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From: Song Liu <songliubraving@meta.com>
To: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>, Song Liu <song@kernel.org>,
	"bpf@vger.kernel.org" <bpf@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	"apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com" <apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com>,
	"selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	"tomoyo-users_en@lists.sourceforge.net"
	<tomoyo-users_en@lists.sourceforge.net>,
	"tomoyo-users_ja@lists.sourceforge.net"
	<tomoyo-users_ja@lists.sourceforge.net>,
	Kernel Team <kernel-team@meta.com>,
	"andrii@kernel.org" <andrii@kernel.org>,
	"eddyz87@gmail.com" <eddyz87@gmail.com>,
	"ast@kernel.org" <ast@kernel.org>,
	"daniel@iogearbox.net" <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	"martin.lau@linux.dev" <martin.lau@linux.dev>,
	"jack@suse.cz" <jack@suse.cz>,
	"kpsingh@kernel.org" <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
	"mattbobrowski@google.com" <mattbobrowski@google.com>,
	"amir73il@gmail.com" <amir73il@gmail.com>,
	"repnop@google.com" <repnop@google.com>,
	"jlayton@kernel.org" <jlayton@kernel.org>,
	"josef@toxicpanda.com" <josef@toxicpanda.com>,
	"mic@digikod.net" <mic@digikod.net>,
	"gnoack@google.com" <gnoack@google.com>,
	"m@maowtm.org" <m@maowtm.org>,
	"john.johansen@canonical.com" <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
	"john@apparmor.net" <john@apparmor.net>,
	"stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com" <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
	"omosnace@redhat.com" <omosnace@redhat.com>,
	"takedakn@nttdata.co.jp" <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>,
	"penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp"
	<penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
	"enlightened@chromium.org" <enlightened@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC] vfs: security: Parse dev_name before calling security_sb_mount
Date: Fri, 11 Jul 2025 23:09:54 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <56339D6E-6435-4BC4-95AC-BC2404DFF2F4@meta.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250711-pfirsich-worum-c408f9a14b13@brauner>



> On Jul 11, 2025, at 2:36 AM, Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> wrote:
> 
> On Thu, Jul 10, 2025 at 05:00:18PM +0000, Song Liu wrote:
>> 
>> 
>>> On Jul 10, 2025, at 4:46 AM, Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> wrote:
>> 
>> [...]
>> 
>>>> Right now, we have security_sb_mount and security_move_mount, for 
>>>> syscall “mount” and “move_mount” respectively. This is confusing 
>>>> because we can also do move mount with syscall “mount”. How about 
>>>> we create 5 different security hooks:
>>>> 
>>>> security_bind_mount
>>>> security_new_mount
>>>> security_reconfigure_mount
>>>> security_remount
>>>> security_change_type_mount
>>>> 
>>>> and remove security_sb_mount. After this, we will have 6 hooks for
>>>> each type of mount (the 5 above plus security_move_mount).
>>> 
>>> I've multiple times pointed out that the current mount security hooks
>>> aren't working and basically everything in the new mount api is
>>> unsupervised from an LSM perspective.
>> 
>> To make sure I understand the comment. By “new mount api”, do you mean 
>> the code path under do_new_mount()?
> 
> fsopen()
> fsconfig()
> fsmount()
> open_tree()
> open_tree_attr()
> move_mount()
> statmount()
> listmount()
> 
> I think that's all.

Reading the code, I think we also need to cover fspick. 

Thanks,
Song




  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-07-11 23:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-07-08 23:05 Song Liu
2025-07-09 10:24 ` Al Viro
2025-07-09 15:19   ` Paul Moore
2025-07-09 17:06     ` Song Liu
2025-07-10 11:46       ` Christian Brauner
2025-07-10 17:00         ` Song Liu
2025-07-11  9:36           ` Christian Brauner
2025-07-11 16:22             ` Song Liu
2025-07-14  8:45               ` Christian Brauner
2025-07-14 15:10                 ` Song Liu
2025-07-15 10:18                   ` Christian Brauner
2025-07-15 22:31                     ` Song Liu
2025-07-16  8:31                       ` Christian Brauner
2025-07-16 17:12                         ` Song Liu
2025-07-11 23:09             ` Song Liu [this message]
2025-07-10 21:40         ` Paul Moore

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