From: "Nikunj A. Dadhania" <nikunj@amd.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
bp@alien8.de, x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
mingo@redhat.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, pgonda@google.com,
pbonzini@redhat.com, peterz@infradead.org,
gautham.shenoy@amd.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 19/20] x86/kvmclock: Skip kvmclock when Secure TSC is available
Date: Wed, 25 Sep 2024 14:23:15 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ef194c25-22d8-204e-ffb6-8f9f0a0621fb@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <4cc88621-d548-d3a1-d667-13586b7bfea8@amd.com>
On 9/20/2024 2:24 PM, Nikunj A. Dadhania wrote:
> On 9/20/2024 12:51 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>> On Fri, Sep 20, 2024, Nikunj A. Dadhania wrote:
>>> On 9/18/2024 5:37 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>>>> On Mon, Sep 16, 2024, Nikunj A. Dadhania wrote:
>>>>> On 9/13/2024 11:00 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
>>>>>>> Tested-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
>>>>>>> ---
>>>>>>> arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c | 2 +-
>>>>>>> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
>>>>>>> index 5b2c15214a6b..3d03b4c937b9 100644
>>>>>>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
>>>>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
>>>>>>> @@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ void __init kvmclock_init(void)
>>>>>>> {
>>>>>>> u8 flags;
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> - if (!kvm_para_available() || !kvmclock)
>>>>>>> + if (!kvm_para_available() || !kvmclock || cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SECURE_TSC))
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I would much prefer we solve the kvmclock vs. TSC fight in a generic way. Unless
>>>>>> I've missed something, the fact that the TSC is more trusted in the SNP/TDX world
>>>>>> is simply what's forcing the issue, but it's not actually the reason why Linux
>>>>>> should prefer the TSC over kvmclock. The underlying reason is that platforms that
>>>>>> support SNP/TDX are guaranteed to have a stable, always running TSC, i.e. that the
>>>>>> TSC is a superior timesource purely from a functionality perspective. That it's
>>>>>> more secure is icing on the cake.
>>>>>
>>>>> Are you suggesting that whenever the guest is either SNP or TDX, kvmclock
>>>>> should be disabled assuming that timesource is stable and always running?
>>>>
>>>> No, I'm saying that the guest should prefer the raw TSC over kvmclock if the TSC
>>>> is stable, irrespective of SNP or TDX. This is effectively already done for the
>>>> timekeeping base (see commit 7539b174aef4 ("x86: kvmguest: use TSC clocksource if
>>>> invariant TSC is exposed")), but the scheduler still uses kvmclock thanks to the
>>>> kvm_sched_clock_init() code.
>>>
>>> The kvm-clock and tsc-early both are having the rating of 299. As they are of
>>> same rating, kvm-clock is being picked up first.
>>>
>>> Is it fine to drop the clock rating of kvmclock to 298 ? With this tsc-early will
>>> be picked up instead.
>>
>> IMO, it's ugly, but that's a problem with the rating system inasmuch as anything.
>>
>> But the kernel will still be using kvmclock for the scheduler clock, which is
>> undesirable.
>
> Agree, kvm_sched_clock_init() is still being called. The above hunk was to use
> tsc-early/tsc as the clocksource and not kvm-clock.
How about the below patch:
From: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2023 18:29:56 +0530
Subject: [RFC PATCH] x86/kvmclock: Prefer invariant TSC as the clocksource and
scheduler clock
For platforms that support stable and always running TSC, although the
kvm-clock rating is dropped to 299 to prefer TSC, the guest scheduler clock
still keeps on using the kvm-clock which is undesirable. Moreover, as the
kvm-clock and early-tsc clocksource are both registered with 299 rating,
kvm-clock is being picked up momentarily instead of selecting more stable
tsc-early clocksource.
kvm-clock: Using msrs 4b564d01 and 4b564d00
kvm-clock: using sched offset of 1799357702246960 cycles
clocksource: kvm-clock: mask: 0xffffffffffffffff max_cycles: 0x1cd42e4dffb, max_idle_ns: 881590591483 ns
tsc: Detected 1996.249 MHz processor
clocksource: tsc-early: mask: 0xffffffffffffffff max_cycles: 0x398cadd9d93, max_idle_ns: 881590552906 ns
clocksource: Switched to clocksource kvm-clock
clocksource: tsc: mask: 0xffffffffffffffff max_cycles: 0x398cadd9d93, max_idle_ns: 881590552906 ns
clocksource: Switched to clocksource tsc
Drop the kvm-clock rating to 298, so that tsc-early is picked up before
kvm-clock and use TSC for scheduler clock as well when the TSC is invariant
and stable.
Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
---
The issue we see here is that on bare-metal if the TSC is marked unstable,
then the sched-clock will fall back to jiffies. In the virtualization case,
do we want to fall back to kvm-clock when TSC is marked unstable?
---
arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c | 11 ++++++-----
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
index 5b2c15214a6b..c997b2628c4b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
@@ -317,9 +317,6 @@ void __init kvmclock_init(void)
if (kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE_STABLE_BIT))
pvclock_set_flags(PVCLOCK_TSC_STABLE_BIT);
- flags = pvclock_read_flags(&hv_clock_boot[0].pvti);
- kvm_sched_clock_init(flags & PVCLOCK_TSC_STABLE_BIT);
-
x86_platform.calibrate_tsc = kvm_get_tsc_khz;
x86_platform.calibrate_cpu = kvm_get_tsc_khz;
x86_platform.get_wallclock = kvm_get_wallclock;
@@ -341,8 +338,12 @@ void __init kvmclock_init(void)
*/
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC) &&
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NONSTOP_TSC) &&
- !check_tsc_unstable())
- kvm_clock.rating = 299;
+ !check_tsc_unstable()) {
+ kvm_clock.rating = 298;
+ } else {
+ flags = pvclock_read_flags(&hv_clock_boot[0].pvti);
+ kvm_sched_clock_init(flags & PVCLOCK_TSC_STABLE_BIT);
+ }
clocksource_register_hz(&kvm_clock, NSEC_PER_SEC);
pv_info.name = "KVM";
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-09-25 8:53 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 66+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-07-31 15:07 [PATCH v11 00/20] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCH v11 01/20] virt: sev-guest: Replace dev_dbg with pr_debug Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-08-27 8:48 ` [tip: x86/sev] virt: sev-guest: Replace dev_dbg() with pr_debug() tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCH v11 02/20] virt: sev-guest: Rename local guest message variables Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-08-27 8:48 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 17:22 ` [PATCH v11 02/20] " Tom Lendacky
2024-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCH v11 03/20] virt: sev-guest: Fix user-visible strings Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-08-27 8:48 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 17:26 ` [PATCH v11 03/20] " Tom Lendacky
2024-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCH v11 04/20] virt: sev-guest: Ensure the SNP guest messages do not exceed a page Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-08-27 8:48 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCH v11 05/20] virt: sev-guest: Use AES GCM crypto library Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCH v11 06/20] x86/sev: Handle failures from snp_init() Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-08-27 11:32 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-08-28 4:47 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-08-28 9:49 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-08-28 10:16 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-08-28 10:23 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCH v11 07/20] x86/sev: Cache the secrets page address Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCH v11 08/20] virt: sev-guest: Consolidate SNP guest messaging parameters to a struct Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-04 14:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-09-05 4:35 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 09/20] virt: sev-guest: Reduce the scope of SNP command mutex Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-12 21:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-09-13 4:26 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-09-13 14:06 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 10/20] virt: sev-guest: Carve out SNP message context structure Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 15:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 11/20] x86/sev: Carve out and export SNP guest messaging init routines Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 15:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 12/20] x86/sev: Relocate SNP guest messaging routines to common code Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 16:27 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-09-16 4:42 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 13/20] x86/cc: Add CC_ATTR_GUEST_SECURE_TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 15:21 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-09-16 4:53 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 14/20] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 16:29 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 15/20] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 16/20] x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP interception " Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 16:49 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 17/20] x86/sev: Allow Secure TSC feature for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 16:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-09-16 6:23 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 18/20] x86/sev: Mark Secure TSC as reliable clocksource Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 16:59 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 19/20] x86/kvmclock: Skip kvmclock when Secure TSC is available Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 17:19 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-09-13 17:30 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-09-16 15:20 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-09-18 12:07 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-09-20 5:15 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-09-20 7:21 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-09-20 8:54 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-09-25 8:53 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania [this message]
2024-09-25 12:55 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-09-30 6:27 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-09-30 21:20 ` Thomas Gleixner
2024-10-01 4:26 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-01 14:36 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCH v11 20/20] x86/cpu/amd: Do not print FW_BUG for Secure TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-09-13 17:21 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-09-13 17:42 ` Jim Mattson
2024-09-16 11:40 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-09-16 20:21 ` Jim Mattson
2024-08-14 4:14 ` [PATCH v11 00/20] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A. Dadhania
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