From: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
To: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Ben Greear <greearb@candelatech.com>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>,
Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>,
Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] Documentation: Add section about CPU vulnerabilities for Spectre
Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 16:30:26 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <526833c7-b9b4-1847-9f9b-52dd248548ad@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <5ff842bb-e0b8-c4aa-134d-32c9d838a162@redhat.com>
On 6/17/19 4:22 PM, Jon Masters wrote:
>> + For kernel code that has been identified where data pointers could
>> + potentially be influenced for Spectre attacks, new "nospec" accessor
>> + macros are used to prevent speculative loading of data.
>
> Maybe explain that nospec (speculative clamping) relies on the absence
> of value prediction in the masking (in current hardware). It may NOT
> always be a safe approach in future hardware, where Spectre-v1 attacks
> are likely to persist but hardware may speculate about the mask value.
Something like the Arm CSDB barrier would seem to be potentially useful
for $FUTURE_X86 as a fence with lighter-weight semantics than an *fence.
Jon.
--
Computer Architect | Sent with my Fedora powered laptop
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-06-17 20:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-06-17 19:11 Tim Chen
2019-06-17 20:21 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-06-17 20:23 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-06-17 22:16 ` Jonathan Corbet
2019-06-17 23:22 ` Tim Chen
2019-06-17 20:22 ` Jon Masters
2019-06-17 20:30 ` Jon Masters [this message]
2019-06-18 20:05 ` Tim Chen
2019-06-18 20:33 ` Thomas Gleixner
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