From: Melody Wang <huibo.wang@amd.com>
To: <kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
"Ashish Kalra" <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
"Melody Wang" <huibo.wang@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4/6] KVM: SVM: Inject NMIs when restricted injection is active
Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2024 00:57:58 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <6d39d187147f9c98863fd5123bb044dafe54a916.1722989996.git.huibo.wang@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1722989996.git.huibo.wang@amd.com>
When restricted injection is active, only #HV exceptions can be injected into
the SEV-SNP guest.
Detect that restricted injection feature is active for the guest, and then
follow the #HV doorbell communication from the GHCB specification to inject
NMIs.
Co-developed-by: Thomas Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Melody Wang <huibo.wang@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++---
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 8 ++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 1 +
3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 0d330b3357bc..7f9f35e0e092 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -5069,7 +5069,10 @@ static bool __sev_snp_inject(enum inject_type type, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (!hvdb)
return false;
- hvdb->events.vector = vcpu->arch.interrupt.nr;
+ if (type == INJECT_NMI)
+ hvdb->events.nmi = 1;
+ else
+ hvdb->events.vector = vcpu->arch.interrupt.nr;
prepare_hv_injection(svm, hvdb);
@@ -5147,10 +5150,17 @@ void sev_snp_cancel_injection(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
/* Copy info back into event_inj field (replaces #HV) */
svm->vmcb->control.event_inj = SVM_EVTINJ_VALID;
+ /*
+ * KVM only injects a single event each time (prepare_hv_injection),
+ * so when events.nmi is true, the vector will be zero
+ */
if (hvdb->events.vector)
svm->vmcb->control.event_inj |= hvdb->events.vector |
SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_INTR;
+ if (hvdb->events.nmi)
+ svm->vmcb->control.event_inj |= SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_NMI;
+
hvdb->events.pending_events = 0;
out:
@@ -5168,8 +5178,11 @@ bool sev_snp_blocked(enum inject_type type, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (!hvdb)
return true;
- /* Indicate interrupts blocked based on guest acknowledgment */
- blocked = !!hvdb->events.vector;
+ /* Indicate NMIs and interrupts blocked based on guest acknowledgment */
+ if (type == INJECT_NMI)
+ blocked = hvdb->events.nmi;
+ else
+ blocked = !!hvdb->events.vector;
unmap_hvdb(vcpu, &hvdb_map);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index a48388d99c97..d9c572344f0c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -3602,6 +3602,9 @@ static void svm_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ if (sev_snp_inject(INJECT_NMI, vcpu))
+ goto status;
+
svm->vmcb->control.event_inj = SVM_EVTINJ_VALID | SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_NMI;
if (svm->nmi_l1_to_l2)
@@ -3616,6 +3619,8 @@ static void svm_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
svm->nmi_masked = true;
svm_set_iret_intercept(svm);
}
+
+status:
++vcpu->stat.nmi_injections;
}
@@ -3786,6 +3791,9 @@ bool svm_nmi_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (!gif_set(svm))
return true;
+ if (sev_snp_is_rinj_active(vcpu))
+ return sev_snp_blocked(INJECT_NMI, vcpu);
+
if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && nested_exit_on_nmi(svm))
return false;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
index 95c0a7070bd1..f60ff6229ff4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ extern int lbrv;
enum inject_type {
INJECT_IRQ,
+ INJECT_NMI,
};
/*
--
2.34.1
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID
From: Melody Wang <huibo.wang@amd.com>
To: <kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
"Ashish Kalra" <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
"Melody Wang" <huibo.wang@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4/6] KVM: SVM: Inject NMIs when restricted injection is active
Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2024 01:00:46 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <6d39d187147f9c98863fd5123bb044dafe54a916.1722989996.git.huibo.wang@amd.com> (raw)
Message-ID: <20240807010046.whpEjSKFbHjesDQJrMe-rK875LtGfetMDQCIt5-Vdv8@z> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1722989996.git.huibo.wang@amd.com>
When restricted injection is active, only #HV exceptions can be injected into
the SEV-SNP guest.
Detect that restricted injection feature is active for the guest, and then
follow the #HV doorbell communication from the GHCB specification to inject
NMIs.
Co-developed-by: Thomas Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Melody Wang <huibo.wang@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++---
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 8 ++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 1 +
3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 0d330b3357bc..7f9f35e0e092 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -5069,7 +5069,10 @@ static bool __sev_snp_inject(enum inject_type type, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (!hvdb)
return false;
- hvdb->events.vector = vcpu->arch.interrupt.nr;
+ if (type == INJECT_NMI)
+ hvdb->events.nmi = 1;
+ else
+ hvdb->events.vector = vcpu->arch.interrupt.nr;
prepare_hv_injection(svm, hvdb);
@@ -5147,10 +5150,17 @@ void sev_snp_cancel_injection(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
/* Copy info back into event_inj field (replaces #HV) */
svm->vmcb->control.event_inj = SVM_EVTINJ_VALID;
+ /*
+ * KVM only injects a single event each time (prepare_hv_injection),
+ * so when events.nmi is true, the vector will be zero
+ */
if (hvdb->events.vector)
svm->vmcb->control.event_inj |= hvdb->events.vector |
SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_INTR;
+ if (hvdb->events.nmi)
+ svm->vmcb->control.event_inj |= SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_NMI;
+
hvdb->events.pending_events = 0;
out:
@@ -5168,8 +5178,11 @@ bool sev_snp_blocked(enum inject_type type, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (!hvdb)
return true;
- /* Indicate interrupts blocked based on guest acknowledgment */
- blocked = !!hvdb->events.vector;
+ /* Indicate NMIs and interrupts blocked based on guest acknowledgment */
+ if (type == INJECT_NMI)
+ blocked = hvdb->events.nmi;
+ else
+ blocked = !!hvdb->events.vector;
unmap_hvdb(vcpu, &hvdb_map);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index a48388d99c97..d9c572344f0c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -3602,6 +3602,9 @@ static void svm_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ if (sev_snp_inject(INJECT_NMI, vcpu))
+ goto status;
+
svm->vmcb->control.event_inj = SVM_EVTINJ_VALID | SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_NMI;
if (svm->nmi_l1_to_l2)
@@ -3616,6 +3619,8 @@ static void svm_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
svm->nmi_masked = true;
svm_set_iret_intercept(svm);
}
+
+status:
++vcpu->stat.nmi_injections;
}
@@ -3786,6 +3791,9 @@ bool svm_nmi_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (!gif_set(svm))
return true;
+ if (sev_snp_is_rinj_active(vcpu))
+ return sev_snp_blocked(INJECT_NMI, vcpu);
+
if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && nested_exit_on_nmi(svm))
return false;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
index 95c0a7070bd1..f60ff6229ff4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ extern int lbrv;
enum inject_type {
INJECT_IRQ,
+ INJECT_NMI,
};
/*
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-08-07 1:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-08-07 0:57 [PATCH 0/6] SEV-SNP restricted injection hypervisor patches Melody Wang
2024-08-07 0:57 ` [PATCH 1/6] x86/sev: Define the #HV doorbell page structure Melody Wang
2024-08-07 0:57 ` [PATCH 2/6] KVM: SVM: Add support for the SEV-SNP #HV doorbell page NAE event Melody Wang
2024-08-07 0:57 ` [PATCH 3/6] KVM: SVM: Inject #HV when restricted injection is active Melody Wang
2024-08-07 0:57 ` Melody Wang [this message]
2024-08-07 1:00 ` [PATCH 4/6] KVM: SVM: Inject NMIs " Melody Wang
2024-08-07 1:00 ` [PATCH 5/6] KVM: SVM: Inject MCEs " Melody Wang
2024-08-07 23:30 ` kernel test robot
2024-08-07 1:00 ` [PATCH 6/6] KVM: SVM: Enable restricted injection for an SEV-SNP guest Melody Wang
2024-08-07 23:49 ` Thomas Gleixner
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