From: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC] cgroups: implement device whitelist lsm (v2)
Date: Fri, 14 Mar 2008 17:05:14 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <47DA861A.2020905@openvz.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20080314135817.GE8744@sergelap.austin.ibm.com>
Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> Quoting Pavel Emelyanov (xemul@openvz.org):
>> Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>>> Quoting James Morris (jmorris@namei.org):
>>>> On Thu, 13 Mar 2008, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Quoting James Morris (jmorris@namei.org):
>>>>>> On Thu, 13 Mar 2008, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> True, but while this change simplifies the code a bit, the semantics
>>>>>>> seem more muddled - devcg will be enforcing when CONFIG_CGROUP_DEV=y
>>>>>>> and:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> SECURITY=n or
>>>>>>> rootplug is enabled
>>>>>>> capabilities is enabled
>>>>>>> smack is enabled
>>>>>>> selinux+capabilities is enabled
>>>>>> Well, this is how real systems are going to be deployed.
>>>>> Sorry, do you mean with capabilities?
>>>> Yes.
>>>>
>>>> All Fedora, RHEL, CentOS etc. ship with SELinux+capabilities. I can't
>>>> imagine not enabling them on other kernels.
>>>>
>>>>>> It becomes confusing, IMHO, if you have to change which secondary LSM you
>>>>>> stack with SELinux to enable a cgroup feature.
>>>>> So you're saying selinux without capabilities should still be able to
>>>>> use dev_cgroup? (Just making sure I understand right)
>>>> Nope, SELinux always stacks with capabilities, so havng the cgroup hooks
>>>> in capabilities makes sense (rather than having us change the secondary
>>>> stacking LSM just to enable a feature).
>>> Oh, ok.
>>>
>>> Will let the patch stand until Pavel and Greg comment then.
>> Well, I saw your previous patch, that was implemented as just another
>> LSM module and I liked it except for the LSM dependency.
>
> James and Stephen agree with your LSM qualms. I suppose we could add
Thanks!
> cgroups next to the lsm hooks. I suspect Paul Menage would complain
> about that (Paul?), and I do think it's silly as they are security
> questions, not group tracking questions, but if it's what people want
> I can send out a new patch next week.
The way I see this is: cgroups provide a common way to group tasks
and an API for general configuration - that's the controller "face",
and it's up to the controller to decide where he turns his "back",
IOW where the hooks are placed. For the memory controller - they are
injected directly into the mm code. For this controller, I think it
would be OK to use LSM or about-LSM hooks.
>> Since this version can happily work w/o LSM, I like it too :)
>
> In an earlier version I asked whether you had any experience with usual
> # rules per container. Do you have an idea? Right now the whitelist is
> a straight list we search through linearly. If # rules is generally
> tiny then I'm inclined to keep it that way...
The # of rules usually has a linear dependency on the number of containers
(each of then has to have an access to /dev/null,zero,random at least), so
having 100 containers we will have to scan through a 300-entries list. I'd
vote for a hash table or a radix/binary/rb tree for that. Or any other way
for non-linear search you can provide :)
> thanks,
> -serge
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2008-03-14 14:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2008-03-13 3:27 Serge E. Hallyn
2008-03-13 9:25 ` James Morris
2008-03-13 13:18 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-03-13 13:50 ` James Morris
2008-03-13 14:38 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-03-13 22:27 ` James Morris
2008-03-13 22:46 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-03-13 23:49 ` James Morris
2008-03-14 1:41 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-03-14 4:47 ` Greg KH
2008-03-14 13:54 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-03-14 13:58 ` Pavel Emelyanov
2008-03-14 15:45 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-03-14 15:54 ` Pavel Emelyanov
2008-03-14 16:57 ` Stephen Smalley
2008-03-14 9:28 ` Pavel Emelyanov
2008-03-14 13:58 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-03-14 14:05 ` Pavel Emelyanov [this message]
2008-03-14 14:37 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-03-14 15:07 ` Pavel Emelyanov
2008-03-14 14:12 ` Paul Menage
2008-03-14 14:42 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-03-16 0:59 ` Paul Menage
2008-03-14 2:51 ` Casey Schaufler
2008-03-14 9:16 ` Paul Menage
2008-03-14 14:05 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-03-14 14:15 ` Paul Menage
2008-03-14 14:35 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-03-16 0:57 ` Paul Menage
2008-03-14 9:18 ` Paul Menage
2008-03-14 14:00 ` Serge E. Hallyn
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=47DA861A.2020905@openvz.org \
--to=xemul@openvz.org \
--cc=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
--cc=greg@kroah.com \
--cc=jmorris@namei.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=sds@epoch.ncsc.mil \
--cc=serue@us.ibm.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox
all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®