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From: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>
To: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Andrey Vagin <avagin@virtuozzo.com>,
	Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com>,
	Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>,
	X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v2 4/6] x86: Disable PTI on compatibility mode
Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2018 14:11:32 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5220B2CE-5E06-4D86-B072-AB7727D54F6E@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAJwJo6ZxnuG9PyP2H_gGq_gTRhE7kzWk1OEtGwQ9dk+Px8aWGQ@mail.gmail.com>

Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com> wrote:

> 2018-02-16 7:11 GMT+00:00 Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>:
>> On Thu, Feb 15, 2018 at 11:29:42PM +0000, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> ...
>>>>>> +bool pti_handle_segment_not_present(long error_code)
>>>>>> +{
>>>>>> +       if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
>>>>>> +               return false;
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> +       if ((unsigned short)error_code != GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER_CS << 3)
>>>>>> +               return false;
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> +       pti_reenable();
>>>>>> +       return true;
>>>>>> +}
>>>>> 
>>>>> Please don't.  You're trying to emulate the old behavior here, but
>>>>> you're emulating it wrong.  In particular, you won't trap on LAR.
>>>> 
>>>> Yes, I thought I’ll manage to address LAR, but failed. I thought you said
>>>> this is not a “show-stopper”. I’ll adapt your approach of using prctl, although
>>>> it really limits the benefit of this mechanism.
>>> 
>>> It's possible we could get away with adding the prctl but making the
>>> default be that only the bitness that matches the program being run is
>>> allowed.  After all, it's possible that CRIU is literally the only
>>> program that switches bitness using the GDT.  (DOSEMU2 definitely does
>>> cross-bitness stuff, but it uses the LDT as far as I know.)  And I've
>>> never been entirely sure that CRIU fully counts toward the Linux
>>> "don't break ABI" guarantee.
>>> 
>>> Linus, how would you feel about, by default, preventing 64-bit
>>> programs from long-jumping to __USER32_CS and vice versa?  I think it
>>> has some value as a hardening measure.  I've certainly engaged in some
>>> exploit shenanigans myself that took advantage of the ability to long
>>> jump/ret to change bitness at will.  This wouldn't affect users of
>>> modify_ldt() -- 64-bit programs could still create and use their own
>>> private 32-bit segments with modify_ldt(), and seccomp can (and
>>> should!) prevent that in sandboxed programs.
>>> 
>>> In general, I prefer an approach where everything is explicit to an
>>> approach where we almost, but not quite, emulate the weird historical
>>> behavior.
>>> 
>>> Pavel and Cyrill, how annoying would it be if CRIU had to do an extra
>>> arch_prctl() to enable its cross-bitness shenanigans when
>>> checkpointing and restoring a 32-bit program?
>> 
>> I think this should not be a problem for criu (CC'ing Dima, who has
>> been working on compat mode support in criu). As far as I remember
>> we initiate restoring of 32 bit tasks in native 64 bit mode (well,
>> ia32e to be precise :) mode and then, once everything is ready,
>> we changing the mode by doing a return to __USER32_CS descriptor.
>> So this won't be painful to add additional prctl call here.
> 
> Yeah, restoring will still be easy..
> But checkpointing will be harder if we can't switch to 64-bit mode.
> ATM we have one 64-bit parasite binary, which does all seizing job
> for both 64 and 32 bit binaries.
> So, if you can't switch back to 64-bit from 32-bit mode, we'll need
> to keep two parasites.

I can allow to switch back and forth by dynamically enabling/disabling PTI.
Andy, Dave, do you think it makes it a viable option? Should I respin
another version of the patch-set?

  reply	other threads:[~2018-02-16 22:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-02-15 16:35 [PATCH RFC v2 0/6] x86: Disabling PTI in " Nadav Amit
2018-02-15 16:35 ` [PATCH RFC v2 1/6] x86: Skip PTI when disable indication is set Nadav Amit
2018-02-15 18:10   ` Dave Hansen
2018-02-15 19:51   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-15 20:51     ` Nadav Amit
2018-02-15 23:35       ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-15 16:35 ` [PATCH RFC v2 2/6] x86: Save pti_disable for each mm_context Nadav Amit
2018-02-15 16:35 ` [PATCH RFC v2 3/6] x86: Switching page-table isolation Nadav Amit
2018-02-15 16:36 ` [PATCH RFC v2 4/6] x86: Disable PTI on compatibility mode Nadav Amit
2018-02-15 20:02   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-15 20:58     ` Nadav Amit
2018-02-15 23:29       ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-16  0:08         ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-16  0:22           ` Nadav Amit
2018-02-16  0:42             ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-16  3:03               ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-16  4:55                 ` Nadav Amit
2018-02-16  0:35           ` Andrew Cooper
2018-02-16 15:20           ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-16  7:11         ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2018-02-16 22:07           ` Dmitry Safonov
2018-02-16 22:11             ` Nadav Amit [this message]
2018-02-16 16:25     ` Dmitry Safonov
2018-02-15 16:36 ` [PATCH RFC v2 5/6] x86: Use global pages when PTI is disabled Nadav Amit
2018-02-15 16:54   ` Dave Hansen
2018-02-15 17:36     ` Nadav Amit
2018-02-15 17:47     ` Nadav Amit
2018-02-15 18:08       ` Dave Hansen
2018-02-15 19:53   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-15 20:32     ` Dave Hansen
2018-02-15 20:45       ` Nadav Amit
2018-02-15 16:36 ` [PATCH RFC v2 6/6] selftest: x86: test using CS64 on compatibility-mode Nadav Amit
2018-02-16  0:21 ` [PATCH RFC v2 0/6] x86: Disabling PTI in compatibility mode Dave Hansen
2018-02-16  0:25   ` Nadav Amit
2018-02-16  0:42     ` Dave Hansen
2018-02-16  0:48       ` Nadav Amit
2018-02-16  0:45     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-02-16  0:51       ` Nadav Amit
2018-02-16  1:04         ` Andrew Cooper
2018-02-16  3:05         ` Andy Lutomirski

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