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From: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: "Mathieu Desnoyers" <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>,
	"André Almeida" <andrealmeid@igalia.com>,
	"Sebastian Andrzej Siewior" <bigeasy@linutronix.de>,
	"Carlos O'Donell" <carlos@redhat.com>,
	"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"Florian Weimer" <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"Rich Felker" <dalias@aerifal.cx>,
	"Torvald Riegel" <triegel@redhat.com>,
	"Darren Hart" <dvhart@infradead.org>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@kernel.org>,
	"Davidlohr Bueso" <dave@stgolabs.net>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Liam R . Howlett" <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>
Subject: Re: [patch 8/8] x86/vdso: Implement __vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock()
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2026 16:33:47 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <64921c86-b4f1-43f8-b03e-addbd1be19a0@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260316164951.484640267@kernel.org>



On 3/16/26 18:13, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> When the FUTEX_ROBUST_UNLOCK mechanism is used for unlocking (PI-)futexes,
> then the unlock sequence in userspace looks like this:
> 
>    1)	robust_list_set_op_pending(mutex);
>    2)	robust_list_remove(mutex);
> 	
>    	lval = gettid();
>    3)	if (atomic_try_cmpxchg(&mutex->lock, lval, 0))
>    4)		robust_list_clear_op_pending();
>    	else
>    5)		sys_futex(OP,...FUTEX_ROBUST_UNLOCK);
> 
> That still leaves a minimal race window between #3 and #4 where the mutex
> could be acquired by some other task which observes that it is the last
> user and:
> 
>    1) unmaps the mutex memory
>    2) maps a different file, which ends up covering the same address
> 
> When then the original task exits before reaching #6 then the kernel robust
> list handling observes the pending op entry and tries to fix up user space.
> 
> In case that the newly mapped data contains the TID of the exiting thread
> at the address of the mutex/futex the kernel will set the owner died bit in
> that memory and therefore corrupt unrelated data.
> 
> Provide a VDSO function which exposes the critical section window in the
> VDSO symbol table. The resulting addresses are updated in the task's mm
> when the VDSO is (re)map()'ed.
> 
> The core code detects when a task was interrupted within the critical
> section and is about to deliver a signal. It then invokes an architecture
> specific function which determines whether the pending op pointer has to be
> cleared or not. The assembly sequence for the non COMPAT case is:
> 
> 	mov		%esi,%eax	// Load TID into EAX
>         	xor		%ecx,%ecx	// Set ECX to 0
> 	lock cmpxchg	%ecx,(%rdi)	// Try the TID -> 0 transition
>    .Lstart:
> 	jnz    		.Lend
> 	movq		$0x0,(%rdx)	// Clear list_op_pending
>    .Lend:
> 	ret
> 
> So the decision can be simply based on the ZF state in regs->flags.
> 
> If COMPAT is enabled then the try_unlock() function needs to take the size
> bit in the OP pointer into account, which makes it slightly more complex:
> 
> 	mov		%esi,%eax	// Load TID into EAX
> 	mov		%rdx,%rsi	// Get the op pointer
> 	xor		%ecx,%ecx	// Set ECX to 0
> 	and		$0xfffffffffffffffe,%rsi // Clear the size bit
> 	lock cmpxchg	%ecx,(%rdi)	// Try the TID -> 0 transition
>    .Lstart:
> 	jnz    		.Lend
>    .Lsuccess:
> 	testl		$0x1,(%rdx)	// Test the size bit
> 	jz     		.Lop64		// Not set: 64-bit
> 	movl		$0x0,(%rsi)	// Clear 32-bit
> 	jmp    		.Lend
>    .Lop64:	
> 	movq		$0x0,(%rsi)	// Clear 64-bit
>    .Lend:
> 	ret
> 
> The decision function has to check whether regs->ip is in the success
> portion as the size bit test obviously modifies ZF too. If it is before
> .Lsuccess then ZF contains the cmpxchg() result. If it's at of after
> .Lsuccess then the pointer has to be cleared.
> 
> The original pointer with the size bit is preserved in RDX so the fixup can
> utilize the existing clearing mechanism, which is used by sys_futex().
> 
> Arguably this could be avoided by providing separate functions and making
> the IP range for the quick check in the exit to user path cover the whole
> text section which contains the two functions. But that's not a win at all
> because:
> 
>     1) User space needs to handle the two variants instead of just
>        relying on a bit which can be saved in the mutex at
>        initialization time.
> 
>     2) The fixup decision function has then to evaluate which code path is
>        used. That just adds more symbols and range checking for no real
>        value.
> 
> The unlock function is inspired by an idea from Mathieu Desnoyers.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260311185409.1988269-1-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com
> ---
>   arch/x86/Kconfig                         |    1
>   arch/x86/entry/vdso/common/vfutex.c      |   72 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>   arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32/Makefile      |    5 +-
>   arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32/vdso32.lds.S  |    6 ++
>   arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32/vfutex.c      |    1
>   arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso64/Makefile      |    7 +--
>   arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso64/vdso64.lds.S  |    6 ++
>   arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso64/vdsox32.lds.S |    6 ++
>   arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso64/vfutex.c      |    1
>   arch/x86/include/asm/futex_robust.h      |   44 ++++++++++++++++++
>   10 files changed, 144 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
> 
> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> @@ -237,6 +237,7 @@ config X86
>   	select HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
>   	select HAVE_EISA			if X86_32
>   	select HAVE_EXIT_THREAD
> +	select HAVE_FUTEX_ROBUST_UNLOCK
>   	select HAVE_GENERIC_TIF_BITS
>   	select HAVE_GUP_FAST
>   	select HAVE_FENTRY			if X86_64 || DYNAMIC_FTRACE
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/common/vfutex.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
> +#include <vdso/futex.h>
> +
> +/*
> + * Compat enabled kernels have to take the size bit into account to support the
> + * mixed size use case of gaming emulators. Contrary to the kernel robust unlock
> + * mechanism all of this does not test for the 32-bit modifier in 32-bit VDSOs
> + * and in compat disabled kernels. User space can keep the pieces.
> + */
> +#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO32_64)
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT

The following asm template can be substantially improved.

> +# define ASM_CLEAR_PTR								\
> +		"	testl	$1, (%[pop])				\n"	\

Please use byte-wide instruction, TESTB with address operand modifier, 
"%a[pop]" instead of "(%[pop])":

testb $1, %a[pop]

> +		"	jz	.Lop64					\n"	\
> +		"	movl	$0, (%[pad])				\n"	\

Here you can reuse zero-valued operand "val" and use address operand 
modifier. Please note %k modifier.

movl %k[val], %a[pad]

> +		"	jmp	__vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock_cs_end	\n"	\
> +		".Lop64:						\n"	\
> +		"	movq	$0, (%[pad])				\n"

Again, zero-valued operand "val" and address op modifier can be used here:

movq %[val], %a[pad]

> +
> +# define ASM_PAD_CONSTRAINT	,[pad] "S" (((unsigned long)pop) & ~0x1UL)
> +
> +#else /* CONFIG_COMPAT */
> +
> +# define ASM_CLEAR_PTR								\
> +		"	movq	$0, (%[pop])				\n"

movq %[val], %a[pop]

> +
> +# define ASM_PAD_CONSTRAINT
> +
> +#endif /* !CONFIG_COMPAT */
> +
> +#else /* CONFIG_X86_64 && !BUILD_VDSO32_64 */
> +
> +# define ASM_CLEAR_PTR								\
> +		"	movl	$0, (%[pad])				\n"

movl %[val], %a[pad]

> +
> +# define ASM_PAD_CONSTRAINT	,[pad] "S" (((unsigned long)pop) & ~0x1UL)
> +
> +#endif /* !CONFIG_X86_64 || BUILD_VDSO32_64 */
> +
> +uint32_t __vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock(uint32_t *lock, uint32_t tid, void *pop)
> +{
> +	asm volatile (
> +		".global __vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock_cs_start		\n"
> +		".global __vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock_cs_success		\n"
> +		".global __vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock_cs_end			\n"
> +		"								\n"
> +		"       lock cmpxchgl	%[val], (%[ptr])			\n"
> +		"								\n"
> +		"__vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock_cs_start:			\n"
> +		"								\n"
> +		"	jnz		__vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock_cs_end	\n"
> +		"								\n"
> +		"__vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock_cs_success:			\n"
> +		"								\n"
> +			ASM_CLEAR_PTR
> +		"								\n"
> +		"__vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock_cs_end:				\n"
> +		: [tid] "+a" (tid)

You need earlyclobber here "+&a", because not all input arguemnts are 
read before this argument is written.

> +		: [ptr] "D"  (lock),
> +		  [pop] "d" (pop),
> +		  [val] "r"  (0)

[val] "r" (0UL), so the correct register width will be used. I'd name 
this operand [zero], because 0 lives here, and it will be reused in 
several places.

Uros.

> +		  ASM_PAD_CONSTRAINT
> +		: "memory"
> +	);
> +
> +	return tid;
> +}
> +
> +uint32_t futex_robust_try_unlock(uint32_t *, uint32_t, void **)
> +	__attribute__((weak, alias("__vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock")));
> --- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32/Makefile
> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32/Makefile
> @@ -7,8 +7,9 @@
>   vdsos-y			:= 32
>   
>   # Files to link into the vDSO:
> -vobjs-y			:= note.o vclock_gettime.o vgetcpu.o
> -vobjs-y			+= system_call.o sigreturn.o
> +vobjs-y					:= note.o vclock_gettime.o vgetcpu.o
> +vobjs-y					+= system_call.o sigreturn.o
> +vobjs-$(CONFIG_FUTEX_ROBUST_UNLOCK)	+= vfutex.o
>   
>   # Compilation flags
>   flags-y			:= -DBUILD_VDSO32 -m32 -mregparm=0
> --- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32/vdso32.lds.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32/vdso32.lds.S
> @@ -30,6 +30,12 @@ VERSION
>   		__vdso_clock_gettime64;
>   		__vdso_clock_getres_time64;
>   		__vdso_getcpu;
> +#ifdef CONFIG_FUTEX_ROBUST_UNLOCK
> +		__vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock;
> +		__vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock_cs_start;
> +		__vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock_cs_success;
> +		__vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock_cs_end;
> +#endif
>   	};
>   
>   	LINUX_2.5 {
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32/vfutex.c
> @@ -0,0 +1 @@
> +#include "common/vfutex.c"
> --- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso64/Makefile
> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso64/Makefile
> @@ -8,9 +8,10 @@ vdsos-y				:= 64
>   vdsos-$(CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI)	+= x32
>   
>   # Files to link into the vDSO:
> -vobjs-y				:= note.o vclock_gettime.o vgetcpu.o
> -vobjs-y				+= vgetrandom.o vgetrandom-chacha.o
> -vobjs-$(CONFIG_X86_SGX)		+= vsgx.o
> +vobjs-y					:= note.o vclock_gettime.o vgetcpu.o
> +vobjs-y					+= vgetrandom.o vgetrandom-chacha.o
> +vobjs-$(CONFIG_X86_SGX)			+= vsgx.o
> +vobjs-$(CONFIG_FUTEX_ROBUST_UNLOCK)	+= vfutex.o
>   
>   # Compilation flags
>   flags-y				:= -DBUILD_VDSO64 -m64 -mcmodel=small
> --- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso64/vdso64.lds.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso64/vdso64.lds.S
> @@ -32,6 +32,12 @@ VERSION {
>   #endif
>   		getrandom;
>   		__vdso_getrandom;
> +#ifdef CONFIG_FUTEX_ROBUST_UNLOCK
> +		__vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock;
> +		__vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock_cs_start;
> +		__vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock_cs_success;
> +		__vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock_cs_end;
> +#endif
>   	local: *;
>   	};
>   }
> --- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso64/vdsox32.lds.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso64/vdsox32.lds.S
> @@ -22,6 +22,12 @@ VERSION {
>   		__vdso_getcpu;
>   		__vdso_time;
>   		__vdso_clock_getres;
> +#ifdef CONFIG_FUTEX_ROBUST_UNLOCK
> +		__vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock;
> +		__vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock_cs_start;
> +		__vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock_cs_success;
> +		__vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock_cs_end;
> +#endif
>   	local: *;
>   	};
>   }
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso64/vfutex.c
> @@ -0,0 +1 @@
> +#include "common/vfutex.c"
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/futex_robust.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> +#ifndef _ASM_X86_FUTEX_ROBUST_H
> +#define _ASM_X86_FUTEX_ROBUST_H
> +
> +#include <asm/ptrace.h>
> +
> +static __always_inline bool x86_futex_needs_robust_unlock_fixup(struct pt_regs *regs)
> +{
> +	/*
> +	 * This is tricky in the compat case as it has to take the size check
> +	 * into account. See the ASM magic in the VDSO vfutex code. If compat is
> +	 * disabled or this is a 32-bit kernel then ZF is authoritive no matter
> +	 * what.
> +	 */
> +	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64) || !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION))
> +		return !!(regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_ZF);
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * For the compat case, the core code already established that regs->ip
> +	 * is >= cs_start and < cs_end. Now check whether it is at the
> +	 * conditional jump which checks the cmpxchg() or if it succeeded and
> +	 * does the size check, which obviously modifies ZF too.
> +	 */
> +	if (regs->ip >= current->mm->futex.unlock_cs_success_ip)
> +		return true;
> +	/*
> +	 * It's at the jnz right after the cmpxchg(). ZF tells whether this
> +	 * succeeded or not.
> +	 */
> +	return !!(regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_ZF);
> +}
> +
> +#define arch_futex_needs_robust_unlock_fixup(regs)		\
> +	x86_futex_needs_robust_unlock_fixup(regs)
> +
> +static __always_inline void __user *x86_futex_robust_unlock_get_pop(struct pt_regs *regs)
> +{
> +	return (void __user *)regs->dx;
> +}
> +
> +#define arch_futex_robust_unlock_get_pop(regs)			\
> +	x86_futex_robust_unlock_get_pop(regs)
> +
> +#endif /* _ASM_X86_FUTEX_ROBUST_H */
> 


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-03-17 15:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 57+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-03-16 17:12 [patch 0/8] futex: Address the robust futex unlock race for real Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 17:12 ` [patch 1/8] futex: Move futex task related data into a struct Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 17:55   ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2026-03-17  2:24   ` André Almeida
2026-03-17  9:52     ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 17:13 ` [patch 2/8] futex: Move futex related mm_struct " Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 18:00   ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2026-03-16 17:13 ` [patch 3/8] futex: Provide UABI defines for robust list entry modifiers Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 18:02   ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2026-03-17  2:38   ` André Almeida
2026-03-17  9:53     ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 17:13 ` [patch 4/8] futex: Add support for unlocking robust futexes Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 18:24   ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2026-03-17 16:17   ` André Almeida
2026-03-17 20:46     ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-03-17 22:40       ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-18  8:02         ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-03-18  8:06           ` Florian Weimer
2026-03-18 14:47           ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-03-18 16:03             ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 17:13 ` [patch 5/8] futex: Add robust futex unlock IP range Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 18:36   ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2026-03-17 19:19   ` André Almeida
2026-03-16 17:13 ` [patch 6/8] futex: Provide infrastructure to plug the non contended robust futex unlock race Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 18:35   ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2026-03-16 20:29     ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 20:52       ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2026-03-16 17:13 ` [patch 7/8] x86/vdso: Prepare for robust futex unlock support Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 17:13 ` [patch 8/8] x86/vdso: Implement __vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock() Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 19:19   ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2026-03-16 21:02     ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 22:35       ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2026-03-16 21:14     ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 21:29     ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-17  7:25   ` Thomas Weißschuh
2026-03-17  9:51     ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-17 11:17       ` Thomas Weißschuh
2026-03-18 16:17         ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-19  7:41           ` Thomas Weißschuh
2026-03-19  8:53             ` Florian Weimer
2026-03-19  9:04               ` Thomas Weißschuh
2026-03-19  9:08               ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-03-19 23:31                 ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-19 10:36             ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2026-03-19 10:49               ` Thomas Weißschuh
2026-03-19 10:55                 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2026-03-17  8:28   ` Florian Weimer
2026-03-17  9:36     ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-17 10:37       ` Florian Weimer
2026-03-17 22:32         ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-18 22:08           ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-18 22:10             ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-03-19  2:05             ` André Almeida
2026-03-19  7:10               ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-17 15:33   ` Uros Bizjak [this message]
2026-03-18  8:21     ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-18  8:32       ` Uros Bizjak

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