Re: SEV guest regression in 4.18

[Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>]

On 23/08/2018 17:29, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 23, 2018 at 01:26:55PM +0200, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
>> On 22/08/2018 22:11, Brijesh Singh wrote:
>>>
>>> Yes, this is one of approach I have in mind. It will avoid splitting
>>> the larger pages; I am thinking that early in boot code we can lookup
>>> for this special section and decrypt it in-place and probably maps with
>>> C=0. Only downside, it will increase data section footprint a bit
>>> because we need to align this section to PM_SIZE.
>>
>> If you can ensure it doesn't span a PMD, maybe it does not need to be
>> aligned; you could establish a C=0 mapping of the whole 2M around it.
> 
> Wouldn't that result in exposing/leaking whatever code/data happened
> to reside on the same 2M page (or corrupting it if the entire page
> isn't decrypted)?  Or are you suggesting that we'd also leave the
> encrypted mapping intact?

Yes, exactly the latter, because...

> Does hardware include the C-bit in the cache tag?

... the C-bit is effectively part of the physical address and hence of
the cache tag.  The kernel is already relying on this to properly
encrypt/decrypt pages, if I remember correctly.

Paolo