From: ross.philipson@oracle.com
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: dpsmith@apertussolutions.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, ardb@kernel.org,
mjg59@srcf.ucam.org, James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com,
peterhuewe@gmx.de, jgg@ziepe.ca, luto@amacapital.net,
nivedita@alum.mit.edu, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au,
davem@davemloft.net, corbet@lwn.net, ebiederm@xmission.com,
dwmw2@infradead.org, baolu.lu@linux.intel.com,
kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com, andrew.cooper3@citrix.com,
trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com, ross.philipson@oracle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 04/19] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file
Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2024 09:49:19 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <23961b5b-a52a-483c-876e-e5e39d9e6c01@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <D1SPFVXS6FOG.IQQB3INFYEF2@kernel.org>
On 6/5/24 11:02 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Wed Jun 5, 2024 at 10:03 PM EEST, wrote:
>> So I did not mean to imply that DRTM support on various
>> platforms/architectures has a short expiration date. In fact we are
>> actively working on DRTM support through the TrenchBoot project on
>> several platforms/architectures. Just a quick rundown here:
>>
>> Intel: Plenty of Intel platforms are vPro with TXT. It is really just
>> the lower end systems that don't have it available (like Core i3). And
>> my guess was wrong about x86s. You can find the spec on the page in the
>> following link. There is an entire subsection on SMX support on x86s and
>> the changes to the various GETSEC instruction leaves that were made to
>> make it work there (see 3.15).
>>
>> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/envisioning-future-simplified-architecture.html__;!!ACWV5N9M2RV99hQ!Lt-srkRLHstA9PPCB-NWogvHP-9mfh2bHjkml-lARY79BhYlWJjhrHb6RyCN_WdGstcABq1FdqPUKn5dCdw$
>
> Happend to bump into same PDF specification and exactly the seeked
> information is "3.15 SMX Changes". So just write this down to some
> patch that starts adding SMX things.
>
> Link: https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/776648__;!!ACWV5N9M2RV99hQ!Lt-srkRLHstA9PPCB-NWogvHP-9mfh2bHjkml-lARY79BhYlWJjhrHb6RyCN_WdGstcABq1FdqPUuZy8Sfk$
>
> So link and document, and other stuff above is not relevant from
> upstream context, only potential maintenance burden :-)
I am not 100% sure what you mean exactly here...
>
> For any architectures dig a similar fact:
>
> 1. Is not dead.
> 2. Will be there also in future.
>
> Make any architecture existentially relevant for and not too much
> coloring in the text that is easy to check.
>
> It is nearing 5k lines so you should be really good with measured
> facts too (not just launch) :-)
... but overall I get your meaning. We will spend time on this sort of
documentation for the v10 release.
Thanks for the feedback,
Ross
>
> BR, Jarkko
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-06-06 16:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 116+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-05-31 1:03 [PATCH v9 00/19] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 01/19] x86/boot: Place kernel_info at a fixed offset Ross Philipson
2024-06-04 18:18 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 20:28 ` ross.philipson
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 02/19] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation Ross Philipson
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 03/19] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 04/19] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file Ross Philipson
2024-06-04 18:21 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 20:31 ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 22:36 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 23:00 ` ross.philipson
2024-06-05 0:22 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-05 0:27 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-05 2:33 ` ross.philipson
2024-06-05 4:04 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-05 19:03 ` ross.philipson
2024-06-06 6:02 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-06 16:49 ` ross.philipson [this message]
2024-06-20 0:18 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-20 16:55 ` ross.philipson
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 05/19] x86: Secure Launch main " Ross Philipson
2024-06-04 18:24 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 20:52 ` ross.philipson
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2024-05-31 2:16 ` Eric Biggers
2024-05-31 13:54 ` Eric W. Biederman
2024-08-15 17:38 ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-08-15 19:10 ` Thomas Gleixner
2024-08-16 10:42 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-08-16 11:01 ` Andrew Cooper
2024-08-16 11:22 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-08-16 18:41 ` Matthew Garrett
2024-08-19 18:05 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-08-19 18:24 ` Matthew Garrett
2024-08-20 15:26 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-08-22 18:29 ` Daniel P. Smith
2026-02-20 15:35 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2026-02-23 23:08 ` Andrew Cooper
2026-02-24 8:25 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-08-29 3:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-08-29 3:25 ` Matthew Garrett
2024-08-29 17:26 ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-09-05 1:01 ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-09-13 0:34 ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-09-14 3:57 ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-09-21 18:36 ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-09-21 22:40 ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-11-02 14:53 ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-11-02 16:04 ` James Bottomley
2024-11-15 1:17 ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-11-18 18:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-11-18 18:50 ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-11-18 19:12 ` James Bottomley
2024-11-18 20:02 ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-11-21 20:11 ` ross.philipson
2024-11-21 20:54 ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-11-21 22:42 ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-11-22 23:37 ` ross.philipson
2024-12-12 19:56 ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-12-12 22:30 ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-12-14 2:56 ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-05-31 16:18 ` ross.philipson
2024-08-27 18:14 ` Eric Biggers
2024-08-28 20:14 ` ross.philipson
2024-08-28 23:13 ` Eric Biggers
2024-06-04 18:52 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 21:02 ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 22:40 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 07/19] x86: Add early SHA-256 " Ross Philipson
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 08/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson
2024-05-31 11:00 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-05-31 13:33 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-05-31 14:04 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-05-31 16:13 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-06-04 17:31 ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 17:24 ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 17:27 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-06-04 17:33 ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 20:54 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-06-04 21:12 ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 17:14 ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 19:56 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 21:09 ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 22:43 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 09/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2024-06-04 19:58 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 21:16 ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 22:45 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 19:59 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 21:17 ` ross.philipson
2024-08-12 19:02 ` ross.philipson
2024-08-15 18:35 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 10/19] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2024-06-04 20:05 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 21:47 ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 22:46 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 11/19] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 12/19] reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 13/19] tpm: Protect against locality counter underflow Ross Philipson
2024-06-04 20:12 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-08-15 18:52 ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 14/19] tpm: Ensure tpm is in known state at startup Ross Philipson
2024-06-04 20:14 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-08-15 19:24 ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 15/19] tpm: Make locality requests return consistent values Ross Philipson
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 16/19] tpm: Add ability to set the preferred locality the TPM chip uses Ross Philipson
2024-06-04 20:27 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 22:14 ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 22:50 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 23:04 ` ross.philipson
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 17/19] tpm: Add sysfs interface to allow setting and querying the preferred locality Ross Philipson
2024-06-04 20:27 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 18/19] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 19/19] x86: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2024-05-31 11:09 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-06-04 17:22 ` ross.philipson
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