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* [PATCH] md/raid5: validate payload size before accessing journal metadata
@ 2026-04-04  7:44 Junrui Luo
  2026-04-07  5:28 ` Yu Kuai
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Junrui Luo @ 2026-04-04  7:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Song Liu, Yu Kuai, Li Nan, Shaohua Li
  Cc: Song Liu, linux-raid, linux-kernel, Yuhao Jiang, stable, Junrui Luo

r5c_recovery_analyze_meta_block() and
r5l_recovery_verify_data_checksum_for_mb() iterate over payloads in a
journal metadata block using on-disk payload size fields without
validating them against the remaining space in the metadata block.

A corrupted journal contains payload sizes extending beyond the PAGE_SIZE
boundary can cause out-of-bounds reads when accessing payload fields or
computing offsets.

Add bounds validation for each payload type to ensure the full payload
fits within meta_size before processing.

Fixes: b4c625c67362 ("md/r5cache: r5cache recovery: part 1")
Reported-by: Yuhao Jiang <danisjiang@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Junrui Luo <moonafterrain@outlook.com>
---
 drivers/md/raid5-cache.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/md/raid5-cache.c b/drivers/md/raid5-cache.c
index 66b10cbda96d..7b7546bfa21f 100644
--- a/drivers/md/raid5-cache.c
+++ b/drivers/md/raid5-cache.c
@@ -2002,15 +2002,27 @@ r5l_recovery_verify_data_checksum_for_mb(struct r5l_log *log,
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	while (mb_offset < le32_to_cpu(mb->meta_size)) {
+		sector_t payload_len;
+
 		payload = (void *)mb + mb_offset;
 		payload_flush = (void *)mb + mb_offset;
 
 		if (le16_to_cpu(payload->header.type) == R5LOG_PAYLOAD_DATA) {
+			payload_len = sizeof(struct r5l_payload_data_parity) +
+				(sector_t)sizeof(__le32) *
+				(le32_to_cpu(payload->size) >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 9));
+			if (mb_offset + payload_len > le32_to_cpu(mb->meta_size))
+				goto mismatch;
 			if (r5l_recovery_verify_data_checksum(
 				    log, ctx, page, log_offset,
 				    payload->checksum[0]) < 0)
 				goto mismatch;
 		} else if (le16_to_cpu(payload->header.type) == R5LOG_PAYLOAD_PARITY) {
+			payload_len = sizeof(struct r5l_payload_data_parity) +
+				(sector_t)sizeof(__le32) *
+				(le32_to_cpu(payload->size) >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 9));
+			if (mb_offset + payload_len > le32_to_cpu(mb->meta_size))
+				goto mismatch;
 			if (r5l_recovery_verify_data_checksum(
 				    log, ctx, page, log_offset,
 				    payload->checksum[0]) < 0)
@@ -2023,22 +2035,18 @@ r5l_recovery_verify_data_checksum_for_mb(struct r5l_log *log,
 				    payload->checksum[1]) < 0)
 				goto mismatch;
 		} else if (le16_to_cpu(payload->header.type) == R5LOG_PAYLOAD_FLUSH) {
-			/* nothing to do for R5LOG_PAYLOAD_FLUSH here */
+			payload_len = sizeof(struct r5l_payload_flush) +
+				(sector_t)le32_to_cpu(payload_flush->size);
+			if (mb_offset + payload_len > le32_to_cpu(mb->meta_size))
+				goto mismatch;
 		} else /* not R5LOG_PAYLOAD_DATA/PARITY/FLUSH */
 			goto mismatch;
 
-		if (le16_to_cpu(payload->header.type) == R5LOG_PAYLOAD_FLUSH) {
-			mb_offset += sizeof(struct r5l_payload_flush) +
-				le32_to_cpu(payload_flush->size);
-		} else {
-			/* DATA or PARITY payload */
+		if (le16_to_cpu(payload->header.type) != R5LOG_PAYLOAD_FLUSH) {
 			log_offset = r5l_ring_add(log, log_offset,
 						  le32_to_cpu(payload->size));
-			mb_offset += sizeof(struct r5l_payload_data_parity) +
-				sizeof(__le32) *
-				(le32_to_cpu(payload->size) >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 9));
 		}
-
+		mb_offset += payload_len;
 	}
 
 	put_page(page);
@@ -2089,6 +2097,7 @@ r5c_recovery_analyze_meta_block(struct r5l_log *log,
 	log_offset = r5l_ring_add(log, ctx->pos, BLOCK_SECTORS);
 
 	while (mb_offset < le32_to_cpu(mb->meta_size)) {
+		sector_t payload_len;
 		int dd;
 
 		payload = (void *)mb + mb_offset;
@@ -2097,6 +2106,12 @@ r5c_recovery_analyze_meta_block(struct r5l_log *log,
 		if (le16_to_cpu(payload->header.type) == R5LOG_PAYLOAD_FLUSH) {
 			int i, count;
 
+			payload_len = sizeof(struct r5l_payload_flush) +
+				(sector_t)le32_to_cpu(payload_flush->size);
+			if (mb_offset + payload_len >
+			    le32_to_cpu(mb->meta_size))
+				return -EINVAL;
+
 			count = le32_to_cpu(payload_flush->size) / sizeof(__le64);
 			for (i = 0; i < count; ++i) {
 				stripe_sect = le64_to_cpu(payload_flush->flush_stripes[i]);
@@ -2110,12 +2125,17 @@ r5c_recovery_analyze_meta_block(struct r5l_log *log,
 				}
 			}
 
-			mb_offset += sizeof(struct r5l_payload_flush) +
-				le32_to_cpu(payload_flush->size);
+			mb_offset += payload_len;
 			continue;
 		}
 
 		/* DATA or PARITY payload */
+		payload_len = sizeof(struct r5l_payload_data_parity) +
+			(sector_t)sizeof(__le32) *
+			(le32_to_cpu(payload->size) >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 9));
+		if (mb_offset + payload_len > le32_to_cpu(mb->meta_size))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
 		stripe_sect = (le16_to_cpu(payload->header.type) == R5LOG_PAYLOAD_DATA) ?
 			raid5_compute_sector(
 				conf, le64_to_cpu(payload->location), 0, &dd,
@@ -2180,9 +2200,7 @@ r5c_recovery_analyze_meta_block(struct r5l_log *log,
 		log_offset = r5l_ring_add(log, log_offset,
 					  le32_to_cpu(payload->size));
 
-		mb_offset += sizeof(struct r5l_payload_data_parity) +
-			sizeof(__le32) *
-			(le32_to_cpu(payload->size) >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 9));
+		mb_offset += payload_len;
 	}
 
 	return 0;

---
base-commit: 7aaa8047eafd0bd628065b15757d9b48c5f9c07d
change-id: 20260404-fixes-ef0f9985384d

Best regards,
-- 
Junrui Luo <moonafterrain@outlook.com>


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] md/raid5: validate payload size before accessing journal metadata
  2026-04-04  7:44 [PATCH] md/raid5: validate payload size before accessing journal metadata Junrui Luo
@ 2026-04-07  5:28 ` Yu Kuai
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Yu Kuai @ 2026-04-07  5:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Junrui Luo, Song Liu, Li Nan, Shaohua Li
  Cc: Song Liu, linux-raid, linux-kernel, Yuhao Jiang, stable, yukuai

Hi,

在 2026/4/4 15:44, Junrui Luo 写道:
> r5c_recovery_analyze_meta_block() and
> r5l_recovery_verify_data_checksum_for_mb() iterate over payloads in a
> journal metadata block using on-disk payload size fields without
> validating them against the remaining space in the metadata block.
>
> A corrupted journal contains payload sizes extending beyond the PAGE_SIZE
> boundary can cause out-of-bounds reads when accessing payload fields or
> computing offsets.
>
> Add bounds validation for each payload type to ensure the full payload
> fits within meta_size before processing.
>
> Fixes: b4c625c67362 ("md/r5cache: r5cache recovery: part 1")
> Reported-by: Yuhao Jiang<danisjiang@gmail.com>

I didn't found a report mail from patchwork, so I remove this tag

> Cc:stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Junrui Luo<moonafterrain@outlook.com>
> ---
>   drivers/md/raid5-cache.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
>   1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
Applied to md-7.1

-- 
Thansk,
Kuai

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2026-04-07  5:28 UTC | newest]

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2026-04-04  7:44 [PATCH] md/raid5: validate payload size before accessing journal metadata Junrui Luo
2026-04-07  5:28 ` Yu Kuai

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