From: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol@kernel.org>
To: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+git@google.com>, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 05/10] efi/libstub: Use ucs2_string library for UTF-16 to UTF-8 conversion
Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2026 19:00:30 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2bcd2325-5ec4-4260-8f31-4526ba5a4aea@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260909115530.1924665-17-ardb+git@google.com>
On 9/9/26 13:55, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
>
> Don't rely on sprintf() with a wide string conversion modifier to
> convert the command line from UTF-16 to UTF-8. Instead, use the
> existing ucs2 string library routine that does the same. Note that while
> UEFI claims support for UTF-16, in practice it ignores surrogate pairs
> entirely, and so the simplified UCS-2 character set (where each
> character takes up exactly 2 bytes) is sufficient here.
>
> This removes the only user of sprintf() in the EFI stub, so drop that
> function as well.
>
> Since boot memory is plentiful on UEFI systems, just establish a worst
> case upper bound for the size of the buffer (which can never exceed
> COMMAND_LINE_SIZE), and allocate that first. Then, perform the
> conversion, and only fall back to processing the command line character
> by character if that resulted in truncation. This makes the common
> execution path much simpler.
>
> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
> ---
> drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile | 3 +-
> drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c | 100 ++++++++------------
> drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/vsprintf.c | 11 ---
> 3 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 73 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
> index 77a2b2d74f3f..12c0c7deb5cb 100644
> --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
> +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
> @@ -66,7 +66,8 @@ KBUILD_AFLAGS := $(KBUILD_CFLAGS) -D__ASSEMBLY__
> lib-y := efi-stub-helper.o gop.o secureboot.o tpm.o \
> file.o mem.o random.o randomalloc.o pci.o \
> skip_spaces.o lib-cmdline.o lib-ctype.o \
> - alignedmem.o printk.o vsprintf.o
> + alignedmem.o printk.o vsprintf.o \
> + lib-ucs2_string.o
>
> # include the stub's libfdt dependencies from lib/ when needed
> libfdt-deps := fdt_rw.c fdt_ro.c fdt_wip.c fdt.c \
> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c
> index f27f2e1f0019..4b51a0bf0e66 100644
> --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c
> +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c
> @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
> #include <linux/efi.h>
> #include <linux/kernel.h>
> #include <linux/overflow.h>
> +#include <linux/ucs2_string.h>
> #include <asm/efi.h>
> #include <asm/setup.h>
>
> @@ -334,81 +335,58 @@ char *efi_convert_cmdline(efi_loaded_image_t *image)
> {
> const efi_char16_t *options = efi_table_attr(image, load_options);
> u32 options_size = efi_table_attr(image, load_options_size);
> - int options_bytes = 0, safe_options_bytes = 0; /* UTF-8 bytes */
> - unsigned long cmdline_addr = 0;
> - const efi_char16_t *s2;
> - bool in_quote = false;
> + unsigned long options_chars = 0;
> + unsigned long cmdline_bytes;
> efi_status_t status;
> - u32 options_chars;
> + char *cmdline_addr;
>
> if (options_size > 0)
> efi_measure_tagged_event((unsigned long)options, options_size,
> EFISTUB_EVT_LOAD_OPTIONS);
>
> efi_apply_loadoptions_quirk((const void **)&options, &options_size);
> - options_chars = options_size / sizeof(efi_char16_t);
> -
> - if (options) {
> - s2 = options;
> - while (options_bytes < COMMAND_LINE_SIZE && options_chars--) {
> - efi_char16_t c = *s2++;
> -
> - if (c < 0x80) {
> - if (c == L'\0' || c == L'\n')
^^^^^^^^^^
This newline check is not present in the new version. The new code only
checks for NUL termination through ucs2_strnlen(). The patch description
says nothing about this, so maybe this is an omission?
> - break;
> - if (c == L'"')
> - in_quote = !in_quote;
> - else if (!in_quote && isspace((char)c))
> - safe_options_bytes = options_bytes;
> -
> - options_bytes++;
> - continue;
> - }
> -
> - /*
> - * Get the number of UTF-8 bytes corresponding to a
> - * UTF-16 character.
> - * The first part handles everything in the BMP.
> - */
> - options_bytes += 2 + (c >= 0x800);
> - /*
> - * Add one more byte for valid surrogate pairs. Invalid
> - * surrogates will be replaced with 0xfffd and take up
> - * only 3 bytes.
> - */
> - if ((c & 0xfc00) == 0xd800) {
> - /*
> - * If the very last word is a high surrogate,
> - * we must ignore it since we can't access the
> - * low surrogate.
> - */
> - if (!options_chars) {
> - options_bytes -= 3;
> - } else if ((*s2 & 0xfc00) == 0xdc00) {
> - options_bytes++;
> - options_chars--;
> - s2++;
> - }
> - }
> - }
> - if (options_bytes >= COMMAND_LINE_SIZE) {
> - options_bytes = safe_options_bytes;
> - efi_err("Command line is too long: truncated to %d bytes\n",
> - options_bytes);
> - }
> - }
> + if (options)
> + options_chars = ucs2_strnlen(options,
> + options_size / sizeof(efi_char16_t));
>
> - options_bytes++; /* NUL termination */
> + /* Each UCS-2 char takes up at most 3 UTF-8 bytes */
> + cmdline_bytes = min(3 * options_chars, COMMAND_LINE_SIZE - 1) + 1;
>
> - status = efi_bs_call(allocate_pool, EFI_LOADER_DATA, options_bytes,
> + status = efi_bs_call(allocate_pool, EFI_LOADER_DATA, cmdline_bytes,
> (void **)&cmdline_addr);
> if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
> return NULL;
>
> - snprintf((char *)cmdline_addr, options_bytes, "%.*ls",
> - options_bytes - 1, options);
> + if (ucs2_as_utf8_l(cmdline_addr, options, options_chars,
> + cmdline_bytes) >= COMMAND_LINE_SIZE) {
> + /*
> + * The output fills up the entire buffer, and may have been
> + * truncated. This can only happen when options_bytes equals
> + * COMMAND_LINE_SIZE.
If truncation occurs because there is not enough space left for a
multi-byte character, ucs2_as_utf8_l() returns a value below
COMMAND_LINE_SIZE.
Should the test instead check whether all the options_chars were consumed?
> + * Work backwards through the buffer to find a safe truncation
> + * point (i.e., a blank character not inside a quoted string).
> + */
> + int safe_pos[2] = {};
> + int in_quote = 0;
> +
> + for (int i = COMMAND_LINE_SIZE - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
> + char c = cmdline_addr[i];
> +
> + if (!c)
> + return cmdline_addr;
> + else if (c == '"')
> + in_quote ^= 1;
> + else if (!safe_pos[in_quote] && isspace(c))
> + safe_pos[in_quote] = i;
> + }
> +
> + efi_err("Command line is too long: truncated to %d bytes\n",
> + safe_pos[in_quote]);
> + cmdline_addr[safe_pos[in_quote]] = '\0';
> + }
>
> - return (char *)cmdline_addr;
> + return cmdline_addr;
> }
>
> /**
> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/vsprintf.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/vsprintf.c
> index 71c71c222346..dba136679172 100644
> --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/vsprintf.c
> +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/vsprintf.c
> @@ -551,14 +551,3 @@ int vsnprintf(char *buf, size_t size, const char *fmt, va_list ap)
>
> return pos;
> }
> -
> -int snprintf(char *buf, size_t size, const char *fmt, ...)
> -{
> - va_list args;
> - int i;
> -
> - va_start(args, fmt);
> - i = vsnprintf(buf, size, fmt, args);
> - va_end(args);
> - return i;> -}
Yours sincerely,
Vincent Mailhol
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-15 17:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-09 11:55 [PATCH v2 00/10] efi/libstub: Avoid UTF-16 conversion busywork Ard Biesheuvel
2026-09-09 11:55 ` [PATCH v2 01/10] x86/boot: Drop pointless re-implementation of panic() Ard Biesheuvel
2026-09-09 19:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-09-09 20:43 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2026-09-10 13:12 ` Kiryl Shutsemau
2026-09-11 7:32 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2026-09-12 6:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-09-12 8:41 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2026-09-12 17:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-09-13 16:35 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2026-09-13 18:11 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-09-09 11:55 ` [PATCH v2 02/10] lib/ucs2_string: Drop arbitrary input size limit and associated WARN() Ard Biesheuvel
2026-09-09 11:55 ` [PATCH v2 03/10] lib/ucs2_string: Suppress modinfo when __DISABLE_EXPORTS is set Ard Biesheuvel
2026-09-09 11:55 ` [PATCH v2 04/10] lib/ucs2_string: Split out ucs2_as_utf8_l() taking a separate limit Ard Biesheuvel
2026-09-16 10:26 ` Vincent Mailhol
2026-09-09 11:55 ` [PATCH v2 05/10] efi/libstub: Use ucs2_string library for UTF-16 to UTF-8 conversion Ard Biesheuvel
2026-09-15 17:00 ` Vincent Mailhol [this message]
2026-09-09 11:55 ` [PATCH v2 06/10] efi/libstub: Avoid efi_puts() for compile time constant strings Ard Biesheuvel
2026-09-15 17:01 ` Vincent Mailhol
2026-09-09 11:55 ` [PATCH v2 07/10] efi/libstub: Output UTF-16 directly from vsnprintf() Ard Biesheuvel
2026-09-09 11:55 ` [PATCH v2 08/10] efi/libstub: Add support for printing human readable GUIDs Ard Biesheuvel
2026-09-09 11:55 ` [PATCH v2 09/10] efi/libstub: Add efi_snprintf() to construct wide strings Ard Biesheuvel
2026-09-15 17:02 ` Vincent Mailhol
2026-09-09 11:55 ` [PATCH v2 10/10] efi/libstub: add initial Boot Loader Interface support Ard Biesheuvel
2026-09-15 17:02 ` Vincent Mailhol
2026-09-15 18:28 ` [PATCH v2 00/10] efi/libstub: Avoid UTF-16 conversion busywork Vincent Mailhol
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