From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: Yian Chen <yian.chen@intel.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>,
Paul Lai <paul.c.lai@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/7] Enable LASS (Linear Address space Separation)
Date: Tue, 10 Jan 2023 14:57:17 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <8ac54f52-5bf0-bf6c-2473-7f0cf2a1a957@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230110055204.3227669-1-yian.chen@intel.com>
On 1/9/23 21:51, Yian Chen wrote:
> LASS (Linear Address Space Separation) is a security
> extension that prevents speculative address accesses across
> user/kernel mode. The LASS details have been published in
> Chapter 11 in
> https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/671368
>
> LASS works in 64-bit mode only and partitions the 64-bit
> virtual address space into two halves:
> 1. Lower half (LA[63]=0) --> user space
> 2. Upper half (LA[63]=1) --> kernel space
> When LASS is enabled, a general protection #GP(0) fault will
> be generated if software accesses the address from the half in
> which it resides to another half, e.g., either from user space
> to upper half, or from kernel space to lower half. This
> protection applies to data access, code execution, cache line
> flushing instructions.
This does a good job of explaining the nuts and bolts -- *what* LASS
does. It does a less good job of explaining why this was built, how it
can benefit end users and who cares about it.
LASS seemed really cool when we were reeling from Meltdown. It would
*obviously* have been a godsend five years ago. But, it's less clear
what role it plays today and how important it is.
Could you enlighten us, please?
prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-01-10 22:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-01-10 5:51 Yian Chen
2023-01-10 5:51 ` [PATCH 1/7] x86/cpu: Enumerate LASS CPUID and CR4 bits Yian Chen
2023-01-10 20:14 ` Sohil Mehta
2023-01-11 0:13 ` Dave Hansen
2023-01-11 23:23 ` Chen, Yian
2023-01-12 0:06 ` Luck, Tony
2023-01-12 0:15 ` Chen, Yian
2023-01-11 19:21 ` Chen, Yian
2023-01-10 5:51 ` [PATCH 2/7] x86: Add CONFIG option X86_LASS Yian Chen
2023-01-10 21:05 ` Sohil Mehta
2023-01-12 0:13 ` Chen, Yian
2023-01-10 5:52 ` [PATCH 3/7] x86/cpu: Disable kernel LASS when patching kernel alternatives Yian Chen
2023-01-10 21:04 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-01-11 1:01 ` Chen, Yian
2023-01-11 9:10 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-01-10 22:41 ` Sohil Mehta
2023-01-12 0:27 ` Chen, Yian
2023-01-12 0:37 ` Dave Hansen
2023-01-12 18:36 ` Chen, Yian
2023-01-12 18:48 ` Dave Hansen
2023-02-01 2:25 ` Sohil Mehta
2023-02-01 18:20 ` Dave Hansen
2023-02-01 2:10 ` Sohil Mehta
2023-01-10 5:52 ` [PATCH 4/7] x86/vsyscall: Setup vsyscall to compromise LASS protection Yian Chen
2023-01-11 0:34 ` Sohil Mehta
2023-01-12 1:43 ` Chen, Yian
2023-01-12 2:49 ` Sohil Mehta
2023-01-21 4:09 ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-01-10 5:52 ` [PATCH 5/7] x86/cpu: Enable LASS (Linear Address Space Separation) Yian Chen
2023-01-11 22:22 ` Sohil Mehta
2023-01-12 17:56 ` Chen, Yian
2023-01-12 18:17 ` Dave Hansen
2023-01-13 1:17 ` Sohil Mehta
2023-01-13 19:39 ` Sohil Mehta
2023-01-10 5:52 ` [PATCH 6/7] x86/cpu: Set LASS as pinning sensitive CR4 bit Yian Chen
2023-01-10 5:52 ` [PATCH 7/7] x86/kvm: Expose LASS feature to VM guest Yian Chen
2023-02-07 3:21 ` Wang, Lei
2023-02-09 17:18 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-01-10 19:48 ` [PATCH 0/7] Enable LASS (Linear Address space Separation) Sohil Mehta
2023-01-10 22:57 ` Dave Hansen [this message]
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