From: Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@linux.ibm.com>
To: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: maddy@linux.ibm.com, mpe@ellerman.id.au, npiggin@gmail.com,
christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu, naveen@kernel.org,
zohar@linux.ibm.com, nayna@linux.ibm.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/3] powerpc/secvar: Expose secvars relevant to the key management mode
Date: Wed, 7 May 2025 00:30:12 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <24ed9d66-ca87-4695-af77-a587929e3e7a@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <43baab5747031ec84100939fe154fa2b071f3789.camel@linux.ibm.com>
On 5/5/25 12:53 PM, Andrew Donnellan wrote:
> On Wed, 2025-04-30 at 14:33 +0530, Srish Srinivasan wrote:
>> The PLPKS enabled PowerVM LPAR sysfs exposes all of the secure boot
>> secvars irrespective of the key management mode.
>>
>> The PowerVM LPAR supports static and dynamic key management for
>> secure
>> boot. The key management option can be updated in the management
>> console. Only in the dynamic key mode can the user modify the secure
>> boot secvars db, dbx, grubdb, grubdbx, and sbat, which are exposed
>> via
>> the sysfs interface. But the sysfs interface exposes these secvars
>> even
>> in the static key mode. This could lead to errors when reading them
>> or
>> writing to them in the static key mode.
>>
>> Expose only PK, trustedcadb, and moduledb in the static key mode to
>> enable loading of signed third-party kernel modules.
>>
>> Co-developed-by: Souradeep <soura@imap.linux.ibm.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Souradeep <soura@imap.linux.ibm.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@linux.ibm.com>
>> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
>> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
> I'm assuming it's been determined that there's no value in letting
> userspace see db/dbx/etc in a read-only way in static mode?
>
> With one comment below:
>
> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>
Hi Andrew,
Thanks a lot for your feedback.
Yes, that is correct.
>> ---
>> Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar | 9 ++++--
>> arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/plpks-secvar.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++-
>> --
>> 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar
>> b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar
>> index 857cf12b0904..2bdc7d9c0c10 100644
>> --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar
>> +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar
>> @@ -22,9 +22,12 @@ Description: A string indicating which backend is
>> in use by the firmware.
>> and is expected to be "ibm,edk2-compat-v1".
>>
>> On pseries/PLPKS, this is generated by the kernel
>> based on the
>> - version number in the SB_VERSION variable in the
>> keystore, and
>> - has the form "ibm,plpks-sb-v<version>", or
>> - "ibm,plpks-sb-unknown" if there is no SB_VERSION
>> variable.
>> + existence of the SB_VERSION property in firmware.
>> This string
>> + takes the form "ibm,plpks-sb-v1" in the presence of
>> SB_VERSION,
>> + indicating the key management mode is dynamic.
>> Otherwise it
>> + takes the form "ibm,plpks-sb-v0" in the static key
>> management
>> + mode. Only secvars relevant to the key management
>> mode are
>> + exposed.
> Everything except the last sentence here is relevant to the previous
> patch in the series (noting my comments on the previous patch about the
> string).
>
> The last sentence is more related to the <variable name> entry than the
> format entry, and perhaps worth including a list of what variables are
> applicable to each mode.
Sure, will fix this.
Thanks and Regards,
Srish
>
>>
>> What: /sys/firmware/secvar/vars/<variable name>
>> Date: August 2019
>> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/plpks-secvar.c
>> b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/plpks-secvar.c
>> index d57067a733ab..cbcb2c356f2a 100644
>> --- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/plpks-secvar.c
>> +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/plpks-secvar.c
>> @@ -59,7 +59,14 @@ static u32 get_policy(const char *name)
>> return PLPKS_SIGNEDUPDATE;
>> }
>>
>> -static const char * const plpks_var_names[] = {
>> +static const char * const plpks_var_names_static[] = {
>> + "PK",
>> + "moduledb",
>> + "trustedcadb",
>> + NULL,
>> +};
>> +
>> +static const char * const plpks_var_names_dynamic[] = {
>> "PK",
>> "KEK",
>> "db",
>> @@ -207,21 +214,34 @@ static int plpks_max_size(u64 *max_size)
>> return 0;
>> }
>>
>> +static const struct secvar_operations plpks_secvar_ops_static = {
>> + .get = plpks_get_variable,
>> + .set = plpks_set_variable,
>> + .format = plpks_secvar_format,
>> + .max_size = plpks_max_size,
>> + .config_attrs = config_attrs,
>> + .var_names = plpks_var_names_static,
>> +};
>>
>> -static const struct secvar_operations plpks_secvar_ops = {
>> +static const struct secvar_operations plpks_secvar_ops_dynamic = {
>> .get = plpks_get_variable,
>> .set = plpks_set_variable,
>> .format = plpks_secvar_format,
>> .max_size = plpks_max_size,
>> .config_attrs = config_attrs,
>> - .var_names = plpks_var_names,
>> + .var_names = plpks_var_names_dynamic,
>> };
>>
>> static int plpks_secvar_init(void)
>> {
>> + u8 mode;
>> +
>> if (!plpks_is_available())
>> return -ENODEV;
>>
>> - return set_secvar_ops(&plpks_secvar_ops);
>> + mode = plpks_get_sb_keymgmt_mode();
>> + if (mode)
>> + return set_secvar_ops(&plpks_secvar_ops_dynamic);
>> + return set_secvar_ops(&plpks_secvar_ops_static);
>> }
>> machine_device_initcall(pseries, plpks_secvar_init);
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-05-06 19:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-04-30 9:03 [PATCH 0/3] Enhancements to the secvar interface in static " Srish Srinivasan
2025-04-30 9:03 ` [PATCH 1/3] powerpc/pseries: Correct secvar format representation for static key management Srish Srinivasan
2025-04-30 15:20 ` Nayna Jain
2025-05-05 8:36 ` Andrew Donnellan
2025-05-06 18:59 ` Srish Srinivasan
2025-05-07 6:17 ` Andrew Donnellan
2025-05-07 15:48 ` Srish Srinivasan
2025-05-12 9:51 ` Andrew Donnellan
2025-05-12 9:55 ` Andrew Donnellan
2025-05-12 10:16 ` Srish Srinivasan
2025-05-06 19:27 ` Nayna Jain
2025-05-07 6:03 ` Andrew Donnellan
2025-04-30 9:03 ` [PATCH 2/3] powerpc/secvar: Expose secvars relevant to the key management mode Srish Srinivasan
2025-04-30 15:22 ` Nayna Jain
2025-05-05 7:23 ` Andrew Donnellan
2025-05-06 19:00 ` Srish Srinivasan [this message]
2025-04-30 9:03 ` [PATCH 3/3] integrity/platform_certs: Allow loading of keys in static " Srish Srinivasan
2025-04-30 15:22 ` Nayna Jain
2025-05-05 7:55 ` Andrew Donnellan
2025-05-06 19:00 ` Srish Srinivasan
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