From: ross.philipson@oracle.com
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, iommu@lists.linux.dev
Cc: dpsmith@apertussolutions.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, ardb@kernel.org,
mjg59@srcf.ucam.org, James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com,
peterhuewe@gmx.de, jarkko@kernel.org, jgg@ziepe.ca,
luto@amacapital.net, nivedita@alum.mit.edu,
herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net, corbet@lwn.net,
ebiederm@xmission.com, dwmw2@infradead.org,
baolu.lu@linux.intel.com, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com,
andrew.cooper3@citrix.com, trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com,
ross.philipson@oracle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v15 19/28] x86/tpm: Early TPM PCR extending driver
Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2025 10:40:10 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <c1436289-372f-4aff-b315-0bb5750d7fe6@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <56929e8b-a7cf-4390-b4ec-0b4c2c32b311@intel.com>
On 12/16/25 1:53 PM, Dave Hansen wrote:
> I'm mostly spot-checking this to see what kind of shape it's in and how
> much work and diligence has been applied in the last 8 months since v14.
>
> On 12/15/25 15:33, Ross Philipson wrote:
> ...
>> The driver could be extended for further operations if needed. This
>> TPM dirver implementation relies as much as possible on existing mainline
>
> <sigh>
>
> v15 and no spell checking. :(
Will fix.
>
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/early_tpm_extend.c
>> @@ -0,0 +1,601 @@
>> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
>> +/*
>> + * Copyright (c) 2010-2012 United States Government, as represented by
>> + * the Secretary of Defense. All rights reserved.
>
> IANAL, but this looks fishy.
>
> It's theoretically fine to go grab random code off the Internet and
> submit it to the kernel, given the correct license. But I do want to
> know what its story is and where it came from.
>
> I also seem to remember that there are special rules around the US
> federal government's inability to hold copyrights. This seems worth at
> least a mention ... somewhere.
>
> This is helpful, for instance:
>
>> + * based off of the original tools/vtpm_manager code base which is:
>> + * Copyright (c) 2005, Intel Corp.
>> + * All rights reserved.
>
> so thanks for that one.
>
>> + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
>> + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
>> + * are met:
>> + *
>> + * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
>> + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
>> + * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above
>> + * copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following
>> + * disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials provided
>> + * with the distribution.
>> + * * Neither the name of Intel Corporation nor the names of its
>> + * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
>> + * from this software without specific prior written permission.
>> + *
>> + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
>> + * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
>> + * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS
>> + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
>> + * COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
>> + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
>> + * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
>> + * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
>> + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
>> + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
>> + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
>> + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
>> + */
>
> Also, IANAL, but this looks BSD-ish.
>
> I would have kinda expected the SPDX header to say BSD-blah-blah and not
> GPL-2.0-only.
>
> I'd really appreciate if you could go have a huddle with your corporate
> Open Source folks and make sure this is all proper. To me, it looks
> fishy at _best_.
Yes, we will do exactly that for all the licensing and sort it out.
>
> ...
>> +/*
>> + * We're far too early to calibrate time. Assume a 5GHz processor (the upper
>> + * end of the Fam19h range), which causes us to be wrong in the safe direction
>> + * on slower systems.
>> + */
>
> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://docs.kernel.org/process/maintainer-tip.html*changelog__;Iw!!ACWV5N9M2RV99hQ!ODp_iKdXfPuA60ae9ZCFdElNvGZjrd7ffPYtSVs3cwOTY2kzGN_tgsRLYawnxEGiHE0jMDN2kgOxBBtMtmu-7ohw$
>
> Imperative voice please.
+1
>
> ...
>> +static int __tis_recv_data(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, int count)
>> +{
>> + int size = 0;
>> + int burstcnt;
>> +
>> + while (size < count && __tis_wait_for_stat(chip, TPM_STS_DATA_AVAIL | TPM_STS_VALID, chip->timeout_c) == 0) {
>> + burstcnt = __tis_get_burstcount(chip);
>> +
>> + for ( ; burstcnt > 0 && size < count; --burstcnt)
>> + buf[size++] = tpm_read8(chip, TPM_DATA_FIFO(chip->locality));
>> + }
>> +
>> + return size;
>> +}
>> +
>> +/**
>> + * tpm_tis_check_locality - Check if the given locality is the active one
>> + * @chip: The TPM chip instance
>> + * @loc: The locality to check
>> + *
>> + * Return: true - locality active, false - not active
>> + */
>> +bool tpm_tis_check_locality(struct tpm_chip *chip, int loc)
>> +{
>> + if ((tpm_read8(chip, TPM_ACCESS(loc)) & (TPM_ACCESS_ACTIVE_LOCALITY | TPM_ACCESS_VALID)) == (TPM_ACCESS_ACTIVE_LOCALITY | TPM_ACCESS_VALID)) {
>> + chip->locality = loc;
>> + return true;
>> + }
>> +
>> + return false;
>> +}
>> +
>> +/**
>> + * tpm_tis_release_locality - Release the active locality
>> + * @chip: The TPM chip instance
>> + */
>> +void tpm_tis_release_locality(struct tpm_chip *chip)
>> +{
>> + if ((tpm_read8(chip, TPM_ACCESS(chip->locality)) & (TPM_ACCESS_REQUEST_PENDING | TPM_ACCESS_VALID)) == (TPM_ACCESS_REQUEST_PENDING | TPM_ACCESS_VALID))
>> + tpm_write8(chip, TPM_ACCESS(chip->locality), TPM_ACCESS_RELINQUISH_LOCALITY);
>> +
>> + chip->locality = 0;
>> +}
>
> I guess some folks aren't enforcing the 80-column limits. But this is
> not even close. It's almost 80x2.
>
> Has there even been an attempt to make this conform to kernel coding
> style? What other checkpatch.pl warnings are being ignored?
>
We do run checkpatch.pl and fix the issues it points out. I feel it is
not clear how to approach the 80 character limit rule though. I have
been told in other reviews that the 80 char rule is not really followed
and certain things would read better w/o it. Reading the guide again, it
does not really spell out details other than try to keep it 80 and
under. Maybe there should be a hard limit (< 80x2) if you exceed it?
But ultimately I will format the code in whatever manner is requested.
Thank you,
Ross
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-12-17 18:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 80+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-12-15 23:32 [PATCH v15 00/28] x86: Secure Launch support for Intel TXT Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:32 ` [PATCH v15 01/28] tpm: Initial step to reorganize TPM public headers Ross Philipson
2026-01-19 23:40 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-01-19 23:52 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-02-01 16:21 ` Daniel P. Smith
2026-02-01 16:20 ` Daniel P. Smith
2026-02-01 22:46 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-12-15 23:32 ` [PATCH v15 02/28] tpm: Move TPM1 specific definitions and functions to new headers Ross Philipson
2026-01-19 23:57 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-02-01 16:23 ` Daniel P. Smith
2026-02-04 17:44 ` ross.philipson
2026-02-08 13:39 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-12-15 23:32 ` [PATCH v15 03/28] tpm: Move TPM2 " Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:32 ` [PATCH v15 04/28] tpm: Move TPM common base definitions to new public common header Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:32 ` [PATCH v15 05/28] tpm: Move platform specific definitions to the new PTP header Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:32 ` [PATCH v15 06/28] tpm: Add TPM buffer support header for standalone reuse Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:32 ` [PATCH v15 07/28] tpm: Remove main TPM header from TPM event log header Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:32 ` [PATCH v15 08/28] tpm/tpm_tis: Close all localities Ross Philipson
2026-03-29 22:57 ` Josh Snyder
2025-12-15 23:32 ` [PATCH v15 09/28] tpm/tpm_tis: Address positive localities in tpm_tis_request_locality() Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:32 ` [PATCH v15 10/28] tpm/tpm_tis: Allow locality to be set to a different value Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:32 ` [PATCH v15 11/28] tpm/sysfs: Show locality used by kernel Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 12/28] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 13/28] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2025-12-16 3:20 ` Randy Dunlap
2025-12-17 18:11 ` ross.philipson
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 14/28] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 15/28] x86: Secure Launch main " Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 16/28] x86/txt: Intel Trusted eXecution Technology (TXT) definitions Ross Philipson
2025-12-16 22:14 ` Dave Hansen
2025-12-17 18:44 ` ross.philipson
2025-12-18 16:34 ` Dave Hansen
2025-12-18 18:17 ` ross.philipson
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 17/28] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2025-12-16 0:21 ` Eric Biggers
2025-12-17 18:10 ` ross.philipson
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 18/28] x86: Add early SHA-256 " Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 19/28] x86/tpm: Early TPM PCR extending driver Ross Philipson
2025-12-16 21:53 ` Dave Hansen
2025-12-17 18:40 ` ross.philipson [this message]
2025-12-17 19:06 ` Dave Hansen
2025-12-19 21:26 ` Daniel P. Smith
2026-01-03 20:44 ` Dave Hansen
2026-01-08 16:21 ` Daniel P. Smith
2026-01-20 0:10 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 20/28] x86/msr: Add variable MTRR base/mask and x2apic ID registers Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 21/28] x86/boot: Place TXT MLE header in the kernel_info section Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 22/28] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson
2025-12-16 22:32 ` Dave Hansen
2025-12-17 18:47 ` ross.philipson
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 23/28] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 24/28] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 25/28] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 26/28] x86/reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 27/28] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 28/28] x86/efi: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2025-12-16 3:46 ` [PATCH v15 00/28] x86: Secure Launch support for Intel TXT Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-12-17 18:15 ` ross.philipson
2025-12-16 22:14 ` Dave Hansen
2026-01-08 16:36 ` Daniel P. Smith
2026-01-08 16:41 ` Dave Hansen
2026-01-08 16:46 ` Daniel P. Smith
2026-02-09 14:04 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2026-02-12 19:49 ` Daniel P. Smith
2026-02-12 19:54 ` Dave Hansen
2026-02-12 20:39 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2026-02-18 17:30 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2026-02-18 18:02 ` ross.philipson
2026-02-26 18:31 ` ross.philipson
2026-02-26 22:33 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2026-02-18 20:03 ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-02-18 20:29 ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-02-18 20:34 ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-02-18 21:04 ` Simo Sorce
2026-02-18 21:54 ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-02-19 7:54 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2026-02-19 17:10 ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-02-19 17:34 ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-02-20 8:30 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2026-02-23 21:37 ` Daniel P. Smith
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=c1436289-372f-4aff-b315-0bb5750d7fe6@oracle.com \
--to=ross.philipson@oracle.com \
--cc=James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com \
--cc=andrew.cooper3@citrix.com \
--cc=ardb@kernel.org \
--cc=baolu.lu@linux.intel.com \
--cc=bp@alien8.de \
--cc=corbet@lwn.net \
--cc=dave.hansen@intel.com \
--cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=davem@davemloft.net \
--cc=dpsmith@apertussolutions.com \
--cc=dwmw2@infradead.org \
--cc=ebiederm@xmission.com \
--cc=herbert@gondor.apana.org.au \
--cc=hpa@zytor.com \
--cc=iommu@lists.linux.dev \
--cc=jarkko@kernel.org \
--cc=jgg@ziepe.ca \
--cc=kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com \
--cc=kexec@lists.infradead.org \
--cc=linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-efi@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=luto@amacapital.net \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=mjg59@srcf.ucam.org \
--cc=nivedita@alum.mit.edu \
--cc=peterhuewe@gmx.de \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox
all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®