* [PATCH v2 0/2] Spectre-v2 detection fixes @ 2019-01-14 10:35 Marc Zyngier 2019-01-14 10:35 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] arm64: Advertise mitigation of Spectre-v2, or lack thereof Marc Zyngier 2019-01-14 10:35 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] arm64: Use firmware to detect CPUs that are not affected by Spectre-v2 Marc Zyngier 0 siblings, 2 replies; 4+ messages in thread From: Marc Zyngier @ 2019-01-14 10:35 UTC (permalink / raw) To: linux-arm-kernel, linux-kernel Cc: Jeremy Linton, Will Deacon, Catalin Marinas These two patches, now built on top of Jeremy's sysfs series, tweak the way we detect the Spectre-v2 vulnerability by switching from a blacklist to a whitelist, making sure we correctly detect unmitigated systems. We further improve things by relying on firmware to tell us about CPUs that are part of an affected system, but that are not affected themselves (big-little type). For convenience, I've pushed out a branch containing both Jeremy's v3 series and these patches at [1]. [1] git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/maz/arm-platforms.git arm64/spectre-sysfs Marc Zyngier (2): arm64: Advertise mitigation of Spectre-v2, or lack thereof arm64: Use firmware to detect CPUs that are not affected by Spectre-v2 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 141 +++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 73 insertions(+), 68 deletions(-) -- 2.20.1 ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v2 1/2] arm64: Advertise mitigation of Spectre-v2, or lack thereof 2019-01-14 10:35 [PATCH v2 0/2] Spectre-v2 detection fixes Marc Zyngier @ 2019-01-14 10:35 ` Marc Zyngier 2019-01-14 17:06 ` Jeremy Linton 2019-01-14 10:35 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] arm64: Use firmware to detect CPUs that are not affected by Spectre-v2 Marc Zyngier 1 sibling, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread From: Marc Zyngier @ 2019-01-14 10:35 UTC (permalink / raw) To: linux-arm-kernel, linux-kernel Cc: Jeremy Linton, Will Deacon, Catalin Marinas We currently have a list of CPUs affected by Spectre-v2, for which we check that the firmware implements ARCH_WORKAROUND_1. It turns out that not all firmwares do implement the required mitigation, and that we fail to let the user know about it. Instead, let's slightly revamp our checks, and rely on a whitelist of cores that are known to be non-vulnerable, and let the user know the status of the mitigation in the kernel log. Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> --- arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 111 +++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 59 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c index c8ff96158b94..145f8b5d093d 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c @@ -138,9 +138,9 @@ static void __copy_hyp_vect_bpi(int slot, const char *hyp_vecs_start, __flush_icache_range((uintptr_t)dst, (uintptr_t)dst + SZ_2K); } -static void __install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn, - const char *hyp_vecs_start, - const char *hyp_vecs_end) +static void install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn, + const char *hyp_vecs_start, + const char *hyp_vecs_end) { static DEFINE_RAW_SPINLOCK(bp_lock); int cpu, slot = -1; @@ -176,31 +176,14 @@ static void __install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn, #define __smccc_workaround_1_smc_start NULL #define __smccc_workaround_1_smc_end NULL -static void __install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn, - const char *hyp_vecs_start, - const char *hyp_vecs_end) +static void install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn, + const char *hyp_vecs_start, + const char *hyp_vecs_end) { __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.fn, fn); } #endif /* CONFIG_KVM_INDIRECT_VECTORS */ -static void install_bp_hardening_cb(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, - bp_hardening_cb_t fn, - const char *hyp_vecs_start, - const char *hyp_vecs_end) -{ - u64 pfr0; - - if (!entry->matches(entry, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) - return; - - pfr0 = read_cpuid(ID_AA64PFR0_EL1); - if (cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field(pfr0, ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT)) - return; - - __install_bp_hardening_cb(fn, hyp_vecs_start, hyp_vecs_end); -} - #include <uapi/linux/psci.h> #include <linux/arm-smccc.h> #include <linux/psci.h> @@ -227,20 +210,21 @@ static void qcom_link_stack_sanitization(void) : "=&r" (tmp)); } -static void -enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry) +/* + * -1: No workaround + * 0: No workaround required + * 1: Workaround installed + */ +static int detect_harden_bp_fw(void) { bp_hardening_cb_t cb; void *smccc_start, *smccc_end; struct arm_smccc_res res; u32 midr = read_cpuid_id(); - if (!entry->matches(entry, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) - return; - if (psci_ops.smccc_version == SMCCC_VERSION_1_0) { __hardenbp_enab = false; - return; + return -1; } switch (psci_ops.conduit) { @@ -249,7 +233,7 @@ enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry) ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res); if ((int)res.a0 < 0) { __hardenbp_enab = false; - return; + return -1; } cb = call_hvc_arch_workaround_1; /* This is a guest, no need to patch KVM vectors */ @@ -262,7 +246,7 @@ enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry) ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res); if ((int)res.a0 < 0) { __hardenbp_enab = false; - return; + return -1; } cb = call_smc_arch_workaround_1; smccc_start = __smccc_workaround_1_smc_start; @@ -271,16 +255,22 @@ enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry) default: __hardenbp_enab = false; - return; + return -1; } if (((midr & MIDR_CPU_MODEL_MASK) == MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR) || ((midr & MIDR_CPU_MODEL_MASK) == MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR_V1)) cb = qcom_link_stack_sanitization; - install_bp_hardening_cb(entry, cb, smccc_start, smccc_end); + install_bp_hardening_cb(cb, smccc_start, smccc_end); - return; + return 1; +} +#else +static int detect_harden_bp_fw(void) +{ + /* Sorry, can't do a thing */ + return -1; } #endif /* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */ @@ -544,7 +534,15 @@ cpu_enable_cache_maint_trap(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused) #if defined(CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR) || \ defined(CONFIG_GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES) - +/* + * List of CPUs that do not need any Spectre-v2 mitigation at all. + */ +static const struct midr_range spectre_v2_safe_list[] = { + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A35), + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A53), + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A55), + { /* sentinel */ } +}; static bool __spectrev2_safe = true; @@ -555,37 +553,34 @@ static bool __spectrev2_safe = true; static bool __maybe_unused check_branch_predictor(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope) { - bool is_vul; + int need_wa; WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible()); - is_vul = is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), entry->midr_range_list); + /* If the CPU has CSV2 set, we're safe */ + if (cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field(read_cpuid(ID_AA64PFR0_EL1), + ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT)) + return false; - if (is_vul) - __spectrev2_safe = false; + /* Alternatively, we have a list of unaffected CPUs */ + if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), spectre_v2_safe_list)) + return false; + + /* Fallback to firmware detection */ + need_wa = detect_harden_bp_fw(); + if (!need_wa) + return false; + + __spectrev2_safe = false; + + if (need_wa < 0) + pr_warn_once("ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 missing from firmware\n"); arm64_requested_vuln_attrs |= VULN_SPECTREV2; - return is_vul; + return (need_wa > 0); } -/* - * List of CPUs where we need to issue a psci call to - * harden the branch predictor. - */ -static const struct midr_range arm64_bp_harden_smccc_cpus[] = { - MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A57), - MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A72), - MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A73), - MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A75), - MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_BRCM_VULCAN), - MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CAVIUM_THUNDERX2), - MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR_V1), - MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR), - MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_NVIDIA_DENVER), - {}, -}; - #endif #ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS @@ -764,10 +759,8 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = { #ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR { .capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR, - .cpu_enable = enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1, .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM, .matches = check_branch_predictor, - .midr_range_list = arm64_bp_harden_smccc_cpus, }, #endif #ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS -- 2.20.1 ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] arm64: Advertise mitigation of Spectre-v2, or lack thereof 2019-01-14 10:35 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] arm64: Advertise mitigation of Spectre-v2, or lack thereof Marc Zyngier @ 2019-01-14 17:06 ` Jeremy Linton 0 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread From: Jeremy Linton @ 2019-01-14 17:06 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Marc Zyngier, linux-arm-kernel, linux-kernel; +Cc: Will Deacon, Catalin Marinas Hi, On 01/14/2019 04:35 AM, Marc Zyngier wrote: > We currently have a list of CPUs affected by Spectre-v2, for which > we check that the firmware implements ARCH_WORKAROUND_1. It turns > out that not all firmwares do implement the required mitigation, > and that we fail to let the user know about it. > > Instead, let's slightly revamp our checks, and rely on a whitelist > of cores that are known to be non-vulnerable, and let the user know > the status of the mitigation in the kernel log. > > Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> > --- > arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 111 +++++++++++++++------------------ > 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 59 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c > index c8ff96158b94..145f8b5d093d 100644 > --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c > +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c > @@ -138,9 +138,9 @@ static void __copy_hyp_vect_bpi(int slot, const char *hyp_vecs_start, > __flush_icache_range((uintptr_t)dst, (uintptr_t)dst + SZ_2K); > } > > -static void __install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn, > - const char *hyp_vecs_start, > - const char *hyp_vecs_end) > +static void install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn, > + const char *hyp_vecs_start, > + const char *hyp_vecs_end) > { > static DEFINE_RAW_SPINLOCK(bp_lock); > int cpu, slot = -1; > @@ -176,31 +176,14 @@ static void __install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn, > #define __smccc_workaround_1_smc_start NULL > #define __smccc_workaround_1_smc_end NULL > > -static void __install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn, > - const char *hyp_vecs_start, > - const char *hyp_vecs_end) > +static void install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn, > + const char *hyp_vecs_start, > + const char *hyp_vecs_end) > { > __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.fn, fn); > } > #endif /* CONFIG_KVM_INDIRECT_VECTORS */ > > -static void install_bp_hardening_cb(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, > - bp_hardening_cb_t fn, > - const char *hyp_vecs_start, > - const char *hyp_vecs_end) > -{ > - u64 pfr0; > - > - if (!entry->matches(entry, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) > - return; > - > - pfr0 = read_cpuid(ID_AA64PFR0_EL1); > - if (cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field(pfr0, ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT)) > - return; > - > - __install_bp_hardening_cb(fn, hyp_vecs_start, hyp_vecs_end); > -} > - > #include <uapi/linux/psci.h> > #include <linux/arm-smccc.h> > #include <linux/psci.h> > @@ -227,20 +210,21 @@ static void qcom_link_stack_sanitization(void) > : "=&r" (tmp)); > } > > -static void > -enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry) > +/* > + * -1: No workaround > + * 0: No workaround required > + * 1: Workaround installed > + */ > +static int detect_harden_bp_fw(void) > { > bp_hardening_cb_t cb; > void *smccc_start, *smccc_end; > struct arm_smccc_res res; > u32 midr = read_cpuid_id(); > > - if (!entry->matches(entry, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) > - return; > - > if (psci_ops.smccc_version == SMCCC_VERSION_1_0) { > __hardenbp_enab = false; > - return; > + return -1; > } > > switch (psci_ops.conduit) { > @@ -249,7 +233,7 @@ enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry) > ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res); > if ((int)res.a0 < 0) { > __hardenbp_enab = false; > - return; > + return -1; > } > cb = call_hvc_arch_workaround_1; > /* This is a guest, no need to patch KVM vectors */ > @@ -262,7 +246,7 @@ enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry) > ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res); > if ((int)res.a0 < 0) { > __hardenbp_enab = false; > - return; > + return -1; > } > cb = call_smc_arch_workaround_1; > smccc_start = __smccc_workaround_1_smc_start; > @@ -271,16 +255,22 @@ enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry) > > default: > __hardenbp_enab = false; > - return; > + return -1; > } > > if (((midr & MIDR_CPU_MODEL_MASK) == MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR) || > ((midr & MIDR_CPU_MODEL_MASK) == MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR_V1)) > cb = qcom_link_stack_sanitization; > > - install_bp_hardening_cb(entry, cb, smccc_start, smccc_end); > + install_bp_hardening_cb(cb, smccc_start, smccc_end); > > - return; > + return 1; > +} > +#else > +static int detect_harden_bp_fw(void) > +{ > + /* Sorry, can't do a thing */ > + return -1; > } > #endif /* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */ > > @@ -544,7 +534,15 @@ cpu_enable_cache_maint_trap(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused) > > #if defined(CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR) || \ > defined(CONFIG_GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES) > - > +/* > + * List of CPUs that do not need any Spectre-v2 mitigation at all. > + */ > +static const struct midr_range spectre_v2_safe_list[] = { > + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A35), > + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A53), > + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A55), > + { /* sentinel */ } > +}; > > static bool __spectrev2_safe = true; > > @@ -555,37 +553,34 @@ static bool __spectrev2_safe = true; > static bool __maybe_unused > check_branch_predictor(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope) > { > - bool is_vul; > + int need_wa; > > WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible()); > > - is_vul = is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), entry->midr_range_list); > + /* If the CPU has CSV2 set, we're safe */ > + if (cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field(read_cpuid(ID_AA64PFR0_EL1), > + ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT)) > + return false; > > - if (is_vul) > - __spectrev2_safe = false; > + /* Alternatively, we have a list of unaffected CPUs */ > + if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), spectre_v2_safe_list)) > + return false; > + > + /* Fallback to firmware detection */ > + need_wa = detect_harden_bp_fw(); > + if (!need_wa) > + return false; > + > + __spectrev2_safe = false; > + > + if (need_wa < 0) > + pr_warn_once("ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 missing from firmware\n"); > > arm64_requested_vuln_attrs |= VULN_SPECTREV2; This bit here, is what turns on the sysfs entry. So it needs to be hoisted before the first return. Also, I think that since detect_harden_bp_fw() is now returning the firmware state, we can check once for failure and set `__hardenbp_enab = false;` here rather the half dozen times it happens in what is now detect_harden_bp_fw(); Thanks, > > - return is_vul; > + return (need_wa > 0); > } > > -/* > - * List of CPUs where we need to issue a psci call to > - * harden the branch predictor. > - */ > -static const struct midr_range arm64_bp_harden_smccc_cpus[] = { > - MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A57), > - MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A72), > - MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A73), > - MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A75), > - MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_BRCM_VULCAN), > - MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CAVIUM_THUNDERX2), > - MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR_V1), > - MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR), > - MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_NVIDIA_DENVER), > - {}, > -}; > - > #endif > > #ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS > @@ -764,10 +759,8 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = { > #ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR > { > .capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR, > - .cpu_enable = enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1, > .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM, > .matches = check_branch_predictor, > - .midr_range_list = arm64_bp_harden_smccc_cpus, > }, > #endif > #ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS > ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v2 2/2] arm64: Use firmware to detect CPUs that are not affected by Spectre-v2 2019-01-14 10:35 [PATCH v2 0/2] Spectre-v2 detection fixes Marc Zyngier 2019-01-14 10:35 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] arm64: Advertise mitigation of Spectre-v2, or lack thereof Marc Zyngier @ 2019-01-14 10:35 ` Marc Zyngier 1 sibling, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread From: Marc Zyngier @ 2019-01-14 10:35 UTC (permalink / raw) To: linux-arm-kernel, linux-kernel Cc: Jeremy Linton, Will Deacon, Catalin Marinas The SMCCC ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 service can indicate that although the firmware knows about the Spectre-v2 mitigation, this particular CPU is not vulnerable, and it is thus not necessary to call the firmware on this CPU. Let's use this information to our benefit. Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> --- arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c index 145f8b5d093d..b44f87e7360d 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c @@ -231,26 +231,38 @@ static int detect_harden_bp_fw(void) case PSCI_CONDUIT_HVC: arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID, ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res); - if ((int)res.a0 < 0) { + switch ((int)res.a0) { + case 1: + /* Firmware says we're just fine */ + return 0; + case 0: + cb = call_hvc_arch_workaround_1; + /* This is a guest, no need to patch KVM vectors */ + smccc_start = NULL; + smccc_end = NULL; + break; + default: __hardenbp_enab = false; return -1; } - cb = call_hvc_arch_workaround_1; - /* This is a guest, no need to patch KVM vectors */ - smccc_start = NULL; - smccc_end = NULL; break; case PSCI_CONDUIT_SMC: arm_smccc_1_1_smc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID, ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res); - if ((int)res.a0 < 0) { + switch ((int)res.a0) { + case 1: + /* Firmware says we're just fine */ + return 0; + case 0: + cb = call_smc_arch_workaround_1; + smccc_start = __smccc_workaround_1_smc_start; + smccc_end = __smccc_workaround_1_smc_end; + break; + default: __hardenbp_enab = false; return -1; } - cb = call_smc_arch_workaround_1; - smccc_start = __smccc_workaround_1_smc_start; - smccc_end = __smccc_workaround_1_smc_end; break; default: -- 2.20.1 ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2019-01-14 17:06 UTC | newest] Thread overview: 4+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed) -- links below jump to the message on this page -- 2019-01-14 10:35 [PATCH v2 0/2] Spectre-v2 detection fixes Marc Zyngier 2019-01-14 10:35 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] arm64: Advertise mitigation of Spectre-v2, or lack thereof Marc Zyngier 2019-01-14 17:06 ` Jeremy Linton 2019-01-14 10:35 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] arm64: Use firmware to detect CPUs that are not affected by Spectre-v2 Marc Zyngier
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