From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: "Pratik R. Sampat" <prsampat@amd.com>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: tglx@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, seanjc@google.com,
pbonzini@redhat.com, kim.phillips@amd.com, nikunj@amd.com,
michael.roth@amd.com, ashish.kalra@amd.com
Subject: Re: [Patch v2 3/4] x86/sev: Add guest support for Enhanced SMT Protection
Date: Fri, 9 Oct 2026 14:18:51 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <3511498b-d72c-4fab-aafe-5d05d9d3f460@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <92a1de684bfb5d8633c2de0ed8511f33282a0d70.1791302373.git.prsampat@amd.com>
On 10/6/26 11:55, Pratik R. Sampat wrote:
> Enhanced SMT Protection requires every VMSA to carry the vCPU's identity
> and the mask of SMT siblings it may co-run with. The guest builds the
> VMSA itself when bringing up an AP, so populate both fields there, before
> the page is turned into a VMSA and while it is still writable.
>
> Fully set the sibling mask so that all threads of the same guest trust
> each other.
>
> Signed-off-by: Pratik R. Sampat <prsampat@amd.com>
Minor comment below, but otherwise:
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> ---
> v1..v2:
> * Add ESMTP to SNP_FEATURES_IMPL and SNP_FEATURES_IMPL_REQ
> ---
> arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c | 6 ++++--
> arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c | 13 +++++++++++++
> arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 4 +++-
> 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
> index c6512f2ea31e..4e0fa5a5f70b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
> @@ -188,7 +188,8 @@ bool sev_es_check_ghcb_fault(unsigned long address)
> MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BIT13 | \
> MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BIT15 | \
> MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_AVIC | \
> - MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BITS19_22 | \
> + MSR_AMD64_SNP_ESMT_PROT | \
> + MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BITS20_22 | \
> MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_MASK)
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_SECURE_AVIC
> @@ -204,7 +205,8 @@ bool sev_es_check_ghcb_fault(unsigned long address)
> */
> #define SNP_FEATURES_IMPL (MSR_AMD64_SNP_DEBUG_SWAP | \
> MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_TSC | \
> - SNP_FEATURE_SECURE_AVIC)
> + SNP_FEATURE_SECURE_AVIC | \
> + MSR_AMD64_SNP_ESMT_PROT)
>
> u64 snp_get_unsupported_features(u64 status)
> {
> diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
> index cc292d7c6fd1..730cff2700d4 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
> @@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ static const char * const sev_status_feat_names[] = {
> [MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMSA_REG_PROT_BIT] = "VMSARegProt",
> [MSR_AMD64_SNP_SMT_PROT_BIT] = "SMTProt",
> [MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_AVIC_BIT] = "SecureAVIC",
> + [MSR_AMD64_SNP_ESMT_PROT_BIT] = "ESMTProt",
> [MSR_AMD64_SNP_IBPB_ON_ENTRY_BIT] = "IBPBOnEntry",
> };
>
> @@ -849,6 +850,18 @@ static int wakeup_cpu_via_vmgexit(u32 apic_id, unsigned long start_ip, unsigned
> vmsa->vmpl = snp_vmpl;
> vmsa->sev_features = sev_status >> 2;
>
> + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP) &&
> + (sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SNP_ESMT_PROT)) {
You're using sev_status for ESMT_PROT, might as well use it for SNP, too,
instead of calling cc_platform_has().
Thanks,
Tom
> + vmsa->vcpu_id = apic_id;
> + /*
> + * The mask fully set puts every vCPU in one group, so any two
> + * of them may be co-resident. A legal ESMTP sibling must
> + * also match on ASID, so the sibling of a vCPU in guest mode is
> + * always either another vCPU of this same guest or idle.
> + */
> + vmsa->vcpu_sibling_mask = U32_MAX;
> + }
> +
> /* Populate AP's TSC scale/offset to get accurate TSC values. */
> if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SNP_SECURE_TSC)) {
> vmsa->tsc_scale = snp_tsc_scale;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> index fbcb3313e946..6fd26151d146 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> @@ -745,7 +745,9 @@
> #define MSR_AMD64_SNP_SMT_PROT BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SNP_SMT_PROT_BIT)
> #define MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_AVIC_BIT 18
> #define MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_AVIC BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_AVIC_BIT)
> -#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BITS19_22 GENMASK_ULL(22, 19)
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_ESMT_PROT_BIT 19
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_ESMT_PROT BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SNP_ESMT_PROT_BIT)
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BITS20_22 GENMASK_ULL(22, 20)
> #define MSR_AMD64_SNP_IBPB_ON_ENTRY_BIT 23
> #define MSR_AMD64_SNP_IBPB_ON_ENTRY BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SNP_IBPB_ON_ENTRY_BIT)
> #define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESV_BIT 24
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-09 19:19 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-06 16:54 [Patch v2 0/4] Introduce Enhanced SMT Protection for SEV-SNP Pratik R. Sampat
2026-10-06 16:54 ` [Patch v2 1/4] KVM: SVM: Re-queue events that were never injected Pratik R. Sampat
2026-10-09 19:21 ` Tom Lendacky
2026-10-06 16:54 ` [Patch v2 2/4] KVM: SVM: Add host support for Enhanced SMT Protection Pratik R. Sampat
2026-10-09 19:05 ` Tom Lendacky
2026-10-09 19:40 ` Pratik R. Sampat
2026-10-09 20:05 ` Tom Lendacky
2026-10-06 16:55 ` [Patch v2 3/4] x86/sev: Add guest " Pratik R. Sampat
2026-10-09 19:18 ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2026-10-09 19:43 ` Pratik R. Sampat
2026-10-06 16:55 ` [Patch v2 4/4] x86/hyperv: " Pratik R. Sampat
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