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From: Koichiro Den <den@valinux.co.jp>
To: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>,
	Atish Patra <atish.patra@linux.dev>,
	Andrew Jones <andrew.jones@linux.dev>
Cc: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>,
	Alexandre Ghiti <alex@ghiti.fr>,
	Bingyu Xian <shanbeeyoo@gmail.com>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, kvm-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 2/3] RISC-V: KVM: Batch user accesses when updating steal time
Date: Sun, 22 Nov 2026 02:35:25 +0900	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261121173526.892344-3-den@valinux.co.jp> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261121173526.892344-1-den@valinux.co.jp>

Updating the SBI STA shared structure performs 2x get_user() + 3x
put_user() calls, each of which toggles sstatus.SUM.

Keep SUM enabled across all five accesses to the shared structure.

Signed-off-by: Koichiro Den <den@valinux.co.jp>
---
Changes since v1:
  - Drop might_fault(). (Andrew)
  - Use scoped_user_rw_access(). (Andrew)
  - Use le32_add_cpu() and le64_add_cpu() to avoid the extra temporaries.

Note:
  - I haven't carried over Andrew's Reviewed-by since the scoped_
    conversion reworks the fault paths. Would appreciate another look.
  - As in v1, I kept WARN_ON() for uaccess failures.

v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20261118062242.2914385-2-den@valinux.co.jp/

 arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_sbi_sta.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++------------------
 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_sbi_sta.c b/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_sbi_sta.c
index f1be90b514b2..68d54696dbae 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_sbi_sta.c
+++ b/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_sbi_sta.c
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
 #include <linux/kvm_host.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/sizes.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
 
 #include <asm/barrier.h>
 #include <asm/bug.h>
@@ -15,7 +16,6 @@
 #include <asm/kvm_vcpu_sbi.h>
 #include <asm/page.h>
 #include <asm/sbi.h>
-#include <asm/uaccess.h>
 
 static void kvm_riscv_vcpu_sbi_sta_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
@@ -27,13 +27,9 @@ void kvm_riscv_vcpu_record_steal_time(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	gpa_t shmem = vcpu->arch.sta.shmem;
 	u64 last_steal = vcpu->arch.sta.last_steal;
-	__le32 __user *sequence_ptr;
-	__le64 __user *steal_ptr;
-	__le32 sequence_le;
-	__le64 steal_le;
-	u32 sequence;
-	u64 steal;
+	struct sbi_sta_struct __user *st;
 	unsigned long hva;
+	bool updated = false;
 	gfn_t gfn;
 
 	if (shmem == INVALID_GPA)
@@ -52,35 +48,39 @@ void kvm_riscv_vcpu_record_steal_time(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		return;
 	}
 
-	sequence_ptr = (__le32 __user *)(hva + offset_in_page(shmem) +
-			       offsetof(struct sbi_sta_struct, sequence));
-	steal_ptr = (__le64 __user *)(hva + offset_in_page(shmem) +
-			    offsetof(struct sbi_sta_struct, steal));
+	st = (struct sbi_sta_struct __user *)(hva + offset_in_page(shmem));
+	scoped_user_rw_access(st, no_write) {
+		bool wrote_steal = false;
+		__le32 sequence;
+		__le64 steal;
 
-	if (WARN_ON(get_user(sequence_le, sequence_ptr)))
-		return;
-
-	sequence = le32_to_cpu(sequence_le);
-	sequence += 1;
-
-	if (WARN_ON(put_user(cpu_to_le32(sequence), sequence_ptr)))
-		return;
+		unsafe_get_user(sequence, &st->sequence, no_write);
+		le32_add_cpu(&sequence, 1);
+		unsafe_put_user(sequence, &st->sequence, no_write);
 
-	/* Publish the odd sequence before updating stolen time. */
-	smp_wmb();
-	if (!WARN_ON(get_user(steal_le, steal_ptr))) {
-		steal = le64_to_cpu(steal_le);
+		/* Publish the odd sequence before updating stolen time. */
+		smp_wmb();
+		unsafe_get_user(steal, &st->steal, finish_update);
 		vcpu->arch.sta.last_steal = READ_ONCE(current->sched_info.run_delay);
-		steal += vcpu->arch.sta.last_steal - last_steal;
-		WARN_ON(put_user(cpu_to_le64(steal), steal_ptr));
+		le64_add_cpu(&steal, vcpu->arch.sta.last_steal - last_steal);
+		unsafe_put_user(steal, &st->steal, finish_update);
+		wrote_steal = true;
+
+finish_update:
+		/* Publish stolen time before the sequence becomes even. */
+		smp_wmb();
+		le32_add_cpu(&sequence, 1);
+		unsafe_put_user(sequence, &st->sequence, mark_dirty);
+		updated = wrote_steal;
 	}
 
-	/* Publish stolen time before the sequence becomes even. */
-	smp_wmb();
-	sequence += 1;
-	WARN_ON(put_user(cpu_to_le32(sequence), sequence_ptr));
-
+mark_dirty:
+	WARN_ON(!updated);
 	kvm_vcpu_mark_page_dirty(vcpu, gfn);
+	return;
+
+no_write:
+	WARN_ON(1);
 }
 
 static int kvm_sbi_sta_steal_time_set_shmem(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-- 
2.54.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-11-21 17:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-21 17:35 [PATCH v2 0/3] RISC-V: KVM: Lessen steal time update overhead Koichiro Den
2026-11-21 17:35 ` [PATCH v2 1/3] RISC-V: KVM: Order writes to the SBI STA shared structure Koichiro Den
2026-11-21 17:35 ` Koichiro Den [this message]
2026-11-21 17:35 ` [PATCH v2 3/3] RISC-V: KVM: Skip steal-time updates when run_delay is unchanged Koichiro Den

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