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From: "Baek Kyu, Kim" <pocj8ur4in@gmail.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: "Baek Kyu, Kim" <pocj8ur4in@gmail.com>,
	David Hildenbrand <david@kernel.org>,
	Lorenzo Stoakes <ljs@kernel.org>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2] mm/secretmem: Keep locked memory accounting until inode eviction
Date: Sun, 22 Nov 2026 01:40:20 +0900	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261121164020.1465498-1-pocj8ur4in@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261030152407.113568-1-pocj8ur4in@gmail.com>

A secretmem inode can outlive its original file. An O_PATH descriptor
opened through /proc/self/fd keeps the inode and its unevictable folios
alive after the mapping and original descriptor are closed. The file
release path nevertheless drops the locked-memory charge, allowing the
same user to reuse RLIMIT_MEMLOCK while those folios remain allocated.

Move private-state and locked-memory accounting cleanup to inode eviction,
after truncating the page cache. Keep secretmem_users active over the same
lifetime so that the hibernation guard covers retained secret pages.

Allocate private state before inode creation and release it if the
secure-inode helper fails. Attach it immediately after creation so
later failures can use iput() for cleanup. An LSM denial inside the
helper can call iput() before i_private is set; skip private cleanup
at eviction when i_private is NULL.

On arm64 QEMU with an 8 KiB RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, the original kernel allowed
an additional 4 KiB secretmem fault while O_PATH retained two pages.
v2 rejected that fault with SIGBUS and allowed it after O_PATH closed.
Injected LSM denial and file-allocation failure completed without a
crash; file-allocation cleanup returned secretmem_users to zero.
KASAN, lockdep, hibernation and long-running concurrency were not
tested in this v2 run.

Fixes: 97d34aa65c29 ("mm/secretmem: properly account locked pages")
Signed-off-by: Baek Kyu, Kim <pocj8ur4in@gmail.com>
---
Changes in v2:
  - Allocate state before inode creation, as Mike Rapoport suggested,
    and free it if the secure-inode helper fails.
  - Guard private-state cleanup in secretmem_evict_inode() because an
    LSM denial can call iput() before i_private is set.

Link to v1: https://lists.openwall.net/linux-kernel/2026/10/30/1883

 mm/secretmem.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------------
 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/secretmem.c b/mm/secretmem.c
index b3f79ad56790..5a7378b62bb2 100644
--- a/mm/secretmem.c
+++ b/mm/secretmem.c
@@ -189,14 +189,7 @@ static void secretmem_destroy_inode_priv(struct inode *inode)
 	free_uid(state->user);
 	kfree(state);
 	inode->i_private = NULL;
-}
-
-static int secretmem_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
-{
 	atomic_dec(&secretmem_users);
-	secretmem_destroy_inode_priv(inode);
-
-	return 0;
 }
 
 static int secretmem_mmap_prepare(struct vm_area_desc *desc)
@@ -216,7 +209,6 @@ bool vma_is_secretmem(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 }
 
 static const struct file_operations secretmem_fops = {
-	.release	= secretmem_release,
 	.mmap_prepare	= secretmem_mmap_prepare,
 };
 
@@ -264,39 +256,34 @@ static const struct inode_operations secretmem_iops = {
 
 static struct vfsmount *secretmem_mnt;
 
-static int secretmem_init_inode_priv(struct inode *inode)
-{
-	struct secretmem_inode_state *state;
-
-	state = kzalloc_obj(*state);
-	if (!state)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	state->user = get_uid(current_user());
-	inode->i_private = state;
-	return 0;
-}
-
 static struct file *secretmem_file_create(unsigned long flags)
 {
+	struct secretmem_inode_state *state;
 	struct file *file;
 	struct inode *inode;
 	const char *anon_name = "[secretmem]";
 	int err;
 
+	state = kzalloc_obj(*state);
+	if (!state)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	state->user = get_uid(current_user());
+
 	inode = anon_inode_make_secure_inode(secretmem_mnt->mnt_sb, anon_name, NULL);
-	if (IS_ERR(inode))
+	if (IS_ERR(inode)) {
+		free_uid(state->user);
+		kfree(state);
 		return ERR_CAST(inode);
+	}
 
-	err = secretmem_init_inode_priv(inode);
-	if (err)
-		goto err_free_inode;
+	inode->i_private = state;
+	atomic_inc(&secretmem_users);
 
 	file = alloc_file_pseudo(inode, secretmem_mnt, "secretmem",
 				 O_RDWR | O_LARGEFILE, &secretmem_fops);
 	if (IS_ERR(file)) {
 		err = PTR_ERR(file);
-		goto err_free_priv;
+		goto err_free_inode;
 	}
 
 	mapping_set_gfp_mask(inode->i_mapping, GFP_USER);
@@ -309,11 +296,7 @@ static struct file *secretmem_file_create(unsigned long flags)
 	inode->i_mode |= S_IFREG;
 	inode->i_size = 0;
 
-	atomic_inc(&secretmem_users);
-
 	return file;
-err_free_priv:
-	secretmem_destroy_inode_priv(inode);
 err_free_inode:
 	iput(inode);
 	return ERR_PTR(err);
@@ -335,6 +318,20 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(memfd_secret, unsigned int, flags)
 	return FD_ADD(flags & O_CLOEXEC, secretmem_file_create(flags));
 }
 
+static void secretmem_evict_inode(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	truncate_inode_pages_final(&inode->i_data);
+	clear_inode(inode);
+	/* The filesystem root and failed secure inodes have no private state. */
+	if (inode->i_private)
+		secretmem_destroy_inode_priv(inode);
+}
+
+static const struct super_operations secretmem_super_ops = {
+	.statfs		= simple_statfs,
+	.evict_inode	= secretmem_evict_inode,
+};
+
 static int secretmem_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc)
 {
 	struct pseudo_fs_context *ctx;
@@ -342,6 +339,7 @@ static int secretmem_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc)
 	ctx = init_pseudo(fc, SECRETMEM_MAGIC);
 	if (!ctx)
 		return -ENOMEM;
+	ctx->ops = &secretmem_super_ops;
 
 	return 0;
 }

      parent reply	other threads:[~2026-11-21 16:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-10-30 15:24 [PATCH] " Baek Kyu, Kim
2026-11-18 22:59 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-11-19  7:36   ` Mike Rapoport
2026-11-20  9:32     ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-11-21 16:40 ` Baek Kyu, Kim [this message]

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