From: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
To: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <x86@kernel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>,
Kiryl Shutsemau <kas@kernel.org>,
"Brendan Jackman" <jackmanb@google.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
"Nam Cao" <namcao@linutronix.de>,
Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@intel.com>,
"Rick Edgecombe" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
"Alexander Shishkin" <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
Maciej Wieczor-Retman <m.wieczorretman@pm.me>,
<linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/5] x86/vsyscall: Reorganize the page fault emulation code
Date: Thu, 5 Mar 2026 16:49:26 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <5dbf57ef-efcd-43c7-a0d6-c31538242e80@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2074c00d-2e73-4bd9-89d2-7b0a015b134e@zytor.com>
On 3/5/2026 2:36 PM, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
> On 2026-03-05 13:40, Sohil Mehta wrote:
>> +bool emulate_vsyscall_pf(unsigned long error_code, struct pt_regs *regs,
>> + unsigned long address)
>> +{
>> + /* Write faults or kernel-privilege faults never get fixed up. */
>> + if ((error_code & (X86_PF_WRITE | X86_PF_USER)) != X86_PF_USER)
>> + return false;
>
>
> I think this can be tightened further. If X86_PF_PK, X86_PF_SHSTK or
> X86_PF_RSVD are set we should definitely not try to do any emulation, and I
> believe the same is true for X86_PF_SGX or X86_PF_RMP; I'm not 100% as I don't
> have the semantics of those bits in my head at the moment.
>
Could some of this already be (or might need to be) taken care of in the
calling function do_user_addr_fault(). For example, I see comments such as:
* PKRU never rejects instruction fetches, so we don't need
* to consider the PF_PK bit.
* Read-only permissions can not be expressed in shadow stack PTEs.
* Treat all shadow stack accesses as WRITE faults.
I would prefer to avoid changing any logic for the existing #PF
emulation handling in this patch. If it's okay, we could pursue these as
a follow-on to this series.
>> + /*
>> + * Assume that faults at regs->ip are because of an instruction
>> + * fetch. Return early and avoid emulation for faults during
>> + * data accesses:
>> + */
>> + if (address != regs->ip) {
>> + /* User code tried and failed to read the vsyscall page. */
>> + if (vsyscall_mode != EMULATE)
>> + warn_bad_vsyscall(KERN_INFO, regs,
>> + "vsyscall read attempt denied -- look up the vsyscall kernel parameter if you need a workaround");
>> +
>> + return false;
>> + }
>> +
>
> I don't really like the reshuffling of the code here.
>
Sure, I'll keep the flow same as the original code. Will change it in
the next revision.
>> + /*
>> + * X86_PF_INSTR is only set when NX is supported. When
>> + * available, use it to double-check that the emulation code
>> + * is only being used for instruction fetches:
>> + */
>> + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_NX))
>> + WARN_ON_ONCE(!(error_code & X86_PF_INSTR));
>> +
>
> I realize this is the same as the previous code, but I really think this
> should have a "return false;" in it as well.
>
Yes, returning early makes sense if the warning triggers. But we would
need to change the logic to:
if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_NX) &&
WARN_ON_ONCE(!(error_code & X86_PF_INSTR)))
return false;
Again, I would like to avoid such a logic change in this patch as it
only focuses on code reorganization. Would it need to be backported?
Preferably I could send it out as a follow-on patch along with the other
tightening that you mentioned above. Your suggestions seem fine to me,
but I really want to understand and evaluate the changes before sending
them out.
>> + return __emulate_vsyscall(regs, address);
>> +}
>> +
>> /*
>
> Other than the above minor nitpicks, looks good to me.
>
> Reviewed-by: H. Peter Anvin (Intel) <hpa@zytor.com>
>
Thank you!
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-03-06 0:49 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-03-05 21:40 [PATCH v2 0/5] x86: Enable LASS support with vsyscall=xonly mode Sohil Mehta
2026-03-05 21:40 ` [PATCH v2 1/5] x86/vsyscall: Reorganize the page fault emulation code Sohil Mehta
2026-03-05 22:36 ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-03-06 0:49 ` Sohil Mehta [this message]
2026-03-19 21:59 ` [tip: x86/cpu] " tip-bot2 for Sohil Mehta
2026-03-05 21:40 ` [PATCH v2 2/5] x86/traps: Consolidate user fixups in the #GP handler Sohil Mehta
2026-03-05 22:22 ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-03-05 22:41 ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-03-19 21:59 ` [tip: x86/cpu] " tip-bot2 for Sohil Mehta
2026-03-05 21:40 ` [PATCH v2 3/5] x86/vsyscall: Restore vsyscall=xonly mode under LASS Sohil Mehta
2026-03-05 22:45 ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-03-19 21:59 ` [tip: x86/cpu] " tip-bot2 for Sohil Mehta
2026-03-05 21:40 ` [PATCH v2 4/5] x86/vsyscall: Disable LASS if vsyscall mode is set to EMULATE Sohil Mehta
2026-03-05 22:45 ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-03-19 21:59 ` [tip: x86/cpu] " tip-bot2 for Sohil Mehta
2026-03-05 21:40 ` [PATCH v2 5/5] x86/cpu: Remove LASS restriction on vsyscall emulation Sohil Mehta
2026-03-05 22:46 ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-03-19 21:59 ` [tip: x86/cpu] " tip-bot2 for Sohil Mehta
2026-03-05 23:21 ` [PATCH 0/1] x86/fault: cleanup: move x86-64 test into is_vsyscall_vaddr() H. Peter Anvin
2026-03-05 23:21 ` [PATCH 1/1] " H. Peter Anvin
2026-03-08 10:38 ` [PATCH v2 0/5] x86: Enable LASS support with vsyscall=xonly mode Maciej Wieczor-Retman
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