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From: Matt Brown <matt@nmatt.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com" 
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM
Date: Fri, 9 Jun 2017 09:15:27 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <4bf3331c-9c02-1d76-01a8-92290800db7c@nmatt.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jKWJV34g5TMDtJLTxF1irijay7KMK3s5oxz8ZYTJZkV5Q@mail.gmail.com>

On 6/9/17 8:55 AM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 9, 2017 at 3:18 AM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
>> On Thu, 2017-06-08 at 23:50 -0400, Matt Brown wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> *  Issues:
>>>>>    *  Can be bypassed by interpreted languages such as python. You can run
>>>>>       malicious code by doing: python -c 'evil code'
>>>>
>>>> What's the recommendation for people interested in using TPE but
>>>> having interpreters installed?
>>>>
>>>
>>> If you don't need a given interpreter installed, uninstall it. While
>>> this is common sense system hardening it especially would make a
>>> difference under the TPE threat model.
>>>
>>> I don't have a knock down answer for this. Interpreters are a hard
>>> problem for TPE.
>>
>> You might be interested in the minor LSM named "shebang", that I
>> posted as a proof of concept back in January, which restricts the
>> python interactive prompt/interpreter, but allows the scripts
>> themselves to be executed.
> 
> https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9547405/
> 
> Maybe these could be merged and the interpreter string could be made
> into a configurable list?
> 

Yes this looks promising. I'll look into integrating this.

Matt

  reply	other threads:[~2017-06-09 13:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-06-08  3:43 [PATCH v2 0/1] " Matt Brown
2017-06-08  3:43 ` [PATCH v2 1/1] " Matt Brown
2017-06-09  2:38   ` Kees Cook
2017-06-09  3:50     ` Matt Brown
2017-06-09 10:18       ` Mimi Zohar
2017-06-09 12:55         ` Kees Cook
2017-06-09 13:15           ` Matt Brown [this message]
2017-06-09 13:16           ` Mimi Zohar
2017-06-09 13:18             ` [kernel-hardening] " Matt Brown
2017-06-09 13:44               ` Mimi Zohar
2017-06-16  2:25   ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-16  2:25   ` [RFC PATCH] print_tpe_error() can be static kbuild test robot
2017-06-08 18:37 ` [PATCH v2 0/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM Alan Cox
2017-06-08 19:01   ` Matt Brown
2017-06-08 19:23     ` Alan Cox
2017-06-11 11:30     ` Mickaël Salaün
2017-06-12  0:04       ` Matt Brown

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