From: "Nikunj A. Dadhania" <nikunj@amd.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
bp@alien8.de, x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
mingo@redhat.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, pgonda@google.com,
pbonzini@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 19/20] x86/kvmclock: Skip kvmclock when Secure TSC is available
Date: Fri, 20 Sep 2024 10:45:15 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2870c470-06c8-aa9c-0257-3f9652a4ccd8@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ZurCbP7MesWXQbqZ@google.com>
On 9/18/2024 5:37 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 16, 2024, Nikunj A. Dadhania wrote:
>> On 9/13/2024 11:00 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>>>> Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
>>>> Tested-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
>>>> ---
>>>> arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c | 2 +-
>>>> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
>>>> index 5b2c15214a6b..3d03b4c937b9 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
>>>> @@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ void __init kvmclock_init(void)
>>>> {
>>>> u8 flags;
>>>>
>>>> - if (!kvm_para_available() || !kvmclock)
>>>> + if (!kvm_para_available() || !kvmclock || cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SECURE_TSC))
>>>
>>> I would much prefer we solve the kvmclock vs. TSC fight in a generic way. Unless
>>> I've missed something, the fact that the TSC is more trusted in the SNP/TDX world
>>> is simply what's forcing the issue, but it's not actually the reason why Linux
>>> should prefer the TSC over kvmclock. The underlying reason is that platforms that
>>> support SNP/TDX are guaranteed to have a stable, always running TSC, i.e. that the
>>> TSC is a superior timesource purely from a functionality perspective. That it's
>>> more secure is icing on the cake.
>>
>> Are you suggesting that whenever the guest is either SNP or TDX, kvmclock
>> should be disabled assuming that timesource is stable and always running?
>
> No, I'm saying that the guest should prefer the raw TSC over kvmclock if the TSC
> is stable, irrespective of SNP or TDX. This is effectively already done for the
> timekeeping base (see commit 7539b174aef4 ("x86: kvmguest: use TSC clocksource if
> invariant TSC is exposed")), but the scheduler still uses kvmclock thanks to the
> kvm_sched_clock_init() code.
The kvm-clock and tsc-early both are having the rating of 299. As they are of
same rating, kvm-clock is being picked up first.
Is it fine to drop the clock rating of kvmclock to 298 ? With this tsc-early will
be picked up instead.
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
index fafdbf813ae3..1982cee74354 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ void __init kvmclock_init(void)
{
u8 flags;
- if (!kvm_para_available() || !kvmclock || cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SNP_SECURE_TSC))
+ if (!kvm_para_available() || !kvmclock)
return;
if (kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE2)) {
@@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ void __init kvmclock_init(void)
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC) &&
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NONSTOP_TSC) &&
!check_tsc_unstable())
- kvm_clock.rating = 299;
+ kvm_clock.rating = 298;
clocksource_register_hz(&kvm_clock, NSEC_PER_SEC);
pv_info.name = "KVM";
[ 0.000000] kvm-clock: Using msrs 4b564d01 and 4b564d00
[ 0.000001] kvm-clock: using sched offset of 6630881179920185 cycles
[ 0.001266] clocksource: kvm-clock: mask: 0xffffffffffffffff max_cycles: 0x1cd42e4dffb, max_idle_ns: 881590591483 ns
[ 0.005347] tsc: Detected 1996.247 MHz processor
[ 0.263100] clocksource: tsc-early: mask: 0xffffffffffffffff max_cycles: 0x398caa9ddcb, max_idle_ns: 881590739785 ns
[ 0.980456] clocksource: Switched to clocksource tsc-early
[ 1.059332] clocksource: tsc: mask: 0xffffffffffffffff max_cycles: 0x398caa9ddcb, max_idle_ns: 881590739785 ns
[ 1.062094] clocksource: Switched to clocksource tsc
> The other aspect of this to consider is wallclock. If I'm reading the code
> correctly, _completely_ disabling kvmclock will case the kernel to keep using the
> RTC for wallclock. Using the RTC is an amusingly bad decision for SNP and TDX
> (and regular VMs), as the RTC is a slooow emulation path and it's still very much
> controlled by the untrusted host.
Right, this is not expected.
> Unless you have a better idea for what to do with wallclock, I think the right
> approach is to come up a cleaner way to prefer TSC over kvmclock for timekeeping
> and the scheduler, but leave wallclock as-is. And then for SNP and TDX, "assert"
> that the TSC is being used instead of kvmclock. Presumably, all SNP and TDX
> hosts provide a stable TSC, so there's probably no reason for the guest to even
> care if the TSC is "secure".
>
> Note, past me missed the wallclock side of things[*], so I don't think hiding
> kvmclock entirely is the best solution.
>
> [*] https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZOjF2DMBgW%2FzVvL3@google.com
Regards
Nikunj
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-09-20 5:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 66+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-07-31 15:07 [PATCH v11 00/20] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCH v11 01/20] virt: sev-guest: Replace dev_dbg with pr_debug Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-08-27 8:48 ` [tip: x86/sev] virt: sev-guest: Replace dev_dbg() with pr_debug() tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCH v11 02/20] virt: sev-guest: Rename local guest message variables Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-08-27 8:48 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 17:22 ` [PATCH v11 02/20] " Tom Lendacky
2024-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCH v11 03/20] virt: sev-guest: Fix user-visible strings Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-08-27 8:48 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 17:26 ` [PATCH v11 03/20] " Tom Lendacky
2024-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCH v11 04/20] virt: sev-guest: Ensure the SNP guest messages do not exceed a page Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-08-27 8:48 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCH v11 05/20] virt: sev-guest: Use AES GCM crypto library Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCH v11 06/20] x86/sev: Handle failures from snp_init() Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-08-27 11:32 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-08-28 4:47 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-08-28 9:49 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-08-28 10:16 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-08-28 10:23 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCH v11 07/20] x86/sev: Cache the secrets page address Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCH v11 08/20] virt: sev-guest: Consolidate SNP guest messaging parameters to a struct Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-04 14:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-09-05 4:35 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 09/20] virt: sev-guest: Reduce the scope of SNP command mutex Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-12 21:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-09-13 4:26 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-09-13 14:06 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 10/20] virt: sev-guest: Carve out SNP message context structure Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 15:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 11/20] x86/sev: Carve out and export SNP guest messaging init routines Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 15:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 12/20] x86/sev: Relocate SNP guest messaging routines to common code Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 16:27 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-09-16 4:42 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 13/20] x86/cc: Add CC_ATTR_GUEST_SECURE_TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 15:21 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-09-16 4:53 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 14/20] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 16:29 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 15/20] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 16/20] x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP interception " Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 16:49 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 17/20] x86/sev: Allow Secure TSC feature for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 16:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-09-16 6:23 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 18/20] x86/sev: Mark Secure TSC as reliable clocksource Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 16:59 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 19/20] x86/kvmclock: Skip kvmclock when Secure TSC is available Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 17:19 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-09-13 17:30 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-09-16 15:20 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-09-18 12:07 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-09-20 5:15 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania [this message]
2024-09-20 7:21 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-09-20 8:54 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-09-25 8:53 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-09-25 12:55 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-09-30 6:27 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-09-30 21:20 ` Thomas Gleixner
2024-10-01 4:26 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-01 14:36 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 20/20] x86/cpu/amd: Do not print FW_BUG for Secure TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 17:21 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-09-13 17:42 ` Jim Mattson
2024-09-16 11:40 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-09-16 20:21 ` Jim Mattson
2024-08-14 4:14 ` [PATCH v11 00/20] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A. Dadhania
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