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From: "Ard Biesheuvel" <ardb@kernel.org>
To: "Daniel P. Smith" <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>,
	"Ross Philipson" <ross.philipson@oracle.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, iommu@lists.linux.dev,
	dave.hansen@linux.intel.com
Cc: "Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	mjg59@srcf.ucam.org, James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com,
	peterhuewe@gmx.de, "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@kernel.org>,
	jgg@ziepe.ca, luto@amacapital.net, nivedita@alum.mit.edu,
	"Herbert Xu" <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	davem@davemloft.net, corbet@lwn.net, ebiederm@xmission.com,
	dwmw2@infradead.org, baolu.lu@linux.intel.com,
	kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com, andrew.cooper3@citrix.com,
	trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v15 00/28] x86: Secure Launch support for Intel TXT
Date: Wed, 18 Feb 2026 18:30:39 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <242a0462-7fc5-4902-b71d-22cf8360239e@app.fastmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <49d169bf-0ad2-49be-b7d7-fceb9e7f831a@app.fastmail.com>

On Thu, 12 Feb 2026, at 21:39, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On Thu, 12 Feb 2026, at 20:49, Daniel P. Smith wrote:
>> On 2/9/26 09:04, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> ...
>>> I've had a stab at implementing all of this in a manner that is more idiomatic for EFI boot:
>>> 
>>> - GRUB does minimal TXT related preparation upfront, and exposes the remaining functionality via a protocol that is attached to the loaded image by GRUB
>>> - The SL stub is moved to the core kernel, with some startup code added to pivot to long mode
>>> - the EFI stub executes and decompresses the kernel as usual
>>> - if the protocol is present, the EFI stub calls it to pass the bootparams pointer, the base and size of the MLE and the header offset back to the GRUB code
>>> - after calling ExitBootServices(), it calls another protocol method to trigger the secure launch.
>>> 
> ...
>>
>> I think this is a great approach for UEFI, though we need to reconcile 
>> this with non-UEFI situations such as booting under coreboot.
>
> There are two approaches that I think are feasible for coreboot in this model:
>
> - just unpack the ELF and boot that - there is already prior art for 
> that with Xen. We can stick the MLE header offset in an ELF note where 
> any loader can find it.
>
> - stick with the current approach as much as possible, i.e., disable 
> physical KASLR so that the decompressed kernel will end up right where 
> the decompressor was loaded, which allows much of the secure launch 
> preparation to be done as before. Only the final bits (including the 
> call into the ACM itself) need to be deferred, and we can propose a 
> generic mechanism for that via boot_params.
>
> I'm working on a prototype of the latter, but GRUB is an odd beast and 
> my x86 fu is weak.
>

I've managed to get a working implementation of the legacy entrypoint, by repurposing the dl_handler() entrypoint you added for EFI [which no longer needs it in my version] as a callback for the legacy boot flow. This /should/ work for i386-coreboot too, but I have no way of testing it (I only tried 'slaunch --legacy-linux' using the x86_64-efi build).

I've pushed the changes to the branches I mentioned previously in this thread.



 

  reply	other threads:[~2026-02-18 17:31 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 80+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-12-15 23:32 Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:32 ` [PATCH v15 01/28] tpm: Initial step to reorganize TPM public headers Ross Philipson
2026-01-19 23:40   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-01-19 23:52     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-02-01 16:21       ` Daniel P. Smith
2026-02-01 16:20     ` Daniel P. Smith
2026-02-01 22:46       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-12-15 23:32 ` [PATCH v15 02/28] tpm: Move TPM1 specific definitions and functions to new headers Ross Philipson
2026-01-19 23:57   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-02-01 16:23     ` Daniel P. Smith
2026-02-04 17:44       ` ross.philipson
2026-02-08 13:39         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-12-15 23:32 ` [PATCH v15 03/28] tpm: Move TPM2 " Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:32 ` [PATCH v15 04/28] tpm: Move TPM common base definitions to new public common header Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:32 ` [PATCH v15 05/28] tpm: Move platform specific definitions to the new PTP header Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:32 ` [PATCH v15 06/28] tpm: Add TPM buffer support header for standalone reuse Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:32 ` [PATCH v15 07/28] tpm: Remove main TPM header from TPM event log header Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:32 ` [PATCH v15 08/28] tpm/tpm_tis: Close all localities Ross Philipson
2026-03-29 22:57   ` Josh Snyder
2025-12-15 23:32 ` [PATCH v15 09/28] tpm/tpm_tis: Address positive localities in tpm_tis_request_locality() Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:32 ` [PATCH v15 10/28] tpm/tpm_tis: Allow locality to be set to a different value Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:32 ` [PATCH v15 11/28] tpm/sysfs: Show locality used by kernel Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 12/28] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 13/28] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2025-12-16  3:20   ` Randy Dunlap
2025-12-17 18:11     ` ross.philipson
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 14/28] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 15/28] x86: Secure Launch main " Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 16/28] x86/txt: Intel Trusted eXecution Technology (TXT) definitions Ross Philipson
2025-12-16 22:14   ` Dave Hansen
2025-12-17 18:44     ` ross.philipson
2025-12-18 16:34   ` Dave Hansen
2025-12-18 18:17     ` ross.philipson
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 17/28] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2025-12-16  0:21   ` Eric Biggers
2025-12-17 18:10     ` ross.philipson
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 18/28] x86: Add early SHA-256 " Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 19/28] x86/tpm: Early TPM PCR extending driver Ross Philipson
2025-12-16 21:53   ` Dave Hansen
2025-12-17 18:40     ` ross.philipson
2025-12-17 19:06       ` Dave Hansen
2025-12-19 21:26     ` Daniel P. Smith
2026-01-03 20:44       ` Dave Hansen
2026-01-08 16:21         ` Daniel P. Smith
2026-01-20  0:10   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 20/28] x86/msr: Add variable MTRR base/mask and x2apic ID registers Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 21/28] x86/boot: Place TXT MLE header in the kernel_info section Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 22/28] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson
2025-12-16 22:32   ` Dave Hansen
2025-12-17 18:47     ` ross.philipson
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 23/28] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 24/28] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 25/28] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 26/28] x86/reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 27/28] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 28/28] x86/efi: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2025-12-16  3:46 ` [PATCH v15 00/28] x86: Secure Launch support for Intel TXT Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-12-17 18:15   ` ross.philipson
2025-12-16 22:14 ` Dave Hansen
2026-01-08 16:36   ` Daniel P. Smith
2026-01-08 16:41     ` Dave Hansen
2026-01-08 16:46       ` Daniel P. Smith
2026-02-09 14:04 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2026-02-12 19:49   ` Daniel P. Smith
2026-02-12 19:54     ` Dave Hansen
2026-02-12 20:39     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2026-02-18 17:30       ` Ard Biesheuvel [this message]
2026-02-18 18:02         ` ross.philipson
2026-02-26 18:31         ` ross.philipson
2026-02-26 22:33           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2026-02-18 20:03       ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-02-18 20:29         ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-02-18 20:34           ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-02-18 21:04             ` Simo Sorce
2026-02-18 21:54               ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-02-19  7:54                 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2026-02-19 17:10                   ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-02-19 17:34                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-02-20  8:30                     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2026-02-23 21:37                       ` Daniel P. Smith

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