested-by: Stephane Debusne <stephane.debusne@cynove.com>
Reviewed-by: Sahil Malhotra <sahil.malhotra@nxp.com>
---
drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c | 111 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.h | 7 +++
2 files changed, 103 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c
index 4b5397f2ca64..4f381b5010ab 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ static void rsa_io_unmap(struct device *dev, struct rsa_edesc *edesc,
{
struct caam_rsa_req_ctx *req_ctx = akcipher_request_ctx(req);
- dma_unmap_sg(dev, req->dst, edesc->dst_nents, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
+ dma_unmap_sg(dev, req_ctx->fixup_dst, edesc->dst_nents, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
dma_unmap_sg(dev, req_ctx->fixup_src, edesc->src_nents, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
if (edesc->sec4_sg_bytes)
@@ -59,6 +59,49 @@ static void rsa_io_unmap(struct device *dev, struct rsa_edesc *edesc,
DMA_TO_DEVICE);
}
+static int do_rsa_bounce_buf(struct akcipher_request *req,
+ struct caam_rsa_req_ctx *req_ctx, int req_err)
+{
+ struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
+ struct caam_rsa_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx_dma(tfm);
+ struct caam_rsa_key *key = &ctx->key;
+ int nents, err = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Only copy back to the destination on success, and only the actual
+ * RSA output (key->n_sz bytes) rather than the full dst_len, so the
+ * trailing capacity of the caller's buffer is left untouched.
+ */
+ if (!req_err) {
+ nents = sg_nents_for_len(req->dst, key->n_sz);
+ if (nents < 0)
+ err = nents;
+ else if (sg_copy_from_buffer(req->dst, nents,
+ req_ctx->bounce_buf,
+ key->n_sz) != key->n_sz)
+ err = -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ kfree(req_ctx->bounce_buf);
+ req_ctx->bounce_buf = NULL;
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static inline void rsa_bounce_buf_done(struct akcipher_request *req, int *err)
+{
+ struct caam_rsa_req_ctx *req_ctx = akcipher_request_ctx(req);
+ int cperr;
+
+ if (!req_ctx->bounce_buf)
+ return;
+
+ cperr = do_rsa_bounce_buf(req, req_ctx, *err);
+
+ if (!*err)
+ *err = cperr;
+}
+
static void rsa_pub_unmap(struct device *dev, struct rsa_edesc *edesc,
struct akcipher_request *req)
{
@@ -155,6 +198,7 @@ static void rsa_pub_done(struct device *dev, u32 *desc, u32 err, void *context)
rsa_pub_unmap(dev, edesc, req);
rsa_io_unmap(dev, edesc, req);
kfree(edesc);
+ rsa_bounce_buf_done(req, &ecode);
/*
* If no backlog flag, the completion of the request is done
@@ -189,6 +233,7 @@ static void rsa_priv_f_done(struct device *dev, u32 *desc, u32 err,
rsa_io_unmap(dev, edesc, req);
kfree(edesc);
+ rsa_bounce_buf_done(req, &ecode);
/*
* If no backlog flag, the completion of the request is done
@@ -270,6 +315,12 @@ static int caam_rsa_count_leading_zeros(struct scatterlist *sgl,
return tbytes - nbytes;
}
+static inline bool sg_is_dma_aligned(struct scatterlist *sg)
+{
+ return IS_ALIGNED(sg->offset, dma_get_cache_alignment()) &&
+ IS_ALIGNED(sg->length, dma_get_cache_alignment());
+}
+
static struct rsa_edesc *rsa_edesc_alloc(struct akcipher_request *req,
size_t desclen)
{
@@ -315,13 +366,37 @@ static struct rsa_edesc *rsa_edesc_alloc(struct akcipher_request *req,
req_ctx->fixup_src_len);
dst_nents = sg_nents_for_len(req->dst, req->dst_len);
+ req_ctx->bounce_buf = NULL;
+ req_ctx->fixup_dst = req->dst;
+ if (req->dst_len > 0) {
+ struct scatterlist *sg;
+ int i;
+
+ for_each_sg(req->dst, sg, dst_nents, i) {
+ if (!sg_is_dma_aligned(sg)) {
+ unsigned int bounce_len =
+ ALIGN(req->dst_len,
+ dma_get_cache_alignment());
+
+ req_ctx->bounce_buf = kzalloc(bounce_len, flags);
+ if (!req_ctx->bounce_buf)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ sg_init_one(&req_ctx->dst, req_ctx->bounce_buf,
+ bounce_len);
+ req_ctx->fixup_dst = &req_ctx->dst;
+ dst_nents = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
mapped_src_nents = dma_map_sg(dev, req_ctx->fixup_src, src_nents,
DMA_TO_DEVICE);
if (unlikely(!mapped_src_nents)) {
dev_err(dev, "unable to map source\n");
- return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ goto bounce_fail;
}
- mapped_dst_nents = dma_map_sg(dev, req->dst, dst_nents,
+ mapped_dst_nents = dma_map_sg(dev, req_ctx->fixup_dst, dst_nents,
DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
if (unlikely(!mapped_dst_nents)) {
dev_err(dev, "unable to map destination\n");
@@ -356,7 +431,7 @@ static struct rsa_edesc *rsa_edesc_alloc(struct akcipher_request *req,
edesc->sec4_sg + !!diff_size, 0);
if (mapped_dst_nents > 1)
- sg_to_sec4_sg_last(req->dst, req->dst_len,
+ sg_to_sec4_sg_last(req_ctx->fixup_dst, req->dst_len,
edesc->sec4_sg + sec4_sg_index, 0);
/* Save nents for later use in Job Descriptor */
@@ -389,9 +464,12 @@ static struct rsa_edesc *rsa_edesc_alloc(struct akcipher_request *req,
sec4_sg_fail:
kfree(edesc);
dst_fail:
- dma_unmap_sg(dev, req->dst, dst_nents, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
+ dma_unmap_sg(dev, req_ctx->fixup_dst, dst_nents, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
src_fail:
dma_unmap_sg(dev, req_ctx->fixup_src, src_nents, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+bounce_fail:
+ kfree(req_ctx->bounce_buf);
+ req_ctx->bounce_buf = NULL;
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
@@ -419,6 +497,7 @@ static int akcipher_do_one_req(struct crypto_engine *engine, void *areq)
req_ctx->akcipher_op_done);
rsa_io_unmap(jrdev, req_ctx->edesc, req);
kfree(req_ctx->edesc);
+ rsa_bounce_buf_done(req, &ret);
} else {
ret = 0;
}
@@ -463,7 +542,7 @@ static int set_rsa_pub_pdb(struct akcipher_request *req,
pdb->g_dma = edesc->sec4_sg_dma +
sec4_sg_index * sizeof(struct sec4_sg_entry);
} else {
- pdb->g_dma = sg_dma_address(req->dst);
+ pdb->g_dma = sg_dma_address(req_ctx->fixup_dst);
}
pdb->sgf |= (key->e_sz << RSA_PDB_E_SHIFT) | key->n_sz;
@@ -476,6 +555,7 @@ static int set_rsa_priv_f1_pdb(struct akcipher_request *req,
struct rsa_edesc *edesc)
{
struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
+ struct caam_rsa_req_ctx *req_ctx = akcipher_request_ctx(req);
struct caam_rsa_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx_dma(tfm);
struct caam_rsa_key *key = &ctx->key;
struct device *dev = ctx->dev;
@@ -501,8 +581,6 @@ static int set_rsa_priv_f1_pdb(struct akcipher_request *req,
sec4_sg_index += edesc->mapped_src_nents;
} else {
- struct caam_rsa_req_ctx *req_ctx = akcipher_request_ctx(req);
-
pdb->g_dma = sg_dma_address(req_ctx->fixup_src);
}
@@ -511,7 +589,7 @@ static int set_rsa_priv_f1_pdb(struct akcipher_request *req,
pdb->f_dma = edesc->sec4_sg_dma +
sec4_sg_index * sizeof(struct sec4_sg_entry);
} else {
- pdb->f_dma = sg_dma_address(req->dst);
+ pdb->f_dma = sg_dma_address(req_ctx->fixup_dst);
}
pdb->sgf |= (key->d_sz << RSA_PDB_D_SHIFT) | key->n_sz;
@@ -523,6 +601,7 @@ static int set_rsa_priv_f2_pdb(struct akcipher_request *req,
struct rsa_edesc *edesc)
{
struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
+ struct caam_rsa_req_ctx *req_ctx = akcipher_request_ctx(req);
struct caam_rsa_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx_dma(tfm);
struct caam_rsa_key *key = &ctx->key;
struct device *dev = ctx->dev;
@@ -566,8 +645,6 @@ static int set_rsa_priv_f2_pdb(struct akcipher_request *req,
pdb->g_dma = edesc->sec4_sg_dma;
sec4_sg_index += edesc->mapped_src_nents;
} else {
- struct caam_rsa_req_ctx *req_ctx = akcipher_request_ctx(req);
-
pdb->g_dma = sg_dma_address(req_ctx->fixup_src);
}
@@ -576,7 +653,7 @@ static int set_rsa_priv_f2_pdb(struct akcipher_request *req,
pdb->f_dma = edesc->sec4_sg_dma +
sec4_sg_index * sizeof(struct sec4_sg_entry);
} else {
- pdb->f_dma = sg_dma_address(req->dst);
+ pdb->f_dma = sg_dma_address(req_ctx->fixup_dst);
}
pdb->sgf |= (key->d_sz << RSA_PDB_D_SHIFT) | key->n_sz;
@@ -600,6 +677,7 @@ static int set_rsa_priv_f3_pdb(struct akcipher_request *req,
struct rsa_edesc *edesc)
{
struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
+ struct caam_rsa_req_ctx *req_ctx = akcipher_request_ctx(req);
struct caam_rsa_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx_dma(tfm);
struct caam_rsa_key *key = &ctx->key;
struct device *dev = ctx->dev;
@@ -655,8 +733,6 @@ static int set_rsa_priv_f3_pdb(struct akcipher_request *req,
pdb->g_dma = edesc->sec4_sg_dma;
sec4_sg_index += edesc->mapped_src_nents;
} else {
- struct caam_rsa_req_ctx *req_ctx = akcipher_request_ctx(req);
-
pdb->g_dma = sg_dma_address(req_ctx->fixup_src);
}
@@ -665,7 +741,7 @@ static int set_rsa_priv_f3_pdb(struct akcipher_request *req,
pdb->f_dma = edesc->sec4_sg_dma +
sec4_sg_index * sizeof(struct sec4_sg_entry);
} else {
- pdb->f_dma = sg_dma_address(req->dst);
+ pdb->f_dma = sg_dma_address(req_ctx->fixup_dst);
}
pdb->sgf |= key->n_sz;
@@ -716,6 +792,7 @@ static int akcipher_enqueue_req(struct device *jrdev,
rsa_pdb_unmap(jrdev, edesc, req, cbk);
rsa_io_unmap(jrdev, edesc, req);
kfree(edesc);
+ rsa_bounce_buf_done(req, &ret);
}
return ret;
@@ -757,6 +834,7 @@ static int caam_rsa_enc(struct akcipher_request *req)
init_fail:
rsa_io_unmap(jrdev, edesc, req);
kfree(edesc);
+ rsa_bounce_buf_done(req, &ret);
return ret;
}
@@ -786,6 +864,7 @@ static int caam_rsa_dec_priv_f1(struct akcipher_request *req)
init_fail:
rsa_io_unmap(jrdev, edesc, req);
kfree(edesc);
+ rsa_bounce_buf_done(req, &ret);
return ret;
}
@@ -815,6 +894,7 @@ static int caam_rsa_dec_priv_f2(struct akcipher_request *req)
init_fail:
rsa_io_unmap(jrdev, edesc, req);
kfree(edesc);
+ rsa_bounce_buf_done(req, &ret);
return ret;
}
@@ -844,6 +924,7 @@ static int caam_rsa_dec_priv_f3(struct akcipher_request *req)
init_fail:
rsa_io_unmap(jrdev, edesc, req);
kfree(edesc);
+ rsa_bounce_buf_done(req, &ret);
return ret;
}
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.h b/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.h
index 96d03704c9be..8810bcc435cc 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.h
@@ -103,6 +103,10 @@ struct caam_rsa_ctx {
* @src : input scatterlist (stripped of leading zeros)
* @fixup_src : input scatterlist (that might be stripped of leading zeros)
* @fixup_src_len : length of the fixup_src input scatterlist
+ * @dst : bounce destination scatterlist (used when bouncing)
+ * @bounce_buf : DMA-aligned bounce buffer for destination (or NULL)
+ * @fixup_dst : destination scatterlist used for the hw operation
+ * (req->dst, or @dst when a bounce buffer is used)
* @edesc : s/w-extended rsa descriptor
* @akcipher_op_done : callback used when operation is done
*/
@@ -110,6 +114,9 @@ struct caam_rsa_req_ctx {
struct scatterlist src[2];
struct scatterlist *fixup_src;
unsigned int fixup_src_len;
+ struct scatterlist dst;
+ u8 *bounce_buf;
+ struct scatterlist *fixup_dst;
struct rsa_edesc *edesc;
void (*akcipher_op_done)(struct device *jrdev, u32 *desc, u32 err,
void *context);
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2026-11-20 12:37 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2026-11-20 12:37 [PATCH v8 0/2] crypto: caam - Fix RSA error-path unmap and unaligned dst buffers Changwei Zou
2026-11-20 12:37 ` [PATCH v8 1/2] crypto: caam - Fix wrong unmap operations Changwei Zou
2026-11-20 12:37 ` [PATCH v8 2/2] crypto: caam - Use bounce buffer for unaligned RSA destination buffers Changwei Zou
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