From: pageexec@freemail.hu
To: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, tglx@tglx.de, hpa@zytor.com
Subject: Re: [patch] Add basic sanity checks to the syscall execution patch
Date: Fri, 05 Sep 2008 14:00:38 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <48C11F66.18988.341780A@pageexec.freemail.hu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20080905114233.GA27878@elte.hu>
On 5 Sep 2008 at 13:42, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> The other, more fundamental problem that nobody has mentioned so far is
> that the check returns -ENOSYS and thus makes rootkit attacks _more
> robust_ and hence more likely!
>
> The far better solution would be to insert uncertainty into the picture:
> some sort of low-frequency watchdog [runs once a second or so] that
> tries to hide itself from the general kernel scope as much as possible,
> perhaps as ELF-PIC code at some randomized location, triggered by some
> frequently used and opaque kernel facility that an attacker can not
> afford to block or fully filter, and which would just check integrity
> periodically and with little cost.
there's that adage about history being repeated by those not knowing it ;)
for details see the series based around bypassing Vista's PatchGuard at:
http://uninformed.org/?v=3
http://uninformed.org/?v=6
http://uninformed.org/?v=8
> A good benchmark for such a silent alarm facility would be whether an
> experienced kernel developer could reliably tell it via a kgdb session
> and full access to memory and system symbols that such a silent alarm is
> running on a box. If he cannot do it reliably then there's probably no
> good way for an attacker either.
i believe the above mentioned papers prove that it's not a good benchmark ;)
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2008-09-05 12:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2008-09-04 2:51 Arjan van de Ven
2008-09-04 12:01 ` Andi Kleen
2008-09-04 12:34 ` Alan Cox
2008-09-04 13:06 ` Andi Kleen
2008-09-04 12:44 ` Arjan van de Ven
2008-09-05 9:43 ` pageexec
2008-09-05 10:14 ` Benjamin Herrenschmidt
2008-09-05 10:49 ` pageexec
2008-09-05 10:57 ` Benjamin Herrenschmidt
2008-09-05 11:42 ` Ingo Molnar
2008-09-05 12:00 ` pageexec [this message]
2008-09-05 15:42 ` Ingo Molnar
2008-09-05 16:23 ` pageexec
2008-09-05 16:52 ` Ingo Molnar
2008-09-05 17:26 ` Andi Kleen
2008-09-05 19:42 ` pageexec
2008-09-05 20:48 ` Andi Kleen
2008-09-05 19:37 ` pageexec
2008-09-06 15:42 ` Ingo Molnar
2008-09-07 0:17 ` pageexec
2008-09-05 12:01 ` Andi Kleen
2008-09-05 20:41 ` Willy Tarreau
2008-09-06 15:45 ` Ingo Molnar
2008-09-06 16:34 ` Jeroen van Rijn
2008-09-07 12:53 ` Pavel Machek
2008-09-05 16:05 ` Arjan van de Ven
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