From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Andrey Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>,
Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>,
Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>,
Rob Landley <rob@landley.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] [RFC] mnt: add ability to clone mntns starting with the current root
Date: Tue, 07 Oct 2014 13:45:22 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87mw97wqvx.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1412683977-29543-1-git-send-email-avagin@openvz.org> (Andrey Vagin's message of "Tue, 7 Oct 2014 16:12:57 +0400")
Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> writes:
> From: Andrey Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
>
> Currently when we create a new container with a separate root,
> we need to clone the current mount namespace with all mounts and then
> clean up it by using pivot_root(). A big part of mountpoints are cloned
> only to be umounted.
Is the motivation performance? Because if that is the motivation we
need numbers.
> Another problem is that rootfs can't be hidden from a container, because
> rootfs can't be moved or umounted.
>
> Here is an example how to get access to rootfs:
> fd = open("/proc/self/ns/mnt", O_RDONLY)
> umount2("/", MNT_DETACH);
> setns(fd, CLONE_NEWNS)
>
> rootfs may contain data, which should not be avaliable in CT-s.
Well don't give those containers CAP_SYS_ADMIN. If you aren't using
user namespaces there is no expectation of safety from those kinds of
problems. Getting at rootfs is perfectly valid for root.
> I suggest to add ability to create a mount namespace with specified
> mount points. A current task root can be used as a root for the new
> mount namespace.
I really don't think you are going to like the result because you will
loose access to /proc and /sys.
> With this patch you can call chroot(ct->rootfs) and
> unshare(UNSHARE_NEWNS2) to get a clean mount namespace.
That is a little bit of an ugly way to smuggle a parameter into the
creation of a mount namespace. Further I am pretty certain this patch
totally breaks the setting of new_fs->root and new_fs->pwd.
In net my opinion is that the code doesn't work and does not provide
sufficient justification for a new system call.
> UNSHARE_NEWNS2 can be used only with the unshare() syscall. The clone()
> syscall doesn't have unused flags.
>
> Here is an example how it looks like:
> $ cat ../../unshare.c
>
> int main(int argc, char **argv)
> {
/* You left out
* mount --bind /some/root/path /some/root/path
* chroot /some/root/path
*/
> if (unshare(UNSHARE_NEWNS2))
> return 1;
>
> execl("/bin/bash", "/bin/bash", NULL);
> return 1;
> }
> $ mount --bind test/ubuntu/ test/ubuntu/
> $ cd test/ubuntu/
> $ chroot .
> $ ./unshare2
> $ mount -t proc proc proc
> $ cat /proc/self/mountinfo
> 55 55 252:1 /home/avagin/test/ubuntu / rw,relatime - ext4 /dev/disk/by-uuid/d672b85f-533c-4868-9609-ca80be52d3c6 rw,errors=remount-ro,data=ordered
> 56 55 0:3 / /proc rw,relatime - proc proc rw
>
> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
> Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
> Cc: Rob Landley <rob@landley.net>
> Signed-off-by: Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
> ---
> fs/namespace.c | 16 ++++++++++++++--
> include/uapi/linux/sched.h | 8 ++++++++
> kernel/fork.c | 11 ++++++++---
> kernel/nsproxy.c | 2 +-
> 4 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
> index 730c50e..f50a848 100644
> --- a/fs/namespace.c
> +++ b/fs/namespace.c
> @@ -2569,12 +2569,24 @@ struct mnt_namespace *copy_mnt_ns(unsigned long flags, struct mnt_namespace *ns,
>
> BUG_ON(!ns);
>
> - if (likely(!(flags & CLONE_NEWNS))) {
> + if (likely(!(flags & (CLONE_NEWNS | UNSHARE_NEWNS2)))) {
> get_mnt_ns(ns);
> return ns;
> }
>
> - old = ns->root;
> + if (flags & CLONE_NEWNS)
> + old = ns->root;
> + else { /* UNSHARE_NEWNS2 */
> + struct path root;
> +
> + get_fs_root(current->fs, &root);
> + if (root.mnt->mnt_root != root.dentry) {
> + path_put(&root);
> + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); /* not a mountpoint */
> + }
> + old = real_mount(root.mnt);
> + path_put(&root);
> + }
>
> new_ns = alloc_mnt_ns(user_ns);
> if (IS_ERR(new_ns))
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/sched.h b/include/uapi/linux/sched.h
> index 34f9d73..8092e50 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/sched.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/sched.h
> @@ -31,6 +31,14 @@
> #define CLONE_IO 0x80000000 /* Clone io context */
>
> /*
> + * Following flags can be used only with unshare(), because
> + * they are intersected with CSIGNAL
> + */
> +#define UNSHARE_NEWNS2 0x00000001 /* Clone mnt namespace starting with the current task root. */
> +
> +#define UNSHARE_FLAGS (UNSHARE_NEWNS2)
> +
> +/*
> * Scheduling policies
> */
> #define SCHED_NORMAL 0
> diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
> index 0cf9cdb..52f1fc0 100644
> --- a/kernel/fork.c
> +++ b/kernel/fork.c
> @@ -1381,7 +1381,12 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags,
> retval = copy_mm(clone_flags, p);
> if (retval)
> goto bad_fork_cleanup_signal;
> - retval = copy_namespaces(clone_flags, p);
> +
> + /*
> + * CSIGNAL and UNSHARE_FLAGS are intersected, but
> + * UNSHARE_FLAGS can't be used with clone().
> + */
> + retval = copy_namespaces(clone_flags & ~UNSHARE_FLAGS, p);
> if (retval)
> goto bad_fork_cleanup_mm;
> retval = copy_io(clone_flags, p);
> @@ -1790,7 +1795,7 @@ static int check_unshare_flags(unsigned long unshare_flags)
> if (unshare_flags & ~(CLONE_THREAD|CLONE_FS|CLONE_NEWNS|CLONE_SIGHAND|
> CLONE_VM|CLONE_FILES|CLONE_SYSVSEM|
> CLONE_NEWUTS|CLONE_NEWIPC|CLONE_NEWNET|
> - CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWPID))
> + CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWPID|UNSHARE_FLAGS))
It seems confusing to use UNSHARE_FLAGS here.
> return -EINVAL;
> /*
> * Not implemented, but pretend it works if there is nothing to
> @@ -1880,7 +1885,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(unshare, unsigned long, unshare_flags)
> /*
> * If unsharing namespace, must also unshare filesystem information.
> */
> - if (unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWNS)
> + if (unshare_flags & (CLONE_NEWNS | UNSHARE_NEWNS2))
> unshare_flags |= CLONE_FS;
>
> err = check_unshare_flags(unshare_flags);
> diff --git a/kernel/nsproxy.c b/kernel/nsproxy.c
> index ef42d0a..a29e836 100644
> --- a/kernel/nsproxy.c
> +++ b/kernel/nsproxy.c
> @@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ int unshare_nsproxy_namespaces(unsigned long unshare_flags,
> int err = 0;
>
> if (!(unshare_flags & (CLONE_NEWNS | CLONE_NEWUTS | CLONE_NEWIPC |
> - CLONE_NEWNET | CLONE_NEWPID)))
> + CLONE_NEWNET | CLONE_NEWPID | UNSHARE_FLAGS)))
It is inappropriate to assume that all unshare flags will be namespaces.
> return 0;
>
> user_ns = new_cred ? new_cred->user_ns : current_user_ns();
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-10-07 20:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-10-07 12:12 Andrey Vagin
2014-10-07 13:30 ` Al Viro
2014-10-07 13:33 ` Al Viro
2014-10-07 19:44 ` Andrew Vagin
2014-10-07 20:30 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-10-07 20:46 ` Serge Hallyn
2014-10-07 20:52 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-10-07 21:32 ` Serge Hallyn
2014-10-07 21:42 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-10-07 22:19 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-10-07 22:42 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-10-07 22:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-10-07 23:42 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-10-07 23:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-10-08 0:20 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-10-08 0:25 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-10-07 21:02 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-10-07 21:26 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-10-07 21:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-10-07 21:50 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-10-07 21:52 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-10-07 21:33 ` Serge Hallyn
2014-10-07 20:45 ` Eric W. Biederman [this message]
2014-10-08 11:08 ` Andrew Vagin
2014-10-08 15:35 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-10-08 19:23 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-10-08 19:31 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-10-08 21:36 ` Rob Landley
2014-10-08 22:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-10-08 23:38 ` Serge Hallyn
2014-10-08 23:41 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-10-08 21:23 ` Rob Landley
2014-10-09 10:29 ` Andrew Vagin
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