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From: richard offer <offer@sgi.com>
To: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <ag@bestbits.at>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@transmeta.com>,
	lsm <linux-security-module@wirex.com>, "Ted Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
	lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Stephen Tweedie <sct@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH] Extended Attributes for Security Modules
Date: Tue, 15 Apr 2003 09:58:04 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <385390000.1050425884@changeling.engr.sgi.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1050414107.16051.70.camel@moss-huskers.epoch.ncsc.mil>



* frm sds@epoch.ncsc.mil "04/15/03 09:41:48 -0400" | sed '1,$s/^/* /'
*
* 
* Note that LSM intentionally does not provide any mechanism itself for
* sharing the security fields of the kernel data structures.  Stacking has
* to be handled by the principal security module.  

I see modules as empheral, but attritbutes as permanant. If I'm running one
LSM module, I reboot and use a different LSM module, what happens to the
attributes that the first module added to the file ?

Either we should guarantee that modules only touch attributes they know
about---ignoring all others (but not overwriting them), or we have separate
namespaces for each module's attributes.

Stacking modules will work with either scheme, but its seems to be that
switching policies over a reboot could easily be broken by a scheme that
shared a single namespace.
 
* -- 
* Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
* National Security Agency

richard.

-- 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Richard Offer                     Technical Lead, Trust Technology, SGI
"Specialization is for insects"
_______________________________________________________________________


  reply	other threads:[~2003-04-15 16:46 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2003-04-10 12:06 Stephen Smalley
2003-04-13 22:57 ` Andreas Gruenbacher
2003-04-15 13:41   ` Stephen Smalley
2003-04-15 16:58     ` richard offer [this message]
2003-04-15 18:19       ` Stephen Smalley
2003-04-16 13:47       ` Stephen Smalley
2003-04-16 22:02         ` richard offer
2003-04-17  4:24           ` Stephen Smalley
2003-04-17 20:30             ` Chris Wright
2003-04-17 20:53               ` richard offer
2003-04-18  1:07                 ` Chris Wright
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2003-04-15 18:33 Chuck Ebbert
2003-04-15 18:56 ` Chris Wright
2003-04-08 20:26 Stephen Smalley

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