From: Alexander Lobakin <aleksander.lobakin@intel.com>
To: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>
Cc: David Heidelberg <david@ixit.cz>, <oe-linux-nfc@lists.linux.dev>,
<netdev@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
<stable@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net v2] nfc: digital: clamp SENSF_RES length to the destination buffer
Date: Wed, 3 Jun 2026 16:28:27 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2f3ea9d6-a483-427d-bf81-ff26627f4f1c@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260603141355.68156-1-doruk@0sec.ai>
From: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>
Date: Wed, 3 Jun 2026 16:13:55 +0200
> digital_in_recv_sensf_res() memcpy()s resp->len bytes from a remote
> NFC-F device response into the NFC_SENSF_RES_MAXSIZE-byte target.sensf_res
> field without an upper-bound check. A nearby malicious NFC-F device can
> send an oversized SENSF_RES response to overflow the stack-local struct
> nfc_target.
>
> Clamp resp->len to NFC_SENSF_RES_MAXSIZE before the copy.
>
> Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).
>
> Fixes: 8c0695e4998d ("NFC Digital: Add NFC-F technology support")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Lobakin <aleksander.lobakin@intel.com>
> ---
> v2:
> - Clamp resp->len with min_t() before the copy (Alexander Lobakin).
> - Add Fixes: tag and Cc: stable (Alexander Lobakin).
> - Frame as a stack buffer overflow (saved-return overwrite not demonstrated).
> net/nfc/digital_technology.c | 2 ++
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/net/nfc/digital_technology.c b/net/nfc/digital_technology.c
> index ae63c5eb0..ae6487c10 100644
> --- a/net/nfc/digital_technology.c
> +++ b/net/nfc/digital_technology.c
> @@ -778,6 +778,8 @@ static void digital_in_recv_sensf_res(struct nfc_digital_dev *ddev, void *arg,
>
> sensf_res = (struct digital_sensf_res *)resp->data;
>
> + resp->len = min_t(unsigned int, resp->len, NFC_SENSF_RES_MAXSIZE);
> +
> memcpy(target.sensf_res, sensf_res, resp->len);
> target.sensf_res_len = resp->len;
I was wondering whether we need to record this in the kernel log.
But given that a malicious device can and would be happy to flood with
such packets, it would be pr_warn_once() or something similar at max.
But I guess it's not needed at all, we can just silently clamp such packets?
Thanks,
Olek
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-06-03 14:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-06-03 14:13 Doruk Tan Ozturk
2026-06-03 14:28 ` Alexander Lobakin [this message]
2026-06-03 16:46 ` Doruk (0sec)
2026-06-06 12:10 ` David Heidelberg
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