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From: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: dgilbert@redhat.com, jmattson@google.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KVM: SVM: relax conditions for allowing MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL accesses
Date: Thu, 06 Feb 2020 15:17:06 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87v9ojg5r1.fsf@vitty.brq.redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1580915628-42930-1-git-send-email-pbonzini@redhat.com>

Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> writes:

> Userspace that does not know about the AMD_IBRS bit might still
> allow the guest to protect itself with MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL using
> the Intel SPEC_CTRL bit.  However, svm.c disallows this and will
> cause a #GP in the guest when writing to the MSR.  Fix this by
> loosening the test and allowing the Intel CPUID bit, and in fact
> allow the AMD_STIBP bit as well since it allows writing to
> MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL too.
>
> Reported-by: Zhiyi Guo <zhguo@redhat.com>
> Analyzed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
> Analyzed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 4 ++++
>  1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> index bf0556588ad0..a3e32d61d60c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> @@ -4225,6 +4225,8 @@ static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
>  		break;
>  	case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
>  		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
> +		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) &&
> +		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP) &&
>  		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS) &&
>  		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))
>  			return 1;
> @@ -4310,6 +4312,8 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
>  		break;
>  	case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
>  		if (!msr->host_initiated &&
> +		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) &&
> +		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP) &&
>  		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS) &&
>  		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))
>  			return 1;

Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>

but out of pure curiosity, why do we need these checks?

At least for the 'set' case right below them we have:

        if (data & ~kvm_spec_ctrl_valid_bits(vcpu))
                 return 1;

so if guest will try using unsupported features it will #GP. So
basically, these checks will only fire when reading/writing '0' and all
features are missing, right? Do we care?

-- 
Vitaly


  reply	other threads:[~2020-02-06 14:17 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-02-05 15:13 Paolo Bonzini
2020-02-06 14:17 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov [this message]
2020-02-06 14:21   ` Paolo Bonzini

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