[PATCH 1/2] x86/bugs: Don't fill RSB on VMEXIT with eIBRS+retpoline

[Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>]

eIBRS protects against RSB underflow/poisoning attacks.  Adding
retpoline to the mix doesn't change that.  Retpoline has a balanced
CALL/RET anyway.

So the current full RSB filling on VMEXIT with eIBRS+retpoline is
overkill.  Disable it (or do the VMEXIT_LITE mitigation if needed).

Suggested-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 47a01d4028f6..68bed17f0980 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1605,20 +1605,20 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(enum spectre_v2_
 	case SPECTRE_V2_NONE:
 		return;
 
-	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE:
 	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS:
+	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE:
+	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE:
 		if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB)) {
-			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE);
 			pr_info("Spectre v2 / PBRSB-eIBRS: Retire a single CALL on VMEXIT\n");
+			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE);
 		}
 		return;
 
-	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE:
 	case SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE:
 	case SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE:
 	case SPECTRE_V2_IBRS:
-		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT);
 		pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB : Filling RSB on VMEXIT\n");
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT);
 		return;
 	}
 
-- 
2.47.0