mirror of https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Vikash Garodia <quic_vgarodia@quicinc.com>
To: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>,
	Stanimir Varbanov <stanimir.k.varbanov@gmail.com>,
	Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>
Cc: <linux-media@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-arm-msm@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/4] media: venus: hfi_parser: add check to avoid out of bound access
Date: Wed, 6 Nov 2024 12:55:08 +0530	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <7f350d73-65dd-097e-8b4a-e9a23472aa28@quicinc.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <640fe933-078d-4bf5-815c-7db0eb8b9de4@linaro.org>


On 11/5/2024 4:21 PM, Bryan O'Donoghue wrote:
> On 05/11/2024 08:54, Vikash Garodia wrote:
>> There is a possibility that init_codecs is invoked multiple times during
>> manipulated payload from video firmware. In such case, if codecs_count
>> can get incremented to value more than MAX_CODEC_NUM, there can be OOB
>> access. Keep a check for max accessible memory before accessing it.
>>
>> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
>> Fixes: 1a73374a04e5 ("media: venus: hfi_parser: add common capability parser")
>> Signed-off-by: Vikash Garodia <quic_vgarodia@quicinc.com>
>> ---
>>   drivers/media/platform/qcom/venus/hfi_parser.c | 4 ++++
>>   1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/qcom/venus/hfi_parser.c
>> b/drivers/media/platform/qcom/venus/hfi_parser.c
>> index
>> 3df241dc3a118bcdeb2c28a6ffdb907b644d5653..27d0172294d5154f4839e8cef172f9a619dfa305 100644
>> --- a/drivers/media/platform/qcom/venus/hfi_parser.c
>> +++ b/drivers/media/platform/qcom/venus/hfi_parser.c
>> @@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ static void init_codecs(struct venus_core *core)
>>           return;
>>         for_each_set_bit(bit, &core->dec_codecs, MAX_CODEC_NUM) {
>> +        if (core->codecs_count >= MAX_CODEC_NUM)
>> +            return;
>>           cap = &caps[core->codecs_count++];
>>           cap->codec = BIT(bit);
>>           cap->domain = VIDC_SESSION_TYPE_DEC;
>> @@ -30,6 +32,8 @@ static void init_codecs(struct venus_core *core)
>>       }
>>         for_each_set_bit(bit, &core->enc_codecs, MAX_CODEC_NUM) {
>> +        if (core->codecs_count >= MAX_CODEC_NUM)
>> +            return;
>>           cap = &caps[core->codecs_count++];
>>           cap->codec = BIT(bit);
>>           cap->domain = VIDC_SESSION_TYPE_ENC;
>>
> 
> I don't see how codecs_count could be greater than the control, since you
> increment by one on each loop but >= is fine too I suppose.
Assume the payload from malicious firmware is packed like below
HFI_PROPERTY_PARAM_CODEC_SUPPORTED
HFI_PROPERTY_PARAM_CODEC_SUPPORTED
HFI_PROPERTY_PARAM_CODEC_SUPPORTED
.....
for 32 or more instances of above type

Regards,
Vikash
> 
> Reviewed-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>

  reply	other threads:[~2024-11-06  7:25 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-11-05  8:54 [PATCH 0/4] Venus driver fixes to avoid possible OOB accesses Vikash Garodia
2024-11-05  8:54 ` [PATCH 1/4] media: venus: hfi_parser: add check to avoid out of bound access Vikash Garodia
2024-11-05 10:51   ` Bryan O'Donoghue
2024-11-06  7:25     ` Vikash Garodia [this message]
2024-11-06 10:23       ` Bryan O'Donoghue
2024-11-07  8:24         ` Vikash Garodia
2024-11-05 13:55   ` Dmitry Baryshkov
2024-11-07  8:17     ` Vikash Garodia
2024-11-07 10:41       ` Dmitry Baryshkov
2024-11-07 12:07         ` Bryan O'Donoghue
2024-11-07 13:02           ` Vikash Garodia
2024-11-07 13:22             ` Dmitry Baryshkov
2024-11-07 13:35               ` Vikash Garodia
2024-11-07 13:54                 ` Dmitry Baryshkov
2024-11-08 11:43                   ` Bryan O'Donoghue
2024-11-11 14:02                     ` Vikash Garodia
2024-11-11 14:04                   ` Vikash Garodia
2024-11-05  8:54 ` [PATCH 2/4] media: venus: hfi_parser: avoid OOB access beyond payload word count Vikash Garodia
2024-11-05 11:15   ` Bryan O'Donoghue
2024-11-11 14:36     ` Vikash Garodia
2024-11-11 23:43       ` Bryan O'Donoghue
2024-11-12  8:05         ` Vikash Garodia
2024-11-12 11:17           ` Bryan O'Donoghue
2024-11-12 12:58             ` Vikash Garodia
2024-11-12 13:00               ` Bryan O'Donoghue
2024-11-05  8:54 ` [PATCH 3/4] media: venus: hfi: add check to handle incorrect queue size Vikash Garodia
2024-11-05 11:23   ` Bryan O'Donoghue
2024-11-05  8:54 ` [PATCH 4/4] media: venus: hfi: add a check to handle OOB in sfr region Vikash Garodia
2024-11-05 11:27   ` Bryan O'Donoghue
2024-11-05 13:58   ` Dmitry Baryshkov
2024-11-06  7:21     ` Vikash Garodia

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=7f350d73-65dd-097e-8b4a-e9a23472aa28@quicinc.com \
    --to=quic_vgarodia@quicinc.com \
    --cc=bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org \
    --cc=linux-arm-msm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-media@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mchehab@kernel.org \
    --cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=stanimir.k.varbanov@gmail.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox

all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®