From: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: "Mathieu Desnoyers" <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>,
"André Almeida" <andrealmeid@igalia.com>,
"Sebastian Andrzej Siewior" <bigeasy@linutronix.de>,
"Carlos O'Donell" <carlos@redhat.com>,
"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>,
"Florian Weimer" <fweimer@redhat.com>,
"Rich Felker" <dalias@aerifal.cx>,
"Torvald Riegel" <triegel@redhat.com>,
"Darren Hart" <dvhart@infradead.org>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@kernel.org>,
"Davidlohr Bueso" <dave@stgolabs.net>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
"Liam R . Howlett" <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>
Subject: Re: [patch 8/8] x86/vdso: Implement __vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock()
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2026 16:33:47 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <64921c86-b4f1-43f8-b03e-addbd1be19a0@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260316164951.484640267@kernel.org>
On 3/16/26 18:13, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> When the FUTEX_ROBUST_UNLOCK mechanism is used for unlocking (PI-)futexes,
> then the unlock sequence in userspace looks like this:
>
> 1) robust_list_set_op_pending(mutex);
> 2) robust_list_remove(mutex);
>
> lval = gettid();
> 3) if (atomic_try_cmpxchg(&mutex->lock, lval, 0))
> 4) robust_list_clear_op_pending();
> else
> 5) sys_futex(OP,...FUTEX_ROBUST_UNLOCK);
>
> That still leaves a minimal race window between #3 and #4 where the mutex
> could be acquired by some other task which observes that it is the last
> user and:
>
> 1) unmaps the mutex memory
> 2) maps a different file, which ends up covering the same address
>
> When then the original task exits before reaching #6 then the kernel robust
> list handling observes the pending op entry and tries to fix up user space.
>
> In case that the newly mapped data contains the TID of the exiting thread
> at the address of the mutex/futex the kernel will set the owner died bit in
> that memory and therefore corrupt unrelated data.
>
> Provide a VDSO function which exposes the critical section window in the
> VDSO symbol table. The resulting addresses are updated in the task's mm
> when the VDSO is (re)map()'ed.
>
> The core code detects when a task was interrupted within the critical
> section and is about to deliver a signal. It then invokes an architecture
> specific function which determines whether the pending op pointer has to be
> cleared or not. The assembly sequence for the non COMPAT case is:
>
> mov %esi,%eax // Load TID into EAX
> xor %ecx,%ecx // Set ECX to 0
> lock cmpxchg %ecx,(%rdi) // Try the TID -> 0 transition
> .Lstart:
> jnz .Lend
> movq $0x0,(%rdx) // Clear list_op_pending
> .Lend:
> ret
>
> So the decision can be simply based on the ZF state in regs->flags.
>
> If COMPAT is enabled then the try_unlock() function needs to take the size
> bit in the OP pointer into account, which makes it slightly more complex:
>
> mov %esi,%eax // Load TID into EAX
> mov %rdx,%rsi // Get the op pointer
> xor %ecx,%ecx // Set ECX to 0
> and $0xfffffffffffffffe,%rsi // Clear the size bit
> lock cmpxchg %ecx,(%rdi) // Try the TID -> 0 transition
> .Lstart:
> jnz .Lend
> .Lsuccess:
> testl $0x1,(%rdx) // Test the size bit
> jz .Lop64 // Not set: 64-bit
> movl $0x0,(%rsi) // Clear 32-bit
> jmp .Lend
> .Lop64:
> movq $0x0,(%rsi) // Clear 64-bit
> .Lend:
> ret
>
> The decision function has to check whether regs->ip is in the success
> portion as the size bit test obviously modifies ZF too. If it is before
> .Lsuccess then ZF contains the cmpxchg() result. If it's at of after
> .Lsuccess then the pointer has to be cleared.
>
> The original pointer with the size bit is preserved in RDX so the fixup can
> utilize the existing clearing mechanism, which is used by sys_futex().
>
> Arguably this could be avoided by providing separate functions and making
> the IP range for the quick check in the exit to user path cover the whole
> text section which contains the two functions. But that's not a win at all
> because:
>
> 1) User space needs to handle the two variants instead of just
> relying on a bit which can be saved in the mutex at
> initialization time.
>
> 2) The fixup decision function has then to evaluate which code path is
> used. That just adds more symbols and range checking for no real
> value.
>
> The unlock function is inspired by an idea from Mathieu Desnoyers.
>
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260311185409.1988269-1-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com
> ---
> arch/x86/Kconfig | 1
> arch/x86/entry/vdso/common/vfutex.c | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32/Makefile | 5 +-
> arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32/vdso32.lds.S | 6 ++
> arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32/vfutex.c | 1
> arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso64/Makefile | 7 +--
> arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso64/vdso64.lds.S | 6 ++
> arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso64/vdsox32.lds.S | 6 ++
> arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso64/vfutex.c | 1
> arch/x86/include/asm/futex_robust.h | 44 ++++++++++++++++++
> 10 files changed, 144 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> @@ -237,6 +237,7 @@ config X86
> select HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
> select HAVE_EISA if X86_32
> select HAVE_EXIT_THREAD
> + select HAVE_FUTEX_ROBUST_UNLOCK
> select HAVE_GENERIC_TIF_BITS
> select HAVE_GUP_FAST
> select HAVE_FENTRY if X86_64 || DYNAMIC_FTRACE
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/common/vfutex.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
> +#include <vdso/futex.h>
> +
> +/*
> + * Compat enabled kernels have to take the size bit into account to support the
> + * mixed size use case of gaming emulators. Contrary to the kernel robust unlock
> + * mechanism all of this does not test for the 32-bit modifier in 32-bit VDSOs
> + * and in compat disabled kernels. User space can keep the pieces.
> + */
> +#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO32_64)
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
The following asm template can be substantially improved.
> +# define ASM_CLEAR_PTR \
> + " testl $1, (%[pop]) \n" \
Please use byte-wide instruction, TESTB with address operand modifier,
"%a[pop]" instead of "(%[pop])":
testb $1, %a[pop]
> + " jz .Lop64 \n" \
> + " movl $0, (%[pad]) \n" \
Here you can reuse zero-valued operand "val" and use address operand
modifier. Please note %k modifier.
movl %k[val], %a[pad]
> + " jmp __vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock_cs_end \n" \
> + ".Lop64: \n" \
> + " movq $0, (%[pad]) \n"
Again, zero-valued operand "val" and address op modifier can be used here:
movq %[val], %a[pad]
> +
> +# define ASM_PAD_CONSTRAINT ,[pad] "S" (((unsigned long)pop) & ~0x1UL)
> +
> +#else /* CONFIG_COMPAT */
> +
> +# define ASM_CLEAR_PTR \
> + " movq $0, (%[pop]) \n"
movq %[val], %a[pop]
> +
> +# define ASM_PAD_CONSTRAINT
> +
> +#endif /* !CONFIG_COMPAT */
> +
> +#else /* CONFIG_X86_64 && !BUILD_VDSO32_64 */
> +
> +# define ASM_CLEAR_PTR \
> + " movl $0, (%[pad]) \n"
movl %[val], %a[pad]
> +
> +# define ASM_PAD_CONSTRAINT ,[pad] "S" (((unsigned long)pop) & ~0x1UL)
> +
> +#endif /* !CONFIG_X86_64 || BUILD_VDSO32_64 */
> +
> +uint32_t __vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock(uint32_t *lock, uint32_t tid, void *pop)
> +{
> + asm volatile (
> + ".global __vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock_cs_start \n"
> + ".global __vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock_cs_success \n"
> + ".global __vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock_cs_end \n"
> + " \n"
> + " lock cmpxchgl %[val], (%[ptr]) \n"
> + " \n"
> + "__vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock_cs_start: \n"
> + " \n"
> + " jnz __vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock_cs_end \n"
> + " \n"
> + "__vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock_cs_success: \n"
> + " \n"
> + ASM_CLEAR_PTR
> + " \n"
> + "__vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock_cs_end: \n"
> + : [tid] "+a" (tid)
You need earlyclobber here "+&a", because not all input arguemnts are
read before this argument is written.
> + : [ptr] "D" (lock),
> + [pop] "d" (pop),
> + [val] "r" (0)
[val] "r" (0UL), so the correct register width will be used. I'd name
this operand [zero], because 0 lives here, and it will be reused in
several places.
Uros.
> + ASM_PAD_CONSTRAINT
> + : "memory"
> + );
> +
> + return tid;
> +}
> +
> +uint32_t futex_robust_try_unlock(uint32_t *, uint32_t, void **)
> + __attribute__((weak, alias("__vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock")));
> --- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32/Makefile
> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32/Makefile
> @@ -7,8 +7,9 @@
> vdsos-y := 32
>
> # Files to link into the vDSO:
> -vobjs-y := note.o vclock_gettime.o vgetcpu.o
> -vobjs-y += system_call.o sigreturn.o
> +vobjs-y := note.o vclock_gettime.o vgetcpu.o
> +vobjs-y += system_call.o sigreturn.o
> +vobjs-$(CONFIG_FUTEX_ROBUST_UNLOCK) += vfutex.o
>
> # Compilation flags
> flags-y := -DBUILD_VDSO32 -m32 -mregparm=0
> --- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32/vdso32.lds.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32/vdso32.lds.S
> @@ -30,6 +30,12 @@ VERSION
> __vdso_clock_gettime64;
> __vdso_clock_getres_time64;
> __vdso_getcpu;
> +#ifdef CONFIG_FUTEX_ROBUST_UNLOCK
> + __vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock;
> + __vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock_cs_start;
> + __vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock_cs_success;
> + __vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock_cs_end;
> +#endif
> };
>
> LINUX_2.5 {
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32/vfutex.c
> @@ -0,0 +1 @@
> +#include "common/vfutex.c"
> --- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso64/Makefile
> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso64/Makefile
> @@ -8,9 +8,10 @@ vdsos-y := 64
> vdsos-$(CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI) += x32
>
> # Files to link into the vDSO:
> -vobjs-y := note.o vclock_gettime.o vgetcpu.o
> -vobjs-y += vgetrandom.o vgetrandom-chacha.o
> -vobjs-$(CONFIG_X86_SGX) += vsgx.o
> +vobjs-y := note.o vclock_gettime.o vgetcpu.o
> +vobjs-y += vgetrandom.o vgetrandom-chacha.o
> +vobjs-$(CONFIG_X86_SGX) += vsgx.o
> +vobjs-$(CONFIG_FUTEX_ROBUST_UNLOCK) += vfutex.o
>
> # Compilation flags
> flags-y := -DBUILD_VDSO64 -m64 -mcmodel=small
> --- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso64/vdso64.lds.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso64/vdso64.lds.S
> @@ -32,6 +32,12 @@ VERSION {
> #endif
> getrandom;
> __vdso_getrandom;
> +#ifdef CONFIG_FUTEX_ROBUST_UNLOCK
> + __vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock;
> + __vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock_cs_start;
> + __vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock_cs_success;
> + __vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock_cs_end;
> +#endif
> local: *;
> };
> }
> --- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso64/vdsox32.lds.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso64/vdsox32.lds.S
> @@ -22,6 +22,12 @@ VERSION {
> __vdso_getcpu;
> __vdso_time;
> __vdso_clock_getres;
> +#ifdef CONFIG_FUTEX_ROBUST_UNLOCK
> + __vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock;
> + __vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock_cs_start;
> + __vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock_cs_success;
> + __vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock_cs_end;
> +#endif
> local: *;
> };
> }
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso64/vfutex.c
> @@ -0,0 +1 @@
> +#include "common/vfutex.c"
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/futex_robust.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> +#ifndef _ASM_X86_FUTEX_ROBUST_H
> +#define _ASM_X86_FUTEX_ROBUST_H
> +
> +#include <asm/ptrace.h>
> +
> +static __always_inline bool x86_futex_needs_robust_unlock_fixup(struct pt_regs *regs)
> +{
> + /*
> + * This is tricky in the compat case as it has to take the size check
> + * into account. See the ASM magic in the VDSO vfutex code. If compat is
> + * disabled or this is a 32-bit kernel then ZF is authoritive no matter
> + * what.
> + */
> + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64) || !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION))
> + return !!(regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_ZF);
> +
> + /*
> + * For the compat case, the core code already established that regs->ip
> + * is >= cs_start and < cs_end. Now check whether it is at the
> + * conditional jump which checks the cmpxchg() or if it succeeded and
> + * does the size check, which obviously modifies ZF too.
> + */
> + if (regs->ip >= current->mm->futex.unlock_cs_success_ip)
> + return true;
> + /*
> + * It's at the jnz right after the cmpxchg(). ZF tells whether this
> + * succeeded or not.
> + */
> + return !!(regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_ZF);
> +}
> +
> +#define arch_futex_needs_robust_unlock_fixup(regs) \
> + x86_futex_needs_robust_unlock_fixup(regs)
> +
> +static __always_inline void __user *x86_futex_robust_unlock_get_pop(struct pt_regs *regs)
> +{
> + return (void __user *)regs->dx;
> +}
> +
> +#define arch_futex_robust_unlock_get_pop(regs) \
> + x86_futex_robust_unlock_get_pop(regs)
> +
> +#endif /* _ASM_X86_FUTEX_ROBUST_H */
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-03-17 15:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 57+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-03-16 17:12 [patch 0/8] futex: Address the robust futex unlock race for real Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 17:12 ` [patch 1/8] futex: Move futex task related data into a struct Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 17:55 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2026-03-17 2:24 ` André Almeida
2026-03-17 9:52 ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 17:13 ` [patch 2/8] futex: Move futex related mm_struct " Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 18:00 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2026-03-16 17:13 ` [patch 3/8] futex: Provide UABI defines for robust list entry modifiers Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 18:02 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2026-03-17 2:38 ` André Almeida
2026-03-17 9:53 ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 17:13 ` [patch 4/8] futex: Add support for unlocking robust futexes Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 18:24 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2026-03-17 16:17 ` André Almeida
2026-03-17 20:46 ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-03-17 22:40 ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-18 8:02 ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-03-18 8:06 ` Florian Weimer
2026-03-18 14:47 ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-03-18 16:03 ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 17:13 ` [patch 5/8] futex: Add robust futex unlock IP range Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 18:36 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2026-03-17 19:19 ` André Almeida
2026-03-16 17:13 ` [patch 6/8] futex: Provide infrastructure to plug the non contended robust futex unlock race Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 18:35 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2026-03-16 20:29 ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 20:52 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2026-03-16 17:13 ` [patch 7/8] x86/vdso: Prepare for robust futex unlock support Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 17:13 ` [patch 8/8] x86/vdso: Implement __vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock() Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 19:19 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2026-03-16 21:02 ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 22:35 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2026-03-16 21:14 ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 21:29 ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-17 7:25 ` Thomas Weißschuh
2026-03-17 9:51 ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-17 11:17 ` Thomas Weißschuh
2026-03-18 16:17 ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-19 7:41 ` Thomas Weißschuh
2026-03-19 8:53 ` Florian Weimer
2026-03-19 9:04 ` Thomas Weißschuh
2026-03-19 9:08 ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-03-19 23:31 ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-19 10:36 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2026-03-19 10:49 ` Thomas Weißschuh
2026-03-19 10:55 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2026-03-17 8:28 ` Florian Weimer
2026-03-17 9:36 ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-17 10:37 ` Florian Weimer
2026-03-17 22:32 ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-18 22:08 ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-18 22:10 ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-03-19 2:05 ` André Almeida
2026-03-19 7:10 ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-17 15:33 ` Uros Bizjak [this message]
2026-03-18 8:21 ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-18 8:32 ` Uros Bizjak
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