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* [PATCH] keys: serialise instantiation against keyctl_chown_key
@ 2026-11-15 12:17 Sinan Turunc
  2026-11-15 12:30 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
  2026-11-19  7:00 ` [syzbot ci] " syzbot ci
  0 siblings, 2 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Sinan Turunc @ 2026-11-15 12:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen
  Cc: paul, jmorris, serge, keyrings, linux-security-module,
	linux-kernel, stable

keyctl_chown_key() replaces key->user under key->sem, but the
instantiation path reads key->user without it: __key_instantiate_and_link()
and key_reject_and_link() bump key->user->nikeys under
key_construction_mutex only, and key_payload_reserve(), called from the
type's instantiate op, reads key->user once for spin_lock_irqsave() and
again for spin_unlock_irqrestore().

A chown of an under-construction key that lands between those two reads
locks the old owner's quota spinlock and unlocks the new owner's.  The
paravirt unlock slow path reports the unheld unlock and the old lock is
never released, so the next quota operation on that uid spins with
interrupts disabled:

  pvqspinlock: lock 0xffff88800f94dc38 has corrupted value 0x0!
  WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 215 at kernel/locking/qspinlock_paravirt.h:504 __pv_queued_spin_unlock_slowpath+0x1dc/0x2e0
  Call Trace:
   _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0xe/0x30
   key_payload_reserve+0x230/0x300
   generic_key_instantiate+0x47/0x230
   __key_instantiate_and_link+0xbd/0x310
   key_instantiate_and_link+0x3f0/0x490
   keyctl_instantiate_key_common+0x246/0x410

The same unsynchronised read lets the instantiator touch the old
key_user after the chown has dropped the last reference to it.

Hold key->sem for write across the instantiate op and the owner-record
updates so that instantiation and chown serialise on the lock that
already protects key->user.  key->sem nests inside key_construction_mutex
and the destination keyring's semaphore here; nothing takes the
construction mutex under a key's semaphore.  The acquisition is
annotated as nested because a keyring instantiated into a keyring shares
the destination's lock class; the key under construction cannot be a
destination itself, so no cycle exists.

Reproducer: a request_key() helper that chowns the target key between
two uids from one thread while instantiating it from another, as root.
Triggers within tens of milliseconds on 6.12.104 and on mainline.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sinan Turunc <enscrpt@pm.me>
---
An AI tool helped with the analysis and the patch. I reviewed and
tested it myself: the unpatched kernel hangs within 40 ms, the patched
one ran the same workload for 60 s with lockdep on and no report.

 security/keys/key.c | 13 +++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -439,7 +439,13 @@
 
 	mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex);
 
-	/* can't instantiate twice */
+	/* can't instantiate twice; key->sem keeps key->user stable against
+	 * keyctl_chown_key() for the instantiate op and the quota update.
+	 * Nested: the caller may hold the destination keyring's sem and the
+	 * key under construction may be a keyring too, but it cannot be
+	 * anyone's destination yet, so there is no cycle.
+	 */
+	down_write_nested(&key->sem, 1);
 	if (key->state == KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED) {
 		/* instantiate the key */
 		ret = key->type->instantiate(key, prep);
@@ -469,6 +475,7 @@
 				key_set_expiry(key, prep->expiry);
 		}
 	}
+	up_write(&key->sem);
 
 	mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
 
@@ -600,7 +607,8 @@
 
 	mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex);
 
-	/* can't instantiate twice */
+	/* can't instantiate twice; see __key_instantiate_and_link() */
+	down_write_nested(&key->sem, 1);
 	if (key->state == KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED) {
 		/* mark the key as being negatively instantiated */
 		atomic_inc(&key->user->nikeys);
@@ -621,6 +629,7 @@
 		if (authkey)
 			key_invalidate(authkey);
 	}
+	up_write(&key->sem);
 
 	mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
 
-- 
2.56.0


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] keys: serialise instantiation against keyctl_chown_key
  2026-11-15 12:17 [PATCH] keys: serialise instantiation against keyctl_chown_key Sinan Turunc
@ 2026-11-15 12:30 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
  2026-11-15 12:33   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
  2026-11-19  7:00 ` [syzbot ci] " syzbot ci
  1 sibling, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2026-11-15 12:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Sinan Turunc
  Cc: David Howells, paul, jmorris, serge, keyrings,
	linux-security-module, linux-kernel, stable

On Sun, Nov 15, 2026 at 12:17:40PM +0000, Sinan Turunc wrote:
> keyctl_chown_key() replaces key->user under key->sem, but the
> instantiation path reads key->user without it: __key_instantiate_and_link()
> and key_reject_and_link() bump key->user->nikeys under
> key_construction_mutex only, and key_payload_reserve(), called from the
> type's instantiate op, reads key->user once for spin_lock_irqsave() and
> again for spin_unlock_irqrestore().
> 
> A chown of an under-construction key that lands between those two reads
> locks the old owner's quota spinlock and unlocks the new owner's.  The
> paravirt unlock slow path reports the unheld unlock and the old lock is
> never released, so the next quota operation on that uid spins with
> interrupts disabled:
> 
>   pvqspinlock: lock 0xffff88800f94dc38 has corrupted value 0x0!
>   WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 215 at kernel/locking/qspinlock_paravirt.h:504 __pv_queued_spin_unlock_slowpath+0x1dc/0x2e0
>   Call Trace:
>    _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0xe/0x30
>    key_payload_reserve+0x230/0x300
>    generic_key_instantiate+0x47/0x230
>    __key_instantiate_and_link+0xbd/0x310
>    key_instantiate_and_link+0x3f0/0x490
>    keyctl_instantiate_key_common+0x246/0x410
> 
> The same unsynchronised read lets the instantiator touch the old
> key_user after the chown has dropped the last reference to it.
> 
> Hold key->sem for write across the instantiate op and the owner-record
> updates so that instantiation and chown serialise on the lock that
> already protects key->user.  key->sem nests inside key_construction_mutex
> and the destination keyring's semaphore here; nothing takes the
> construction mutex under a key's semaphore.  The acquisition is
> annotated as nested because a keyring instantiated into a keyring shares
> the destination's lock class; the key under construction cannot be a
> destination itself, so no cycle exists.
> 
> Reproducer: a request_key() helper that chowns the target key between
> two uids from one thread while instantiating it from another, as root.
> Triggers within tens of milliseconds on 6.12.104 and on mainline.
> 
> Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Sinan Turunc <enscrpt@pm.me>
> ---
> An AI tool helped with the analysis and the patch. I reviewed and
> tested it myself: the unpatched kernel hangs within 40 ms, the patched
> one ran the same workload for 60 s with lockdep on and no report.
> 
>  security/keys/key.c | 13 +++++++++++--
>  1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
> --- a/security/keys/key.c
> +++ b/security/keys/key.c
> @@ -439,7 +439,13 @@
>  
>  	mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex);
>  
> -	/* can't instantiate twice */
> +	/* can't instantiate twice; key->sem keeps key->user stable against
> +	 * keyctl_chown_key() for the instantiate op and the quota update.
> +	 * Nested: the caller may hold the destination keyring's sem and the
> +	 * key under construction may be a keyring too, but it cannot be
> +	 * anyone's destination yet, so there is no cycle.
> +	 */

:-(

> +	down_write_nested(&key->sem, 1);
>  	if (key->state == KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED) {
>  		/* instantiate the key */
>  		ret = key->type->instantiate(key, prep);
> @@ -469,6 +475,7 @@
>  				key_set_expiry(key, prep->expiry);
>  		}
>  	}
> +	up_write(&key->sem);
>  
>  	mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
>  
> @@ -600,7 +607,8 @@
>  
>  	mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex);
>  
> -	/* can't instantiate twice */
> +	/* can't instantiate twice; see __key_instantiate_and_link() */
> +	down_write_nested(&key->sem, 1);
>  	if (key->state == KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED) {
>  		/* mark the key as being negatively instantiated */
>  		atomic_inc(&key->user->nikeys);
> @@ -621,6 +629,7 @@
>  		if (authkey)
>  			key_invalidate(authkey);
>  	}
> +	up_write(&key->sem);
>  
>  	mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
>  
> -- 
> 2.56.0
> 

Please review the LLM generated patch yourself at first and write
a commit message thta you can understand yourself.

Plus, remove spurious inline comment changes. I'm only then going
to review this.

Br, Jarkko

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] keys: serialise instantiation against keyctl_chown_key
  2026-11-15 12:30 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2026-11-15 12:33   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
  2026-11-15 12:36     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2026-11-15 12:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Sinan Turunc
  Cc: David Howells, paul, jmorris, serge, keyrings,
	linux-security-module, linux-kernel, stable

On Sun, Nov 15, 2026 at 02:30:23PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> Please review the LLM generated patch yourself at first and write
> a commit message thta you can understand yourself.
> 
> Plus, remove spurious inline comment changes. I'm only then going
> to review this.

I.e., I have serious concerns that you might not know what you're
doing. Well-formed commit is the way to get evidence on that.

br, Jarkko

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] keys: serialise instantiation against keyctl_chown_key
  2026-11-15 12:33   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2026-11-15 12:36     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
  2026-11-15 12:41       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2026-11-15 12:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Sinan Turunc
  Cc: David Howells, paul, jmorris, serge, keyrings,
	linux-security-module, linux-kernel, stable

On Sun, Nov 15, 2026 at 02:33:36PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Sun, Nov 15, 2026 at 02:30:23PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > Please review the LLM generated patch yourself at first and write
> > a commit message thta you can understand yourself.
> > 
> > Plus, remove spurious inline comment changes. I'm only then going
> > to review this.
> 
> I.e., I have serious concerns that you might not know what you're
> doing. Well-formed commit is the way to get evidence on that.

E.g., if I pick and write proper explanation instead of slop,
should I call it my own?

To have a review process, there must be two who think. Otherwise,
it is just me figuring out all of this; and LLM. You have no role.

This is also why it is important to write proper commits.

Br, Jarkko

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] keys: serialise instantiation against keyctl_chown_key
  2026-11-15 12:36     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2026-11-15 12:41       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
  2026-11-17 12:31         ` Sinan Turunc
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2026-11-15 12:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Sinan Turunc
  Cc: David Howells, paul, jmorris, serge, keyrings,
	linux-security-module, linux-kernel, stable

On Sun, Nov 15, 2026 at 02:36:25PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Sun, Nov 15, 2026 at 02:33:36PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Sun, Nov 15, 2026 at 02:30:23PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > Please review the LLM generated patch yourself at first and write
> > > a commit message thta you can understand yourself.
> > > 
> > > Plus, remove spurious inline comment changes. I'm only then going
> > > to review this.
> > 
> > I.e., I have serious concerns that you might not know what you're
> > doing. Well-formed commit is the way to get evidence on that.
> 
> E.g., if I pick and write proper explanation instead of slop,
> should I call it my own?
> 
> To have a review process, there must be two who think. Otherwise,
> it is just me figuring out all of this; and LLM. You have no role.
> 
> This is also why it is important to write proper commits.

Finally, while not knowing if this is the case, it is irresponsible
as hell to send patches to subsystems like keyrings *if* you don't
understand yourself exactly what you are doing.

Leaf driver mixes up only that leave driver; an uncosidered fix to
a subsystem that is always on  side-effects can do much worse.

Have you considered this?

I'll hold for for v2 :-) Just do the work properly. That's all.

Br, Jarkko

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] keys: serialise instantiation against keyctl_chown_key
  2026-11-15 12:41       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2026-11-17 12:31         ` Sinan Turunc
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Sinan Turunc @ 2026-11-17 12:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Jarkko Sakkinen
  Cc: David Howells, Paul Moore, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn,
	keyrings, linux-security-module, linux-kernel, stable

Hi Jarkko,

Sorry for the sloppy v1 patch and for over-relying on an LLM to write
the commit message. That will not happen again. I have removed the
inline comments and rewritten the commit message in my own words.
Please let me know if any part of it is unclear, as I have tried to
describe it as clearly as I can.

The race happens because keyctl_chown_key() looks up the target key by
calling lookup_user_key() with KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL. That flag lets a
caller with CAP_SYS_ADMIN change the UID of an uninstantiated key during
construction. When the UID changes, keyctl_chown_key() swaps key->user
under key->sem and drops the old reference with key_user_put().
__key_instantiate_and_link() and key_reject_and_link() only hold
key_construction_mutex when they increment key->user->nikeys during
construction. __key_instantiate_and_link() also calls the key type
instantiate callback without holding key->sem on the key.

In key_payload_reserve(), when the key is in quota and its size changes,
key->user is read without key->sem. It reads key->user once for
spin_lock_irqsave(&key->user->lock, flags) and reads it again for
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&key->user->lock, flags). If keyctl_chown_key()
replaces key->user between those two reads, key_payload_reserve()
unlocks the new spinlock and leaves the old spinlock held.

As the Sashiko review noted on v1, taking down_write_nested(&key->sem,
1) also causes a lockdep cycle against __key_move_lock(). A lockdep test
on v1 triggered that warning on the first KEYCTL_MOVE call against the
keyring instantiation order. __key_move_lock() takes subclass 1 before
keyring_serialise_link_lock, while __key_link_lock() takes
keyring_serialise_link_lock before __key_instantiate_and_link() takes
key_construction_mutex. In v2 I switched down_write_nested() to subclass
2, which is an unused subclass taken only inside key_construction_mutex.
That change ran clean under lockdep on both 7.4-rc2 and your
for-next-keys branch across our test workloads.

I will send the v2 patch out to the list right after this message.

Thanks,
Sinan


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread

* [syzbot ci] Re: keys: serialise instantiation against keyctl_chown_key
  2026-11-15 12:17 [PATCH] keys: serialise instantiation against keyctl_chown_key Sinan Turunc
  2026-11-15 12:30 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2026-11-19  7:00 ` syzbot ci
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: syzbot ci @ 2026-11-19  7:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: dhowells, enscrpt, jarkko, jmorris, keyrings, linux-kernel,
	linux-security-module, paul, serge, stable
  Cc: syzbot, syzkaller-bugs

syzbot ci has tested the following series

[v1] keys: serialise instantiation against keyctl_chown_key
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20261115121722.206-1-enscrpt@pm.me
* [PATCH] keys: serialise instantiation against keyctl_chown_key

and found the following issue:
possible deadlock in key_move

Full report is available here:
https://ci.syzbot.org/series/51455b74-3344-42d0-9ba7-b64be2ff0b40

***

possible deadlock in key_move

tree:      torvalds
URL:       https://kernel.googlesource.com/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux
base:      4405c18c95d2d0f99f6c581ef0ee8591a1aa6ccd
arch:      amd64
compiler:  Debian clang version 22.1.8 (1~deb13u4), Debian LLD 22.1.8
config:    https://ci.syzbot.org/builds/309e9321-2f31-411e-ac93-724f183b5510/config
syz repro: https://ci.syzbot.org/findings/89658ad2-f692-4500-bd4e-ef9d90dc18e5/syz_repro

======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
syzkaller #0 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syz.0.17/5852 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffffff908c1a40 (keyring_serialise_link_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __key_move_lock security/keys/keyring.c:1305 [inline]
ffffffff908c1a40 (keyring_serialise_link_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: key_move+0x1d3/0x7b0 security/keys/keyring.c:1634

but task is already holding lock:
ffff888104aa1290 (&type->lock_class/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __key_move_lock security/keys/keyring.c:-1 [inline]
ffff888104aa1290 (&type->lock_class/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: key_move+0x16a/0x7b0 security/keys/keyring.c:1634

which lock already depends on the new lock.


the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #2 (&type->lock_class/1){+.+.}-{4:4}:
       down_write_nested+0x98/0x200 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1757
       __key_instantiate_and_link+0x9d/0x4d0 security/keys/key.c:451
       key_instantiate_and_link+0x331/0x4b0 security/keys/key.c:549
       keyring_alloc+0x6f/0xb0 security/keys/keyring.c:541
       system_trusted_keyring_init+0x67/0x120 certs/system_keyring.c:231
       do_one_initcall+0x250/0x870 init/main.c:1419
       do_initcall_level+0x10a/0x1a0 init/main.c:1481
       do_initcalls+0x59/0xa0 init/main.c:1497
       kernel_init_freeable+0x29d/0x3e0 init/main.c:1732
       kernel_init+0x22/0x1d0 init/main.c:1622
       ret_from_fork+0x514/0xb70 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
       ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245

-> #1 (key_construction_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}:
       __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:646 [inline]
       __mutex_lock+0x197/0x15a0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:821
       __key_instantiate_and_link+0x8f/0x4d0 security/keys/key.c:443
       key_instantiate_and_link+0x466/0x4b0 security/keys/key.c:549
       keyring_alloc+0x6f/0xb0 security/keys/keyring.c:541
       look_up_user_keyrings+0x376/0x670 security/keys/process_keys.c:116
       do_one_initcall+0x250/0x870 init/main.c:1419
       do_initcall_level+0x10a/0x1a0 init/main.c:1481
       do_initcalls+0x59/0xa0 init/main.c:1497
       kernel_init_freeable+0x29d/0x3e0 init/main.c:1732
       kernel_init+0x22/0x1d0 init/main.c:1622
       ret_from_fork+0x514/0xb70 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
       ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245

-> #0 (keyring_serialise_link_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}:
       check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3209 [inline]
       check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3328 [inline]
       validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3952 [inline]
       __lock_acquire+0x164c/0x2de0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5288
       lock_acquire+0x115/0x350 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5942
       __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:646 [inline]
       __mutex_lock+0x197/0x15a0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:821
       __key_move_lock security/keys/keyring.c:1305 [inline]
       key_move+0x1d3/0x7b0 security/keys/keyring.c:1634
       keyctl_keyring_move+0xd6/0x110 security/keys/keyctl.c:618
       __do_sys_keyctl security/keys/keyctl.c:2023 [inline]
       __se_sys_keyctl+0x85a/0xbc0 security/keys/keyctl.c:1885
       do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 [inline]
       do_syscall_64+0x171/0x540 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:89
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

other info that might help us debug this:

Chain exists of:
  keyring_serialise_link_lock --> key_construction_mutex --> &type->lock_class/1

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&type->lock_class/1);
                               lock(key_construction_mutex);
                               lock(&type->lock_class/1);
  lock(keyring_serialise_link_lock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

locks held by syz.0.17/5852: 2, on CPU#0:
 #0: ffff888104aa1090 (&type->lock_class#2){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __key_move_lock security/keys/keyring.c:-1 [inline]
 #0: ffff888104aa1090 (&type->lock_class#2){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: key_move+0x159/0x7b0 security/keys/keyring.c:1634
 #1: ffff888104aa1290 (&type->lock_class/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __key_move_lock security/keys/keyring.c:-1 [inline]
 #1: ffff888104aa1290 (&type->lock_class/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: key_move+0x16a/0x7b0 security/keys/keyring.c:1634

stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5852 Comm: syz.0.17 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) 
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120
 print_circular_bug+0x2e2/0x300 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2087
 check_noncircular+0x12f/0x150 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2219
 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3209 [inline]
 check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3328 [inline]
 validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3952 [inline]
 __lock_acquire+0x164c/0x2de0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5288
 lock_acquire+0x115/0x350 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5942
 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:646 [inline]
 __mutex_lock+0x197/0x15a0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:821
 __key_move_lock security/keys/keyring.c:1305 [inline]
 key_move+0x1d3/0x7b0 security/keys/keyring.c:1634
 keyctl_keyring_move+0xd6/0x110 security/keys/keyctl.c:618
 __do_sys_keyctl security/keys/keyctl.c:2023 [inline]
 __se_sys_keyctl+0x85a/0xbc0 security/keys/keyctl.c:1885
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x171/0x540 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:89
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f417a9a8fd9
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 e8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f417b7c9028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000fa
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f417ac25fa0 RCX: 00007f417a9a8fd9
RDX: fffffffffffffffe RSI: 00000000326b97d4 RDI: 000000000000001e
RBP: 00007f417aa37fed R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00000000326b97d4 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007f417ac26038 R14: 00007f417ac25fa0 R15: 00007ffc44b5b118
 </TASK>


***

If these findings have caused you to resend the series or submit a
separate fix, please add the following tag to your commit message:
  Tested-by: syzbot@syzkaller.appspotmail.com

---
This report is generated by a bot. It may contain errors.
syzbot ci engineers can be reached at syzkaller@googlegroups.com.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2026-11-19  7:00 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2026-11-15 12:17 [PATCH] keys: serialise instantiation against keyctl_chown_key Sinan Turunc
2026-11-15 12:30 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-15 12:33   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-15 12:36     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-15 12:41       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 12:31         ` Sinan Turunc
2026-11-19  7:00 ` [syzbot ci] " syzbot ci

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