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From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>, Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, "Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"Tony Luck" <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	"Piotr Luc" <piotr.luc@intel.com>,
	"Fenghua Yu" <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
	"Lu Baolu" <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>,
	"Reza Arbab" <arbab@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	"Laura Abbott" <labbott@redhat.com>,
	"Ard Biesheuvel" <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Eric Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	"Benjamin Herrenschmidt" <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	"Paul Mackerras" <paulus@samba.org>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Dave Airlie" <airlied@redhat.com>,
	"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>, "Tejun Heo" <tj@kernel.org>,
	"Christoph Lameter" <cl@linux.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 11/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages
Date: Thu, 17 Aug 2017 14:22:48 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <74c7115c-d435-7ae3-6d2e-820558d3e446@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170802040255.GA4336@nazgul.tnic>

On 8/1/2017 11:02 PM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 02:07:51PM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
>> From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>>
>> In order for memory pages to be properly mapped when SEV is active, we
>> need to use the PAGE_KERNEL protection attribute as the base protection.
>> This will insure that memory mapping of, e.g. ACPI tables, receives the
>> proper mapping attributes.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
>> ---
>>   arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c  | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>   include/linux/ioport.h |  3 +++
>>   kernel/resource.c      | 17 +++++++++++++++++
>>   3 files changed, 48 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
>> index c0be7cf..7b27332 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
>> @@ -69,6 +69,26 @@ static int __ioremap_check_ram(unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long nr_pages,
>>   	return 0;
>>   }
>>   
>> +static int __ioremap_res_desc_other(struct resource *res, void *arg)
>> +{
>> +	return (res->desc != IORES_DESC_NONE);
>> +}
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * This function returns true if the target memory is marked as
>> + * IORESOURCE_MEM and IORESOURCE_BUSY and described as other than
>> + * IORES_DESC_NONE (e.g. IORES_DESC_ACPI_TABLES).
>> + */
>> +static bool __ioremap_check_if_mem(resource_size_t addr, unsigned long size)
>> +{
>> +	u64 start, end;
>> +
>> +	start = (u64)addr;
>> +	end = start + size - 1;
>> +
>> +	return (walk_mem_res(start, end, NULL, __ioremap_res_desc_other) == 1);
>> +}
>> +
>>   /*
>>    * Remap an arbitrary physical address space into the kernel virtual
>>    * address space. It transparently creates kernel huge I/O mapping when
>> @@ -146,7 +166,15 @@ static void __iomem *__ioremap_caller(resource_size_t phys_addr,
>>   		pcm = new_pcm;
>>   	}
>>   
>> +	/*
>> +	 * If the page being mapped is in memory and SEV is active then
>> +	 * make sure the memory encryption attribute is enabled in the
>> +	 * resulting mapping.
>> +	 */
>>   	prot = PAGE_KERNEL_IO;
>> +	if (sev_active() && __ioremap_check_if_mem(phys_addr, size))
>> +		prot = pgprot_encrypted(prot);
> 
> Hmm, so this function already does walk_system_ram_range() a bit
> earlier and now on SEV systems we're going to do it again. Can we make
> walk_system_ram_range() return a distinct value for SEV systems and act
> accordingly in __ioremap_caller() instead of repeating the operation?
> 
> It looks to me like we could...

Let me look into this.  I can probably come up with something that does
the walk once.

Thanks,
Tom

> 

  reply	other threads:[~2017-08-17 19:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 79+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-07-24 19:07 [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 01/17] Documentation/x86: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) descrption Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25  5:45   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 14:59     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25 10:26   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 14:29     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 14:36       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 14:58         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 15:13           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 15:29             ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 15:33               ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-09 18:17                 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17  8:12                   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 03/17] x86/mm: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26  4:28   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-26 16:47     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-27 13:39       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 04/17] x86/mm: Don't attempt to encrypt initrd under SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 14:44   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 05/17] x86, realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area " Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 16:03   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-10 13:03     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 06/17] x86/mm: Use encrypted access of boot related data with SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-07-27 13:31   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 18:05     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 07/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes Brijesh Singh
2017-07-27 14:58   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-28  8:47     ` David Laight
2017-08-17 18:21       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:10     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 08/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-07-28 10:31   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 18:42     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 09/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code Brijesh Singh
2017-07-28 15:23   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 18:55     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 19:03       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 10/17] resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callback Brijesh Singh
2017-07-31  8:26   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-31 22:19   ` Kees Cook
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 11/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages Brijesh Singh
2017-08-02  4:02   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 19:22     ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 12/17] x86/mm: DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2017-08-07  3:48   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 19:35     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25  9:51   ` David Laight
2017-07-26 10:45     ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-07-26 19:24       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 19:26         ` H. Peter Anvin
2017-07-26 20:07           ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-27  7:45             ` David Laight
2017-08-22 16:52             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 12:24               ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 14:13                 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-15 14:40                   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 14:48                     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-15 16:22                       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 16:27                         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 14/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2017-08-23 15:30   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-24 18:54     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-25 12:54       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 15/17] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot Brijesh Singh
2017-08-28 10:51   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-28 11:49     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables Brijesh Singh
2017-08-29 10:22   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-30 16:18     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-30 17:46       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-01 22:52         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-02  3:21           ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-09-03  2:34             ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-04 17:05           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-04 17:47             ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 17/17] X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-08-31 15:06   ` Borislav Petkov

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