From: Matt Brown <matt@nmatt.com>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
"Alan Cox" <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: james.l.morris@oracle.com, serge@hallyn.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM
Date: Sun, 11 Jun 2017 20:04:59 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <d3b11dde-be5c-0bb8-6573-b331c593c9f7@nmatt.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <9d175249-c9f3-daba-bae4-f60dc97795e6@digikod.net>
On 06/11/2017 07:30 AM, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>
> On 08/06/2017 21:01, Matt Brown wrote:
>> On 6/8/17 2:37 PM, Alan Cox wrote:
>>>> http://phrack.org/issues/52/6.html#article
>>>>
>>>> | A trusted path is one that is inside a root owned directory that
>>>> | is not group or world writable. /bin, /usr/bin, /usr/local/bin, are
>>>> | (under normal circumstances) considered trusted. Any non-root
>>>> | users home directory is not trusted, nor is /tmp.
>>>
>>> Note that in the real world the trusted path would and should also
>>> require that any elements of the path above that point are also locked
>>> down if you are using path based models. Ie you need to ensure nobody has
>>> the ability to rename /usr or /usr/local before you trust /usr/local/bin.
>>>
>>
>> So actually in this LSM it's not so much full paths that are trusted,
>> rather it checks that the directory containing the program is only
>> writable by root and that the program itself is only writable by root.
>>
>> For example, consider the following:
>>
>> /user/ with permissions drwxr-xr-x user user
>> /user/user-owned/ with permissions drwxr-xr-x user user
>> /user/user-owned/root-owned/ with permissions drwxr-xr-x root root
>> /user/user-owned/root-owned/exe with permissions -rwxr-xr-x root root
>
> Some tests would make this scenario clear. ;)
>
> You can take a look at how seccomp-bpf does with the test_harness.h
> helper. A new kselftest_harness.h will be available soon to not include
> a file from the seccomp-bpf directory (cf. linux-next).
>
I'll take a look at those. Thanks!
Matt
prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-06-12 0:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-06-08 3:43 Matt Brown
2017-06-08 3:43 ` [PATCH v2 1/1] " Matt Brown
2017-06-09 2:38 ` Kees Cook
2017-06-09 3:50 ` Matt Brown
2017-06-09 10:18 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-06-09 12:55 ` Kees Cook
2017-06-09 13:15 ` Matt Brown
2017-06-09 13:16 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-06-09 13:18 ` [kernel-hardening] " Matt Brown
2017-06-09 13:44 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-06-16 2:25 ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-16 2:25 ` [RFC PATCH] print_tpe_error() can be static kbuild test robot
2017-06-08 18:37 ` [PATCH v2 0/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM Alan Cox
2017-06-08 19:01 ` Matt Brown
2017-06-08 19:23 ` Alan Cox
2017-06-11 11:30 ` Mickaël Salaün
2017-06-12 0:04 ` Matt Brown [this message]
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