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From: ross.philipson@oracle.com
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, iommu@lists.linux.dev
Cc: dpsmith@apertussolutions.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
	mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com,
	dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, ardb@kernel.org,
	mjg59@srcf.ucam.org, James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com,
	peterhuewe@gmx.de, jarkko@kernel.org, jgg@ziepe.ca,
	luto@amacapital.net, nivedita@alum.mit.edu,
	herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net, corbet@lwn.net,
	ebiederm@xmission.com, dwmw2@infradead.org,
	baolu.lu@linux.intel.com, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com,
	andrew.cooper3@citrix.com, trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com,
	ross.philipson@oracle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v15 19/28] x86/tpm: Early TPM PCR extending driver
Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2025 10:40:10 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <c1436289-372f-4aff-b315-0bb5750d7fe6@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <56929e8b-a7cf-4390-b4ec-0b4c2c32b311@intel.com>

On 12/16/25 1:53 PM, Dave Hansen wrote:
> I'm mostly spot-checking this to see what kind of shape it's in and how
> much work and diligence has been applied in the last 8 months since v14.
> 
> On 12/15/25 15:33, Ross Philipson wrote:
> ...
>> The driver could be extended for further operations if needed. This
>> TPM dirver implementation relies as much as possible on existing mainline
> 
> <sigh>
> 
> v15 and no spell checking. :(

Will fix.

> 
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/early_tpm_extend.c
>> @@ -0,0 +1,601 @@
>> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
>> +/*
>> + * Copyright (c) 2010-2012 United States Government, as represented by
>> + * the Secretary of Defense.  All rights reserved.
> 
> IANAL, but this looks fishy.
> 
> It's theoretically fine to go grab random code off the Internet and
> submit it to the kernel, given the correct license. But I do want to
> know what its story is and where it came from.
> 
> I also seem to remember that there are special rules around the US
> federal government's inability to hold copyrights. This seems worth at
> least a mention ... somewhere.
> 
> This is helpful, for instance:
> 
>> + * based off of the original tools/vtpm_manager code base which is:
>> + * Copyright (c) 2005, Intel Corp.
>> + * All rights reserved.
> 
> so thanks for that one.
> 
>> + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
>> + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
>> + * are met:
>> + *
>> + *   * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
>> + *     notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
>> + *   * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above
>> + *     copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following
>> + *     disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials provided
>> + *     with the distribution.
>> + *   * Neither the name of Intel Corporation nor the names of its
>> + *     contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
>> + *     from this software without specific prior written permission.
>> + *
>> + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
>> + * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
>> + * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS
>> + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
>> + * COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
>> + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
>> + * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
>> + * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
>> + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
>> + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
>> + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
>> + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
>> + */
> 
> Also, IANAL, but this looks BSD-ish.
> 
> I would have kinda expected the SPDX header to say BSD-blah-blah and not
> GPL-2.0-only.
> 
> I'd really appreciate if you could go have a huddle with your corporate
> Open Source folks and make sure this is all proper. To me, it looks
> fishy at _best_.

Yes, we will do exactly that for all the licensing and sort it out.

> 
> ...
>> +/*
>> + * We're far too early to calibrate time.  Assume a 5GHz processor (the upper
>> + * end of the Fam19h range), which causes us to be wrong in the safe direction
>> + * on slower systems.
>> + */
> 
> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://docs.kernel.org/process/maintainer-tip.html*changelog__;Iw!!ACWV5N9M2RV99hQ!ODp_iKdXfPuA60ae9ZCFdElNvGZjrd7ffPYtSVs3cwOTY2kzGN_tgsRLYawnxEGiHE0jMDN2kgOxBBtMtmu-7ohw$
> 
> Imperative voice please.

+1

> 
> ...
>> +static int __tis_recv_data(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, int count)
>> +{
>> +	int size = 0;
>> +	int burstcnt;
>> +
>> +	while (size < count && __tis_wait_for_stat(chip, TPM_STS_DATA_AVAIL | TPM_STS_VALID, chip->timeout_c) == 0) {
>> +		burstcnt = __tis_get_burstcount(chip);
>> +
>> +		for ( ; burstcnt > 0 && size < count; --burstcnt)
>> +			buf[size++] = tpm_read8(chip, TPM_DATA_FIFO(chip->locality));
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	return size;
>> +}
>> +
>> +/**
>> + * tpm_tis_check_locality - Check if the given locality is the active one
>> + * @chip:	The TPM chip instance
>> + * @loc:	The locality to check
>> + *
>> + * Return: true - locality active, false - not active
>> + */
>> +bool tpm_tis_check_locality(struct tpm_chip *chip, int loc)
>> +{
>> +	if ((tpm_read8(chip, TPM_ACCESS(loc)) & (TPM_ACCESS_ACTIVE_LOCALITY | TPM_ACCESS_VALID)) == (TPM_ACCESS_ACTIVE_LOCALITY | TPM_ACCESS_VALID)) {
>> +		chip->locality = loc;
>> +		return true;
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	return false;
>> +}
>> +
>> +/**
>> + * tpm_tis_release_locality - Release the active locality
>> + * @chip:	The TPM chip instance
>> + */
>> +void tpm_tis_release_locality(struct tpm_chip *chip)
>> +{
>> +	if ((tpm_read8(chip, TPM_ACCESS(chip->locality)) & (TPM_ACCESS_REQUEST_PENDING | TPM_ACCESS_VALID)) == (TPM_ACCESS_REQUEST_PENDING | TPM_ACCESS_VALID))
>> +		tpm_write8(chip, TPM_ACCESS(chip->locality), TPM_ACCESS_RELINQUISH_LOCALITY);
>> +
>> +	chip->locality = 0;
>> +}
> 
> I guess some folks aren't enforcing the 80-column limits. But this is
> not even close. It's almost 80x2.
> 
> Has there even been an attempt to make this conform to kernel coding
> style? What other checkpatch.pl warnings are being ignored?
> 

We do run checkpatch.pl and fix the issues it points out. I feel it is 
not clear how to approach the 80 character limit rule though. I have 
been told in other reviews that the 80 char rule is not really followed 
and certain things would read better w/o it. Reading the guide again, it 
does not really spell out details other than try to keep it 80 and 
under. Maybe there should be a hard limit (< 80x2) if you exceed it?

But ultimately I will format the code in whatever manner is requested.

Thank you,
Ross


  reply	other threads:[~2025-12-17 18:41 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 80+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-12-15 23:32 [PATCH v15 00/28] x86: Secure Launch support for Intel TXT Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:32 ` [PATCH v15 01/28] tpm: Initial step to reorganize TPM public headers Ross Philipson
2026-01-19 23:40   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-01-19 23:52     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-02-01 16:21       ` Daniel P. Smith
2026-02-01 16:20     ` Daniel P. Smith
2026-02-01 22:46       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-12-15 23:32 ` [PATCH v15 02/28] tpm: Move TPM1 specific definitions and functions to new headers Ross Philipson
2026-01-19 23:57   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-02-01 16:23     ` Daniel P. Smith
2026-02-04 17:44       ` ross.philipson
2026-02-08 13:39         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-12-15 23:32 ` [PATCH v15 03/28] tpm: Move TPM2 " Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:32 ` [PATCH v15 04/28] tpm: Move TPM common base definitions to new public common header Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:32 ` [PATCH v15 05/28] tpm: Move platform specific definitions to the new PTP header Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:32 ` [PATCH v15 06/28] tpm: Add TPM buffer support header for standalone reuse Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:32 ` [PATCH v15 07/28] tpm: Remove main TPM header from TPM event log header Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:32 ` [PATCH v15 08/28] tpm/tpm_tis: Close all localities Ross Philipson
2026-03-29 22:57   ` Josh Snyder
2025-12-15 23:32 ` [PATCH v15 09/28] tpm/tpm_tis: Address positive localities in tpm_tis_request_locality() Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:32 ` [PATCH v15 10/28] tpm/tpm_tis: Allow locality to be set to a different value Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:32 ` [PATCH v15 11/28] tpm/sysfs: Show locality used by kernel Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 12/28] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 13/28] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2025-12-16  3:20   ` Randy Dunlap
2025-12-17 18:11     ` ross.philipson
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 14/28] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 15/28] x86: Secure Launch main " Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 16/28] x86/txt: Intel Trusted eXecution Technology (TXT) definitions Ross Philipson
2025-12-16 22:14   ` Dave Hansen
2025-12-17 18:44     ` ross.philipson
2025-12-18 16:34   ` Dave Hansen
2025-12-18 18:17     ` ross.philipson
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 17/28] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2025-12-16  0:21   ` Eric Biggers
2025-12-17 18:10     ` ross.philipson
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 18/28] x86: Add early SHA-256 " Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 19/28] x86/tpm: Early TPM PCR extending driver Ross Philipson
2025-12-16 21:53   ` Dave Hansen
2025-12-17 18:40     ` ross.philipson [this message]
2025-12-17 19:06       ` Dave Hansen
2025-12-19 21:26     ` Daniel P. Smith
2026-01-03 20:44       ` Dave Hansen
2026-01-08 16:21         ` Daniel P. Smith
2026-01-20  0:10   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 20/28] x86/msr: Add variable MTRR base/mask and x2apic ID registers Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 21/28] x86/boot: Place TXT MLE header in the kernel_info section Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 22/28] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson
2025-12-16 22:32   ` Dave Hansen
2025-12-17 18:47     ` ross.philipson
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 23/28] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 24/28] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 25/28] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 26/28] x86/reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 27/28] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson
2025-12-15 23:33 ` [PATCH v15 28/28] x86/efi: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2025-12-16  3:46 ` [PATCH v15 00/28] x86: Secure Launch support for Intel TXT Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-12-17 18:15   ` ross.philipson
2025-12-16 22:14 ` Dave Hansen
2026-01-08 16:36   ` Daniel P. Smith
2026-01-08 16:41     ` Dave Hansen
2026-01-08 16:46       ` Daniel P. Smith
2026-02-09 14:04 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2026-02-12 19:49   ` Daniel P. Smith
2026-02-12 19:54     ` Dave Hansen
2026-02-12 20:39     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2026-02-18 17:30       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2026-02-18 18:02         ` ross.philipson
2026-02-26 18:31         ` ross.philipson
2026-02-26 22:33           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2026-02-18 20:03       ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-02-18 20:29         ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-02-18 20:34           ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-02-18 21:04             ` Simo Sorce
2026-02-18 21:54               ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-02-19  7:54                 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2026-02-19 17:10                   ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-02-19 17:34                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-02-20  8:30                     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2026-02-23 21:37                       ` Daniel P. Smith

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