* [PATCH 1/3] Doc: trusted-keys as protected keys
2025-10-06 7:17 [PATCH 0/3] trusted-keys: Add support for protected keys using CAAM meenakshi.aggarwal
@ 2025-10-06 7:17 ` meenakshi.aggarwal
2025-10-06 7:17 ` [PATCH 2/3] KEYS: trusted: caam based protected key meenakshi.aggarwal
` (3 subsequent siblings)
4 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: meenakshi.aggarwal @ 2025-10-06 7:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: horia.geanta, V.sethi, pankaj.gupta, gaurav.jain, herbert
Cc: linux-crypto, linux-kernel, Meenakshi Aggarwal
From: Meenakshi Aggarwal <meenakshi.aggarwal@nxp.com>
Add a section in trusted key document describing the protected-keys.
- Detailing need for protected keys.
- Detailing the usage for protected keys.
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Meenakshi Aggarwal <meenakshi.aggarwal@nxp.com>
---
.../security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 87 ++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 86 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
index f4d7e162d5e4..2bcaaa7d119b 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
@@ -10,6 +10,36 @@ of a Trust Source for greater security, while Encrypted Keys can be used on any
system. All user level blobs, are displayed and loaded in hex ASCII for
convenience, and are integrity verified.
+Trusted Keys as Protected key
+=============================
+It is the secure way of keeping the keys in the kernel key-ring as Trusted-Key,
+such that:
+- Key-blob, an encrypted key-data, created to be stored, loaded and seen by
+ userspace.
+- Key-data, the plain-key text in the system memory, to be used by
+ kernel space only.
+
+Though key-data is not accessible to the user-space in plain-text, but it is in
+plain-text in system memory, when used in kernel space. Even though kernel-space
+attracts small surface attack, but with compromised kernel or side-channel
+attack accessing the system memory can lead to a chance of the key getting
+compromised/leaked.
+
+In order to protect the key in kernel space, the concept of "protected-keys" is
+introduced which will act as an added layer of protection. The key-data of the
+protected keys is encrypted with Key-Encryption-Key(KEK), and decrypted inside
+the trust source boundary. The plain-key text never available out-side in the
+system memory. Thus, any crypto operation that is to be executed using the
+protected key, can only be done by the trust source, which generated the
+key blob.
+
+Hence, if the protected-key is leaked or compromised, it is of no use to the
+hacker.
+
+Trusted keys as protected keys, with trust source having the capability of
+generating:
+
+- Key-Blob, to be loaded, stored and seen by user-space.
Trust Source
============
@@ -252,7 +282,7 @@ in bytes. Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits).
Trusted Keys usage: CAAM
------------------------
-Usage::
+Trusted Keys Usage::
keyctl add trusted name "new keylen" ring
keyctl add trusted name "load hex_blob" ring
@@ -262,6 +292,21 @@ Usage::
CAAM-specific format. The key length for new keys is always in bytes.
Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits).
+Trusted Keys as Protected Keys Usage::
+
+ keyctl add trusted name "new keylen pk [options]" ring
+ keyctl add trusted name "load hex_blob [options]" ring
+ keyctl print keyid
+
+ where, 'pk' is used to direct trust source to generate protected key.
+
+ options:
+ key_enc_algo = For CAAM, supported enc algo are ECB(2), CCM(1).
+
+"keyctl print" returns an ASCII hex copy of the sealed key, which is in a
+CAAM-specific format. The key length for new keys is always in bytes.
+Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits).
+
Trusted Keys usage: DCP
-----------------------
@@ -343,6 +388,46 @@ Load a trusted key from the saved blob::
f1f8fff03ad0acb083725535636addb08d73dedb9832da198081e5deae84bfaf0409c22b
e4a8aea2b607ec96931e6f4d4fe563ba
+Create and save a trusted key as protected key named "kmk" of length 32 bytes.
+
+::
+
+ $ keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 pk key_enc_algo=1" @u
+ 440502848
+
+ $ keyctl show
+ Session Keyring
+ -3 --alswrv 500 500 keyring: _ses
+ 97833714 --alswrv 500 -1 \_ keyring: _uid.500
+ 440502848 --alswrv 500 500 \_ trusted: kmk
+
+ $ keyctl print 440502848
+ 0101000000000000000001005d01b7e3f4a6be5709930f3b70a743cbb42e0cc95e18e915
+ 3f60da455bbf1144ad12e4f92b452f966929f6105fd29ca28e4d4d5a031d068478bacb0b
+ 27351119f822911b0a11ba3d3498ba6a32e50dac7f32894dd890eb9ad578e4e292c83722
+ a52e56a097e6a68b3f56f7a52ece0cdccba1eb62cad7d817f6dc58898b3ac15f36026fec
+ d568bd4a706cb60bb37be6d8f1240661199d640b66fb0fe3b079f97f450b9ef9c22c6d5d
+ dd379f0facd1cd020281dfa3c70ba21a3fa6fc2471dc6d13ecf8298b946f65345faa5ef0
+ f1f8fff03ad0acb083725535636addb08d73dedb9832da198081e5deae84bfaf0409c22b
+ e4a8aea2b607ec96931e6f4d4fe563ba
+
+ $ keyctl pipe 440502848 > kmk.blob
+
+Load a trusted key from the saved blob::
+
+ $ keyctl add trusted kmk "load `cat kmk.blob` key_enc_algo=1" @u
+ 268728824
+
+ $ keyctl print 268728824
+ 0101000000000000000001005d01b7e3f4a6be5709930f3b70a743cbb42e0cc95e18e915
+ 3f60da455bbf1144ad12e4f92b452f966929f6105fd29ca28e4d4d5a031d068478bacb0b
+ 27351119f822911b0a11ba3d3498ba6a32e50dac7f32894dd890eb9ad578e4e292c83722
+ a52e56a097e6a68b3f56f7a52ece0cdccba1eb62cad7d817f6dc58898b3ac15f36026fec
+ d568bd4a706cb60bb37be6d8f1240661199d640b66fb0fe3b079f97f450b9ef9c22c6d5d
+ dd379f0facd1cd020281dfa3c70ba21a3fa6fc2471dc6d13ecf8298b946f65345faa5ef0
+ f1f8fff03ad0acb083725535636addb08d73dedb9832da198081e5deae84bfaf0409c22b
+ e4a8aea2b607ec96931e6f4d4fe563ba
+
Reseal (TPM specific) a trusted key under new PCR values::
$ keyctl update 268728824 "update pcrinfo=`cat pcr.blob`"
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread* [PATCH 2/3] KEYS: trusted: caam based protected key
2025-10-06 7:17 [PATCH 0/3] trusted-keys: Add support for protected keys using CAAM meenakshi.aggarwal
2025-10-06 7:17 ` [PATCH 1/3] Doc: trusted-keys as protected keys meenakshi.aggarwal
@ 2025-10-06 7:17 ` meenakshi.aggarwal
2025-10-06 7:17 ` [PATCH 3/3] crypto:caam: Add support of paes algorithm meenakshi.aggarwal
` (2 subsequent siblings)
4 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: meenakshi.aggarwal @ 2025-10-06 7:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: horia.geanta, V.sethi, pankaj.gupta, gaurav.jain, herbert
Cc: linux-crypto, linux-kernel, Meenakshi Aggarwal
From: Meenakshi Aggarwal <meenakshi.aggarwal@nxp.com>
- CAAM supports two types of protected keys:
-- Plain key encrypted with ECB
-- Plain key encrypted with CCM
Due to robustness, default encryption used for protected key is CCM.
- Generate protected key blob and add it to trusted key payload.
This is done as part of sealing operation, which is triggered
when below two operations are requested:
-- new key generation
-- load key,
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Meenakshi Aggarwal <meenakshi.aggarwal@nxp.com>
---
drivers/crypto/caam/blob_gen.c | 86 +++++++++++++----
drivers/crypto/caam/desc.h | 9 +-
include/soc/fsl/caam-blob.h | 26 ++++++
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c | 108 ++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 212 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/blob_gen.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/blob_gen.c
index 079a22cc9f02..c18dbac56493 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/blob_gen.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/blob_gen.c
@@ -2,13 +2,14 @@
/*
* Copyright (C) 2015 Pengutronix, Steffen Trumtrar <kernel@pengutronix.de>
* Copyright (C) 2021 Pengutronix, Ahmad Fatoum <kernel@pengutronix.de>
- * Copyright 2024 NXP
+ * Copyright 2024-2025 NXP
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "caam blob_gen: " fmt
#include <linux/bitfield.h>
#include <linux/device.h>
+#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
#include <soc/fsl/caam-blob.h>
#include "compat.h"
@@ -60,18 +61,27 @@ static void caam_blob_job_done(struct device *dev, u32 *desc, u32 err, void *con
complete(&res->completion);
}
+static u32 check_caam_state(struct device *jrdev)
+{
+ const struct caam_drv_private *ctrlpriv;
+
+ ctrlpriv = dev_get_drvdata(jrdev->parent);
+ return FIELD_GET(CSTA_MOO, rd_reg32(&ctrlpriv->jr[0]->perfmon.status));
+}
+
int caam_process_blob(struct caam_blob_priv *priv,
struct caam_blob_info *info, bool encap)
{
- const struct caam_drv_private *ctrlpriv;
struct caam_blob_job_result testres;
struct device *jrdev = &priv->jrdev;
dma_addr_t dma_in, dma_out;
int op = OP_PCLID_BLOB;
+ int hwbk_caam_ovhd = 0;
size_t output_len;
u32 *desc;
u32 moo;
int ret;
+ int len;
if (info->key_mod_len > CAAM_BLOB_KEYMOD_LENGTH)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -82,14 +92,29 @@ int caam_process_blob(struct caam_blob_priv *priv,
} else {
op |= OP_TYPE_DECAP_PROTOCOL;
output_len = info->input_len - CAAM_BLOB_OVERHEAD;
+ info->output_len = output_len;
+ }
+
+ if (encap && info->pkey_info.is_pkey) {
+ op |= OP_PCL_BLOB_BLACK;
+ if (info->pkey_info.key_enc_algo == CAAM_ENC_ALGO_CCM) {
+ op |= OP_PCL_BLOB_EKT;
+ hwbk_caam_ovhd = CAAM_CCM_OVERHEAD;
+ }
+ if ((info->input_len + hwbk_caam_ovhd) > MAX_KEY_SIZE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ len = info->input_len + hwbk_caam_ovhd;
+ } else {
+ len = info->input_len;
}
desc = kzalloc(CAAM_BLOB_DESC_BYTES_MAX, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!desc)
return -ENOMEM;
- dma_in = dma_map_single(jrdev, info->input, info->input_len,
- DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+ dma_in = dma_map_single(jrdev, info->input, len,
+ encap ? DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL : DMA_TO_DEVICE);
if (dma_mapping_error(jrdev, dma_in)) {
dev_err(jrdev, "unable to map input DMA buffer\n");
ret = -ENOMEM;
@@ -104,8 +129,7 @@ int caam_process_blob(struct caam_blob_priv *priv,
goto out_unmap_in;
}
- ctrlpriv = dev_get_drvdata(jrdev->parent);
- moo = FIELD_GET(CSTA_MOO, rd_reg32(&ctrlpriv->jr[0]->perfmon.status));
+ moo = check_caam_state(jrdev);
if (moo != CSTA_MOO_SECURE && moo != CSTA_MOO_TRUSTED)
dev_warn(jrdev,
"using insecure test key, enable HAB to use unique device key!\n");
@@ -117,18 +141,48 @@ int caam_process_blob(struct caam_blob_priv *priv,
* Class 1 Context DWords 0+1+2+3. The random BK is stored in the
* Class 1 Key Register. Operation Mode is set to AES-CCM.
*/
-
init_job_desc(desc, 0);
+
+ if (encap && info->pkey_info.is_pkey) {
+ /*!1. key command used to load class 1 key register
+ * from input plain key.
+ */
+ append_key(desc, dma_in, info->input_len,
+ CLASS_1 | KEY_DEST_CLASS_REG);
+ /*!2. Fifostore to store protected key from class 1 key register. */
+ if (info->pkey_info.key_enc_algo == CAAM_ENC_ALGO_CCM) {
+ append_fifo_store(desc, dma_in, info->input_len,
+ LDST_CLASS_1_CCB |
+ FIFOST_TYPE_KEY_CCM_JKEK);
+ } else {
+ append_fifo_store(desc, dma_in, info->input_len,
+ LDST_CLASS_1_CCB |
+ FIFOST_TYPE_KEY_KEK);
+ }
+ /*
+ * JUMP_OFFSET specifies the offset of the JUMP target from
+ * the JUMP command's address in the descriptor buffer.
+ */
+ append_jump(desc, JUMP_COND_NOP | BIT(0) << JUMP_OFFSET_SHIFT);
+ }
+
+ /*!3. Load class 2 key with key modifier. */
append_key_as_imm(desc, info->key_mod, info->key_mod_len,
- info->key_mod_len, CLASS_2 | KEY_DEST_CLASS_REG);
- append_seq_in_ptr_intlen(desc, dma_in, info->input_len, 0);
- append_seq_out_ptr_intlen(desc, dma_out, output_len, 0);
+ info->key_mod_len, CLASS_2 | KEY_DEST_CLASS_REG);
+
+ /*!4. SEQ IN PTR Command. */
+ append_seq_in_ptr(desc, dma_in, info->input_len, 0);
+
+ /*!5. SEQ OUT PTR Command. */
+ append_seq_out_ptr(desc, dma_out, output_len, 0);
+
+ /*!6. Blob encapsulation/decapsulation PROTOCOL Command. */
append_operation(desc, op);
- print_hex_dump_debug("data@"__stringify(__LINE__)": ",
+ print_hex_dump_debug("data@" __stringify(__LINE__)": ",
DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 1, info->input,
- info->input_len, false);
- print_hex_dump_debug("jobdesc@"__stringify(__LINE__)": ",
+ len, false);
+ print_hex_dump_debug("jobdesc@" __stringify(__LINE__)": ",
DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 1, desc,
desc_bytes(desc), false);
@@ -139,7 +193,7 @@ int caam_process_blob(struct caam_blob_priv *priv,
if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) {
wait_for_completion(&testres.completion);
ret = testres.err;
- print_hex_dump_debug("output@"__stringify(__LINE__)": ",
+ print_hex_dump_debug("output@" __stringify(__LINE__)": ",
DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 1, info->output,
output_len, false);
}
@@ -149,10 +203,10 @@ int caam_process_blob(struct caam_blob_priv *priv,
dma_unmap_single(jrdev, dma_out, output_len, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
out_unmap_in:
- dma_unmap_single(jrdev, dma_in, info->input_len, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+ dma_unmap_single(jrdev, dma_in, len,
+ encap ? DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL : DMA_TO_DEVICE);
out_free:
kfree(desc);
-
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(caam_process_blob);
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/desc.h b/drivers/crypto/caam/desc.h
index e13470901586..c28e94fcb8c7 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/desc.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/desc.h
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
* Definitions to support CAAM descriptor instruction generation
*
* Copyright 2008-2011 Freescale Semiconductor, Inc.
- * Copyright 2018 NXP
+ * Copyright 2018, 2025 NXP
*/
#ifndef DESC_H
@@ -162,6 +162,7 @@
* Enhanced Encryption of Key
*/
#define KEY_EKT 0x00100000
+#define KEY_EKT_OFFSET 20
/*
* Encrypted with Trusted Key
@@ -403,6 +404,7 @@
#define FIFOST_TYPE_PKHA_N (0x08 << FIFOST_TYPE_SHIFT)
#define FIFOST_TYPE_PKHA_A (0x0c << FIFOST_TYPE_SHIFT)
#define FIFOST_TYPE_PKHA_B (0x0d << FIFOST_TYPE_SHIFT)
+#define FIFOST_TYPE_KEY_CCM_JKEK (0x14 << FIFOST_TYPE_SHIFT)
#define FIFOST_TYPE_AF_SBOX_JKEK (0x20 << FIFOST_TYPE_SHIFT)
#define FIFOST_TYPE_AF_SBOX_TKEK (0x21 << FIFOST_TYPE_SHIFT)
#define FIFOST_TYPE_PKHA_E_JKEK (0x22 << FIFOST_TYPE_SHIFT)
@@ -1001,6 +1003,11 @@
#define OP_PCL_TLS12_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xff63
#define OP_PCL_TLS12_AES_256_CBC_SHA512 0xff65
+/* Blob protocol protinfo bits */
+
+#define OP_PCL_BLOB_BLACK 0x0004
+#define OP_PCL_BLOB_EKT 0x0100
+
/* For DTLS - OP_PCLID_DTLS */
#define OP_PCL_DTLS_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x002f
diff --git a/include/soc/fsl/caam-blob.h b/include/soc/fsl/caam-blob.h
index 937cac52f36d..922f7ec3e231 100644
--- a/include/soc/fsl/caam-blob.h
+++ b/include/soc/fsl/caam-blob.h
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
/*
* Copyright (C) 2020 Pengutronix, Ahmad Fatoum <kernel@pengutronix.de>
+ * Copyright 2024-2025 NXP
*/
#ifndef __CAAM_BLOB_GEN
@@ -12,11 +13,34 @@
#define CAAM_BLOB_KEYMOD_LENGTH 16
#define CAAM_BLOB_OVERHEAD (32 + 16)
#define CAAM_BLOB_MAX_LEN 4096
+#define CAAM_ENC_ALGO_CCM 0x1
+#define CAAM_ENC_ALGO_ECB 0x2
+#define CAAM_NONCE_SIZE 6
+#define CAAM_ICV_SIZE 6
+#define CAAM_CCM_OVERHEAD (CAAM_NONCE_SIZE + CAAM_ICV_SIZE)
struct caam_blob_priv;
+/**
+ * struct caam_pkey_info - information for CAAM protected key
+ * @is_pkey: flag to identify, if the key is protected.
+ * @key_enc_algo: identifies the algorithm, ccm or ecb
+ * @plain_key_sz: size of plain key.
+ * @key_buf: contains key data
+ */
+struct caam_pkey_info {
+ u8 is_pkey;
+ u8 key_enc_algo;
+ u16 plain_key_sz;
+ u8 key_buf[];
+} __packed;
+
+/* sizeof struct caam_pkey_info */
+#define CAAM_PKEY_HEADER 4
+
/**
* struct caam_blob_info - information for CAAM blobbing
+ * @pkey_info: pointer to keep protected key information
* @input: pointer to input buffer (must be DMAable)
* @input_len: length of @input buffer in bytes.
* @output: pointer to output buffer (must be DMAable)
@@ -26,6 +50,8 @@ struct caam_blob_priv;
* May not exceed %CAAM_BLOB_KEYMOD_LENGTH
*/
struct caam_blob_info {
+ struct caam_pkey_info pkey_info;
+
void *input;
size_t input_len;
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c
index e3415c520c0a..090099d1b04d 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c
@@ -1,12 +1,14 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* Copyright (C) 2021 Pengutronix, Ahmad Fatoum <kernel@pengutronix.de>
+ * Copyright 2025 NXP
*/
#include <keys/trusted_caam.h>
#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
#include <linux/build_bug.h>
#include <linux/key-type.h>
+#include <linux/parser.h>
#include <soc/fsl/caam-blob.h>
static struct caam_blob_priv *blobifier;
@@ -16,6 +18,77 @@ static struct caam_blob_priv *blobifier;
static_assert(MAX_KEY_SIZE + CAAM_BLOB_OVERHEAD <= CAAM_BLOB_MAX_LEN);
static_assert(MAX_BLOB_SIZE <= CAAM_BLOB_MAX_LEN);
+enum {
+ opt_err,
+ opt_key_enc_algo,
+};
+
+static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
+ {opt_key_enc_algo, "key_enc_algo=%s"},
+ {opt_err, NULL}
+};
+
+#ifdef CAAM_DEBUG
+static inline void dump_options(struct caam_pkey_info pkey_info)
+{
+ pr_info("key encryption algo %d\n", pkey_info.key_enc_algo);
+}
+#else
+static inline void dump_options(struct caam_pkey_info pkey_info)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
+static int get_pkey_options(char *c,
+ struct caam_pkey_info *pkey_info)
+{
+ substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
+ unsigned long token_mask = 0;
+ u16 key_enc_algo;
+ char *p = c;
+ int token;
+ int res;
+
+ if (!c)
+ return 0;
+
+ while ((p = strsep(&c, " \t"))) {
+ if (*p == '\0' || *p == ' ' || *p == '\t')
+ continue;
+ token = match_token(p, key_tokens, args);
+ if (test_and_set_bit(token, &token_mask))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ switch (token) {
+ case opt_key_enc_algo:
+ res = kstrtou16(args[0].from, 16, &key_enc_algo);
+ if (res < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ pkey_info->key_enc_algo = key_enc_algo;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static bool is_key_pkey(char **datablob)
+{
+ char *c = NULL;
+
+ do {
+ /* Second argument onwards,
+ * determine if tied to HW
+ */
+ c = strsep(datablob, " \t");
+ if (c && (strcmp(c, "pk") == 0))
+ return true;
+ } while (c);
+
+ return false;
+}
+
static int trusted_caam_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
{
int ret;
@@ -25,11 +98,30 @@ static int trusted_caam_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
.key_mod = KEYMOD, .key_mod_len = sizeof(KEYMOD) - 1,
};
+ /*
+ * If it is to be treated as protected key,
+ * read next arguments too.
+ */
+ if (is_key_pkey(&datablob)) {
+ info.pkey_info.plain_key_sz = p->key_len;
+ info.pkey_info.is_pkey = 1;
+ ret = get_pkey_options(datablob, &info.pkey_info);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return 0;
+ dump_options(info.pkey_info);
+ }
+
ret = caam_encap_blob(blobifier, &info);
if (ret)
return ret;
p->blob_len = info.output_len;
+ if (info.pkey_info.is_pkey) {
+ p->key_len = p->blob_len + sizeof(struct caam_pkey_info);
+ memcpy(p->key, &info.pkey_info, sizeof(struct caam_pkey_info));
+ memcpy(p->key + sizeof(struct caam_pkey_info), p->blob, p->blob_len);
+ }
+
return 0;
}
@@ -42,11 +134,27 @@ static int trusted_caam_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
.key_mod = KEYMOD, .key_mod_len = sizeof(KEYMOD) - 1,
};
+ if (is_key_pkey(&datablob)) {
+ info.pkey_info.plain_key_sz = p->blob_len - CAAM_BLOB_OVERHEAD;
+ info.pkey_info.is_pkey = 1;
+ ret = get_pkey_options(datablob, &info.pkey_info);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return 0;
+ dump_options(info.pkey_info);
+
+ p->key_len = p->blob_len + sizeof(struct caam_pkey_info);
+ memcpy(p->key, &info.pkey_info, sizeof(struct caam_pkey_info));
+ memcpy(p->key + sizeof(struct caam_pkey_info), p->blob, p->blob_len);
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+
ret = caam_decap_blob(blobifier, &info);
if (ret)
return ret;
p->key_len = info.output_len;
+
return 0;
}
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3/3] crypto:caam: Add support of paes algorithm
2025-10-06 7:17 [PATCH 0/3] trusted-keys: Add support for protected keys using CAAM meenakshi.aggarwal
2025-10-06 7:17 ` [PATCH 1/3] Doc: trusted-keys as protected keys meenakshi.aggarwal
2025-10-06 7:17 ` [PATCH 2/3] KEYS: trusted: caam based protected key meenakshi.aggarwal
@ 2025-10-06 7:17 ` meenakshi.aggarwal
2025-10-14 8:56 ` [PATCH 0/3] trusted-keys: Add support for protected keys using CAAM Horia Geanta
2025-10-17 8:22 ` Herbert Xu
4 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: meenakshi.aggarwal @ 2025-10-06 7:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: horia.geanta, V.sethi, pankaj.gupta, gaurav.jain, herbert
Cc: linux-crypto, linux-kernel, Meenakshi Aggarwal
From: Meenakshi Aggarwal <meenakshi.aggarwal@nxp.com>
PAES algorithm uses protected key for encryption/decryption operations.
Signed-off-by: Gaurav Jain <gaurav.jain@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Meenakshi Aggarwal <meenakshi.aggarwal@nxp.com>
---
drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c | 128 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_desc.c | 87 +++++++++++++++++++-
drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_desc.h | 13 ++-
drivers/crypto/caam/desc_constr.h | 8 +-
4 files changed, 220 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c
index 2cfb1b8d8c7c..32a6e6e15ee2 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
* caam - Freescale FSL CAAM support for crypto API
*
* Copyright 2008-2011 Freescale Semiconductor, Inc.
- * Copyright 2016-2019, 2023 NXP
+ * Copyright 2016-2019, 2023, 2025 NXP
*
* Based on talitos crypto API driver.
*
@@ -61,13 +61,16 @@
#include <crypto/internal/engine.h>
#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
#include <crypto/xts.h>
+#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
#include <linux/device.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/key-type.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <soc/fsl/caam-blob.h>
/*
* crypto alg
@@ -119,12 +122,15 @@ struct caam_ctx {
dma_addr_t sh_desc_enc_dma;
dma_addr_t sh_desc_dec_dma;
dma_addr_t key_dma;
+ u8 protected_key[CAAM_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
+ dma_addr_t protected_key_dma;
enum dma_data_direction dir;
struct device *jrdev;
struct alginfo adata;
struct alginfo cdata;
unsigned int authsize;
bool xts_key_fallback;
+ bool is_blob;
struct crypto_skcipher *fallback;
};
@@ -751,9 +757,14 @@ static int skcipher_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *skcipher, const u8 *key,
print_hex_dump_debug("key in @"__stringify(__LINE__)": ",
DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 4, key, keylen, 1);
+ /* Here keylen is actual key length */
ctx->cdata.keylen = keylen;
ctx->cdata.key_virt = key;
ctx->cdata.key_inline = true;
+ /* Here protected key len is plain key length */
+ ctx->cdata.plain_keylen = keylen;
+ ctx->cdata.key_cmd_opt = 0;
+
/* skcipher_encrypt shared descriptor */
desc = ctx->sh_desc_enc;
@@ -772,6 +783,62 @@ static int skcipher_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *skcipher, const u8 *key,
return 0;
}
+static int paes_skcipher_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *skcipher,
+ const u8 *key,
+ unsigned int keylen)
+{
+ struct caam_pkey_info *pkey_info = (struct caam_pkey_info *)key;
+ struct caam_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx_dma(skcipher);
+ struct device *jrdev = ctx->jrdev;
+ int err;
+
+ ctx->cdata.key_inline = false;
+
+ keylen = keylen - CAAM_PKEY_HEADER;
+
+ /* Retrieve the length of key */
+ ctx->cdata.plain_keylen = pkey_info->plain_key_sz;
+
+ /* Retrieve the length of blob*/
+ ctx->cdata.keylen = keylen;
+
+ /* Retrieve the address of the blob */
+ ctx->cdata.key_virt = pkey_info->key_buf;
+
+ /* Validate key length for AES algorithms */
+ err = aes_check_keylen(ctx->cdata.plain_keylen);
+ if (err) {
+ dev_err(jrdev, "bad key length\n");
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ /* set command option */
+ ctx->cdata.key_cmd_opt |= KEY_ENC;
+
+ /* check if the Protected-Key is CCM key */
+ if (pkey_info->key_enc_algo == CAAM_ENC_ALGO_CCM)
+ ctx->cdata.key_cmd_opt |= KEY_EKT;
+
+ memcpy(ctx->key, ctx->cdata.key_virt, keylen);
+ dma_sync_single_for_device(jrdev, ctx->key_dma, keylen, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+ ctx->cdata.key_dma = ctx->key_dma;
+
+ if (pkey_info->key_enc_algo == CAAM_ENC_ALGO_CCM)
+ ctx->protected_key_dma = dma_map_single(jrdev, ctx->protected_key,
+ ctx->cdata.plain_keylen +
+ CAAM_CCM_OVERHEAD,
+ DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
+ else
+ ctx->protected_key_dma = dma_map_single(jrdev, ctx->protected_key,
+ ctx->cdata.plain_keylen,
+ DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
+
+ ctx->cdata.protected_key_dma = ctx->protected_key_dma;
+ ctx->is_blob = true;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int aes_skcipher_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *skcipher,
const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
{
@@ -1254,7 +1321,9 @@ static void init_skcipher_job(struct skcipher_request *req,
struct caam_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx_dma(skcipher);
struct device *jrdev = ctx->jrdev;
int ivsize = crypto_skcipher_ivsize(skcipher);
- u32 *desc = edesc->hw_desc;
+ u32 *desc = !ctx->is_blob ? edesc->hw_desc :
+ (u32 *)((u8 *)edesc->hw_desc + CAAM_DESC_BYTES_MAX);
+ dma_addr_t desc_dma;
u32 *sh_desc;
u32 in_options = 0, out_options = 0;
dma_addr_t src_dma, dst_dma, ptr;
@@ -1269,11 +1338,6 @@ static void init_skcipher_job(struct skcipher_request *req,
DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 4, req->src,
edesc->src_nents > 1 ? 100 : req->cryptlen, 1);
- sh_desc = encrypt ? ctx->sh_desc_enc : ctx->sh_desc_dec;
- ptr = encrypt ? ctx->sh_desc_enc_dma : ctx->sh_desc_dec_dma;
-
- len = desc_len(sh_desc);
- init_job_desc_shared(desc, ptr, len, HDR_SHARE_DEFER | HDR_REVERSE);
if (ivsize || edesc->mapped_src_nents > 1) {
src_dma = edesc->sec4_sg_dma;
@@ -1283,8 +1347,6 @@ static void init_skcipher_job(struct skcipher_request *req,
src_dma = sg_dma_address(req->src);
}
- append_seq_in_ptr(desc, src_dma, req->cryptlen + ivsize, in_options);
-
if (likely(req->src == req->dst)) {
dst_dma = src_dma + !!ivsize * sizeof(struct sec4_sg_entry);
out_options = in_options;
@@ -1296,7 +1358,25 @@ static void init_skcipher_job(struct skcipher_request *req,
out_options = LDST_SGF;
}
- append_seq_out_ptr(desc, dst_dma, req->cryptlen + ivsize, out_options);
+ if (ctx->is_blob) {
+ cnstr_desc_skcipher_enc_dec(desc, &ctx->cdata,
+ src_dma, dst_dma, req->cryptlen + ivsize,
+ in_options, out_options,
+ ivsize, encrypt);
+
+ desc_dma = dma_map_single(jrdev, desc, desc_bytes(desc), DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+
+ cnstr_desc_protected_blob_decap(edesc->hw_desc, &ctx->cdata, desc_dma);
+ } else {
+ sh_desc = encrypt ? ctx->sh_desc_enc : ctx->sh_desc_dec;
+ ptr = encrypt ? ctx->sh_desc_enc_dma : ctx->sh_desc_dec_dma;
+
+ len = desc_len(sh_desc);
+ init_job_desc_shared(desc, ptr, len, HDR_SHARE_DEFER | HDR_REVERSE);
+ append_seq_in_ptr(desc, src_dma, req->cryptlen + ivsize, in_options);
+
+ append_seq_out_ptr(desc, dst_dma, req->cryptlen + ivsize, out_options);
+ }
}
/*
@@ -1817,6 +1897,7 @@ static inline int skcipher_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, bool encrypt)
struct caam_drv_private *ctrlpriv = dev_get_drvdata(jrdev->parent);
u32 *desc;
int ret = 0;
+ int len;
/*
* XTS is expected to return an error even for input length = 0
@@ -1842,8 +1923,12 @@ static inline int skcipher_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, bool encrypt)
crypto_skcipher_decrypt(&rctx->fallback_req);
}
+ len = DESC_JOB_IO_LEN * CAAM_CMD_SZ;
+ if (ctx->is_blob)
+ len += CAAM_DESC_BYTES_MAX;
+
/* allocate extended descriptor */
- edesc = skcipher_edesc_alloc(req, DESC_JOB_IO_LEN * CAAM_CMD_SZ);
+ edesc = skcipher_edesc_alloc(req, len);
if (IS_ERR(edesc))
return PTR_ERR(edesc);
@@ -1885,6 +1970,27 @@ static int skcipher_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
}
static struct caam_skcipher_alg driver_algs[] = {
+ {
+ .skcipher.base = {
+ .base = {
+ .cra_name = "cbc(paes)",
+ .cra_driver_name = "cbc-paes-caam",
+ .cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ },
+ .setkey = paes_skcipher_setkey,
+ .encrypt = skcipher_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = skcipher_decrypt,
+ .min_keysize = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE + CAAM_BLOB_OVERHEAD +
+ CAAM_PKEY_HEADER,
+ .max_keysize = AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE + CAAM_BLOB_OVERHEAD +
+ CAAM_PKEY_HEADER,
+ .ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ },
+ .skcipher.op = {
+ .do_one_request = skcipher_do_one_req,
+ },
+ .caam.class1_alg_type = OP_ALG_ALGSEL_AES | OP_ALG_AAI_CBC,
+ },
{
.skcipher.base = {
.base = {
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_desc.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_desc.c
index 7571e1ac913b..04c1105eb1f5 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_desc.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_desc.c
@@ -2,12 +2,13 @@
/*
* Shared descriptors for aead, skcipher algorithms
*
- * Copyright 2016-2019 NXP
+ * Copyright 2016-2019, 2025 NXP
*/
#include "compat.h"
#include "desc_constr.h"
#include "caamalg_desc.h"
+#include <soc/fsl/caam-blob.h>
/*
* For aead functions, read payload and write payload,
@@ -1364,6 +1365,84 @@ static inline void skcipher_append_src_dst(u32 *desc)
append_seq_fifo_store(desc, 0, FIFOST_TYPE_MESSAGE_DATA | KEY_VLF);
}
+void cnstr_desc_skcipher_enc_dec(u32 * const desc, struct alginfo *cdata,
+ dma_addr_t src, dma_addr_t dst, unsigned int data_sz,
+ unsigned int in_options, unsigned int out_options,
+ unsigned int ivsize, const bool encrypt)
+{
+ u32 options = cdata->algtype | OP_ALG_AS_INIT;
+
+ if (encrypt)
+ options |= OP_ALG_ENCRYPT;
+ else
+ options |= OP_ALG_DECRYPT;
+
+ init_job_desc(desc, 0);
+
+ append_jump(desc, JUMP_JSL | JUMP_TYPE_LOCAL |
+ JUMP_COND_NOP | JUMP_TEST_ALL | 1);
+
+ append_key(desc, cdata->protected_key_dma, cdata->plain_keylen,
+ CLASS_1 | KEY_DEST_CLASS_REG | cdata->key_cmd_opt);
+
+ append_seq_in_ptr(desc, src, data_sz, in_options);
+
+ append_seq_out_ptr(desc, dst, data_sz, out_options);
+
+ /* Load IV, if there is one */
+ if (ivsize)
+ append_seq_load(desc, ivsize, LDST_SRCDST_BYTE_CONTEXT |
+ LDST_CLASS_1_CCB);
+
+ append_operation(desc, options);
+
+ skcipher_append_src_dst(desc);
+
+ /* Store IV */
+ if (ivsize)
+ append_seq_store(desc, ivsize, LDST_SRCDST_BYTE_CONTEXT |
+ LDST_CLASS_1_CCB);
+
+ print_hex_dump_debug("skcipher_enc_dec job desc@" __stringify(__LINE__)": ",
+ DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 4, desc, desc_bytes(desc),
+ 1);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(cnstr_desc_skcipher_enc_dec);
+
+void cnstr_desc_protected_blob_decap(u32 * const desc, struct alginfo *cdata,
+ dma_addr_t next_desc_addr)
+{
+ u32 protected_store;
+
+ init_job_desc(desc, 0);
+
+ /* Load key modifier */
+ append_load_as_imm(desc, KEYMOD, sizeof(KEYMOD) - 1,
+ LDST_CLASS_2_CCB | LDST_SRCDST_BYTE_KEY);
+
+ append_seq_in_ptr_intlen(desc, cdata->key_dma,
+ cdata->plain_keylen + CAAM_BLOB_OVERHEAD, 0);
+
+ append_seq_out_ptr_intlen(desc, cdata->protected_key_dma,
+ cdata->plain_keylen, 0);
+
+ protected_store = OP_PCLID_BLOB | OP_PCL_BLOB_BLACK;
+ if ((cdata->key_cmd_opt >> KEY_EKT_OFFSET) & 1)
+ protected_store |= OP_PCL_BLOB_EKT;
+
+ append_operation(desc, OP_TYPE_DECAP_PROTOCOL | protected_store);
+
+ if (next_desc_addr) {
+ append_jump(desc, JUMP_TYPE_NONLOCAL | JUMP_TEST_ALL);
+ append_ptr(desc, next_desc_addr);
+ }
+
+ print_hex_dump_debug("protected blob decap job desc@" __stringify(__LINE__) ":",
+ DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 4, desc,
+ desc_bytes(desc), 1);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(cnstr_desc_protected_blob_decap);
+
/**
* cnstr_shdsc_skcipher_encap - skcipher encapsulation shared descriptor
* @desc: pointer to buffer used for descriptor construction
@@ -1391,7 +1470,8 @@ void cnstr_shdsc_skcipher_encap(u32 * const desc, struct alginfo *cdata,
/* Load class1 key only */
append_key_as_imm(desc, cdata->key_virt, cdata->keylen,
- cdata->keylen, CLASS_1 | KEY_DEST_CLASS_REG);
+ cdata->plain_keylen, CLASS_1 | KEY_DEST_CLASS_REG
+ | cdata->key_cmd_opt);
/* Load nonce into CONTEXT1 reg */
if (is_rfc3686) {
@@ -1466,7 +1546,8 @@ void cnstr_shdsc_skcipher_decap(u32 * const desc, struct alginfo *cdata,
/* Load class1 key only */
append_key_as_imm(desc, cdata->key_virt, cdata->keylen,
- cdata->keylen, CLASS_1 | KEY_DEST_CLASS_REG);
+ cdata->plain_keylen, CLASS_1 | KEY_DEST_CLASS_REG
+ | cdata->key_cmd_opt);
/* Load nonce into CONTEXT1 reg */
if (is_rfc3686) {
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_desc.h b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_desc.h
index f2893393ba5e..323490a4a756 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_desc.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_desc.h
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
/*
* Shared descriptors for aead, skcipher algorithms
*
- * Copyright 2016 NXP
+ * Copyright 2016, 2025 NXP
*/
#ifndef _CAAMALG_DESC_H_
@@ -48,6 +48,9 @@
#define DESC_SKCIPHER_DEC_LEN (DESC_SKCIPHER_BASE + \
16 * CAAM_CMD_SZ)
+/* Key modifier for CAAM Protected blobs */
+#define KEYMOD "SECURE_KEY"
+
void cnstr_shdsc_aead_null_encap(u32 * const desc, struct alginfo *adata,
unsigned int icvsize, int era);
@@ -113,4 +116,12 @@ void cnstr_shdsc_xts_skcipher_encap(u32 * const desc, struct alginfo *cdata);
void cnstr_shdsc_xts_skcipher_decap(u32 * const desc, struct alginfo *cdata);
+void cnstr_desc_protected_blob_decap(u32 * const desc, struct alginfo *cdata,
+ dma_addr_t next_desc);
+
+void cnstr_desc_skcipher_enc_dec(u32 * const desc, struct alginfo *cdata,
+ dma_addr_t src, dma_addr_t dst, unsigned int data_sz,
+ unsigned int in_options, unsigned int out_options,
+ unsigned int ivsize, const bool encrypt);
+
#endif /* _CAAMALG_DESC_H_ */
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/desc_constr.h b/drivers/crypto/caam/desc_constr.h
index 824c94d44f94..2a29dd2c9c8a 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/desc_constr.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/desc_constr.h
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
* caam descriptor construction helper functions
*
* Copyright 2008-2012 Freescale Semiconductor, Inc.
- * Copyright 2019 NXP
+ * Copyright 2019, 2025 NXP
*/
#ifndef DESC_CONSTR_H
@@ -498,17 +498,23 @@ do { \
* @keylen: length of the provided algorithm key, in bytes
* @keylen_pad: padded length of the provided algorithm key, in bytes
* @key_dma: dma (bus) address where algorithm key resides
+ * @protected_key_dma: dma (bus) address where protected key resides
* @key_virt: virtual address where algorithm key resides
* @key_inline: true - key can be inlined in the descriptor; false - key is
* referenced by the descriptor
+ * @plain_keylen: size of the key to be loaded by the CAAM
+ * @key_cmd_opt: optional parameters for KEY command
*/
struct alginfo {
u32 algtype;
unsigned int keylen;
unsigned int keylen_pad;
dma_addr_t key_dma;
+ dma_addr_t protected_key_dma;
const void *key_virt;
bool key_inline;
+ u32 plain_keylen;
+ u32 key_cmd_opt;
};
/**
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 0/3] trusted-keys: Add support for protected keys using CAAM
2025-10-06 7:17 [PATCH 0/3] trusted-keys: Add support for protected keys using CAAM meenakshi.aggarwal
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2025-10-06 7:17 ` [PATCH 3/3] crypto:caam: Add support of paes algorithm meenakshi.aggarwal
@ 2025-10-14 8:56 ` Horia Geanta
2025-10-17 8:22 ` Herbert Xu
4 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Horia Geanta @ 2025-10-14 8:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Gaurav Jain, Meenakshi Aggarwal, Varun Sethi, Pankaj Gupta, herbert
Cc: linux-crypto, linux-kernel
On Mon, 2025-10-06 at 09:17 +0200, meenakshi.aggarwal@nxp.com wrote:
> From: Meenakshi Aggarwal <meenakshi.aggarwal@nxp.com>
>
> Overview:
> This patch set adds:
> - Support for creating and loading protected keys via `keyctl`
> interface.
> - Documentation updates to describe protected key usage and options.
> - CAAM-specific implementation for protected key encryption
> algorithms.
>
> User can create protected/encrypted key using keyctl interface:
>
> KEYNAME=dm_trust_key_hw
> KEY="$(keyctl add trusted $KEYNAME 'new 32 pk key_enc_algo=1' @s)"
> keyctl pipe $KEY >~/$KEYNAME.blob
> keyctl list @s
>
> dm-crypt can load the protected key buffer from the keyring and use
> it to
> initialize encrypted volumes, ensuring that key material is never
> exposed in plaintext.
>
> The Protected key buffer is passed to the CAAM driver via the kernel
> crypto API.
> CAAM driver will decapsulate the protected key buffer and perform
> cipher operation.
>
AFAICS, the algorithms implemented in caam driver are still marked with
CRYPTO_ALG_ALLOCATES_MEMORY.
Thus, I am wondering if currently dm-crypt is really a use case for
"protected keys" having CAAM as backend.
Thanks,
Horia
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 0/3] trusted-keys: Add support for protected keys using CAAM
2025-10-06 7:17 [PATCH 0/3] trusted-keys: Add support for protected keys using CAAM meenakshi.aggarwal
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2025-10-14 8:56 ` [PATCH 0/3] trusted-keys: Add support for protected keys using CAAM Horia Geanta
@ 2025-10-17 8:22 ` Herbert Xu
4 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Herbert Xu @ 2025-10-17 8:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: meenakshi.aggarwal
Cc: horia.geanta, V.sethi, pankaj.gupta, gaurav.jain, linux-crypto,
linux-kernel
On Mon, Oct 06, 2025 at 09:17:50AM +0200, meenakshi.aggarwal@nxp.com wrote:
> From: Meenakshi Aggarwal <meenakshi.aggarwal@nxp.com>
>
> Overview:
> This patch set adds:
> - Support for creating and loading protected keys via `keyctl` interface.
> - Documentation updates to describe protected key usage and options.
> - CAAM-specific implementation for protected key encryption algorithms.
>
> User can create protected/encrypted key using keyctl interface:
>
> KEYNAME=dm_trust_key_hw
> KEY="$(keyctl add trusted $KEYNAME 'new 32 pk key_enc_algo=1' @s)"
> keyctl pipe $KEY >~/$KEYNAME.blob
> keyctl list @s
>
> dm-crypt can load the protected key buffer from the keyring and use it to
> initialize encrypted volumes, ensuring that key material is never exposed in plaintext.
>
> The Protected key buffer is passed to the CAAM driver via the kernel crypto API.
> CAAM driver will decapsulate the protected key buffer and perform cipher operation.
>
> Protected Keys are identified by a header structure:
>
> struct caam_pkey_info {
> u8 is_pkey;
> u8 key_enc_algo;
> u16 plain_key_sz;
> u8 key_buf[];
> };
>
> This information is populated based on the parameters provided during key creation such as 'new 32 pk key_enc_algo=1'
>
> Internal Workflow:
> ::
>
> +------------------------+ +-------------------------------+
> | Seal Function | | paes_skcipher_setkey() |
> | - Constructs key buffer|---->| - Parses header and key_buf[] |
> | - Adds header metadata | | - Initializes cipher context |
> +------------------------+ +-------------------------------+
>
> I welcome feedback and suggestions from the community.
>
> Thank you for your time and consideration.
>
> Best regards,
> Meenakshi Aggarwal
>
> Meenakshi Aggarwal (3):
> Doc: trusted-keys as protected keys
> KEYS: trusted: caam based protected key
> crypto:caam: Add support of paes algorithm
>
> .../security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 87 +++++++++++-
> drivers/crypto/caam/blob_gen.c | 86 +++++++++---
> drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c | 128 ++++++++++++++++--
> drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_desc.c | 87 +++++++++++-
> drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_desc.h | 13 +-
> drivers/crypto/caam/desc.h | 9 +-
> drivers/crypto/caam/desc_constr.h | 8 +-
> include/soc/fsl/caam-blob.h | 26 ++++
> security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c | 108 +++++++++++++++
> 9 files changed, 518 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
>
> --
> 2.25.1
All applied. Thanks.
--
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
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