From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
To: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Kiryl Shutsemau <kas@kernel.org>,
Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Nam Cao <namcao@linutronix.de>,
Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@intel.com>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
Maciej Wieczor-Retman <m.wieczorretman@pm.me>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 4/5] x86/vsyscall: Disable LASS if vsyscall mode is set to EMULATE
Date: Thu, 5 Mar 2026 14:45:59 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <e3d63c9c-cf1c-4a78-8975-9cbe38568830@zytor.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260305214026.3887452-5-sohil.mehta@intel.com>
On 2026-03-05 13:40, Sohil Mehta wrote:
> The EMULATE mode of vsyscall maps the vsyscall page with a high kernel
> address directly into user address space. Reading the vsyscall page in
> EMULATE mode would cause LASS to trigger a #GP.
>
> Fixing the LASS violation in EMULATE mode would require complex
> instruction decoding because the resulting #GP does include the
> necessary error information, and the vsyscall address is not
> readily available in the RIP.
>
> The EMULATE mode has been deprecated since 2022 and can only be enabled
> using the command line parameter vsyscall=emulate. See commit
> bf00745e7791 ("x86/vsyscall: Remove CONFIG_LEGACY_VSYSCALL_EMULATE") for
> details. At this point, no one is expected to be using this insecure
> mode. The rare usages that need it obviously do not care about security.
>
> Disable LASS when EMULATE mode is requested to avoid breaking legacy
> user software. Also, update the vsyscall documentation to reflect this.
> LASS will only be supported if vsyscall mode is set to XONLY (default)
> or NONE.
>
> Signed-off-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
> Reviewed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
> Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
> ---
> Eventually, the plan is to get rid of the EMULATE mode altogether. Linus
> and AndyL seem to be okay with such a change. However, those changes are
> beyond the scope of this series.
>
> v2:
> - Picked up Dave's review tag
> - Removed unnecessary CR4 clearing during vsyscall_setup().
> CR4.LASS is enabled much later via a late_initcall().
> ---
> Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 4 +++-
> arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c | 5 +++++
> 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> index cb850e5290c2..64df2c52b2e5 100644
> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> @@ -8376,7 +8376,9 @@ Kernel parameters
>
> emulate Vsyscalls turn into traps and are emulated
> reasonably safely. The vsyscall page is
> - readable.
> + readable. This disables the Linear
> + Address Space Separation (LASS) security
> + feature and makes the system less secure.
>
> xonly [default] Vsyscalls turn into traps and are
> emulated reasonably safely. The vsyscall
> diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
> index b34c8763d5e9..215ae07dd3c7 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
> @@ -62,6 +62,11 @@ static int __init vsyscall_setup(char *str)
> else
> return -EINVAL;
>
> + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_LASS) && vsyscall_mode == EMULATE) {
> + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_LASS);
> + pr_warn_once("x86/cpu: Disabling LASS due to vsyscall=emulate\n");
> + }
> +
> return 0;
> }
>
Reviewed-by: H. Peter Anvin (Intel) <hpa@zytor.com>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-03-05 22:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-03-05 21:40 [PATCH v2 0/5] x86: Enable LASS support with vsyscall=xonly mode Sohil Mehta
2026-03-05 21:40 ` [PATCH v2 1/5] x86/vsyscall: Reorganize the page fault emulation code Sohil Mehta
2026-03-05 22:36 ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-03-06 0:49 ` Sohil Mehta
2026-03-19 21:59 ` [tip: x86/cpu] " tip-bot2 for Sohil Mehta
2026-03-05 21:40 ` [PATCH v2 2/5] x86/traps: Consolidate user fixups in the #GP handler Sohil Mehta
2026-03-05 22:22 ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-03-05 22:41 ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-03-19 21:59 ` [tip: x86/cpu] " tip-bot2 for Sohil Mehta
2026-03-05 21:40 ` [PATCH v2 3/5] x86/vsyscall: Restore vsyscall=xonly mode under LASS Sohil Mehta
2026-03-05 22:45 ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-03-19 21:59 ` [tip: x86/cpu] " tip-bot2 for Sohil Mehta
2026-03-05 21:40 ` [PATCH v2 4/5] x86/vsyscall: Disable LASS if vsyscall mode is set to EMULATE Sohil Mehta
2026-03-05 22:45 ` H. Peter Anvin [this message]
2026-03-19 21:59 ` [tip: x86/cpu] " tip-bot2 for Sohil Mehta
2026-03-05 21:40 ` [PATCH v2 5/5] x86/cpu: Remove LASS restriction on vsyscall emulation Sohil Mehta
2026-03-05 22:46 ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-03-19 21:59 ` [tip: x86/cpu] " tip-bot2 for Sohil Mehta
2026-03-05 23:21 ` [PATCH 0/1] x86/fault: cleanup: move x86-64 test into is_vsyscall_vaddr() H. Peter Anvin
2026-03-05 23:21 ` [PATCH 1/1] " H. Peter Anvin
2026-03-08 10:38 ` [PATCH v2 0/5] x86: Enable LASS support with vsyscall=xonly mode Maciej Wieczor-Retman
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