From: "Chen, Yian" <yian.chen@intel.com>
To: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>,
<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <x86@kernel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
"Tony Luck" <tony.luck@intel.com>,
Paul Lai <paul.c.lai@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/7] x86/cpu: Enumerate LASS CPUID and CR4 bits
Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2023 11:21:28 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <e7352525-02e5-1a41-7eb2-4d9e1151fa02@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <9d935618-8f84-2d6e-4f4c-9d38eec2ba67@intel.com>
On 1/10/2023 12:14 PM, Sohil Mehta wrote:
> On 1/9/2023 9:51 PM, Yian Chen wrote:
>> LASS (Linear Address Space Separation) is a CPU feature to
>> prevent speculative address access in user/kernel mode.
>>
>
> Would it be better to say?
>
> LASS (Linear Address Space Separation) is a security feature that
> intends to prevent unintentional speculative address access across
> user/kernel mode.
>
>
Sure, I will revise the statement precisely.
>> LASS partitions 64-bit virtual address space into two
>> halves, lower address (LA[63]=0) and upper address
>> (LA[63]=1). It stops any data access or code execution
>> 1. from upper half address space to any lower half address
>> 2, from lower half address space to any upper half address
>> and generates #GP fault for a violation.
>>
>
> I am not sure if this is the best way to say it. The kernel already
> partitions the address space this way. LASS takes what is already the
> typical OS implementation and bakes it into the hardware architecture.
>
Yes, LASS by design matches the addressing usage in OS. I will try to
include this in the statement.
>> In Linux, this means LASS does not allow both kernel code
>> to access any user space address and user code to access
>> any kernel space address.
>>
>
> There is clearly an overlap between the protections provided by paging
> and with SMAP and SMEP. It would be useful to paraphrase some of the
> information mentioned in the spec regarding how LASS differs from them.
>
Yes, I will differentiate between LASS and SMAP more clearly.
> "With these mode-based protections, paging can prevent malicious
> software from directly reading or writing memory inappropriately. To
> enforce these protections, the processor must traverse the hierarchy of
> paging structures in memory. Unprivileged software can use timing
> information resulting from this traversal to determine details about the
> paging structures, and these details may be used to determine the layout
> of supervisor memory.
>
> Linear-address space separation (LASS) is an independent mechanism that
> enforces the same mode-based protections as paging but without
> traversing the paging structures. Because the protections enforced by
> LASS are applied before paging, “probes” by malicious software will
> provide no paging-based timing information."
>
Yes, I will also state the advantage of LASS.
>> Signed-off-by: Yian Chen <yian.chen@intel.com>
>> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
>
Thanks,
Yian
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-01-11 19:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-01-10 5:51 [PATCH 0/7] Enable LASS (Linear Address space Separation) Yian Chen
2023-01-10 5:51 ` [PATCH 1/7] x86/cpu: Enumerate LASS CPUID and CR4 bits Yian Chen
2023-01-10 20:14 ` Sohil Mehta
2023-01-11 0:13 ` Dave Hansen
2023-01-11 23:23 ` Chen, Yian
2023-01-12 0:06 ` Luck, Tony
2023-01-12 0:15 ` Chen, Yian
2023-01-11 19:21 ` Chen, Yian [this message]
2023-01-10 5:51 ` [PATCH 2/7] x86: Add CONFIG option X86_LASS Yian Chen
2023-01-10 21:05 ` Sohil Mehta
2023-01-12 0:13 ` Chen, Yian
2023-01-10 5:52 ` [PATCH 3/7] x86/cpu: Disable kernel LASS when patching kernel alternatives Yian Chen
2023-01-10 21:04 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-01-11 1:01 ` Chen, Yian
2023-01-11 9:10 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-01-10 22:41 ` Sohil Mehta
2023-01-12 0:27 ` Chen, Yian
2023-01-12 0:37 ` Dave Hansen
2023-01-12 18:36 ` Chen, Yian
2023-01-12 18:48 ` Dave Hansen
2023-02-01 2:25 ` Sohil Mehta
2023-02-01 18:20 ` Dave Hansen
2023-02-01 2:10 ` Sohil Mehta
2023-01-10 5:52 ` [PATCH 4/7] x86/vsyscall: Setup vsyscall to compromise LASS protection Yian Chen
2023-01-11 0:34 ` Sohil Mehta
2023-01-12 1:43 ` Chen, Yian
2023-01-12 2:49 ` Sohil Mehta
2023-01-21 4:09 ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-01-10 5:52 ` [PATCH 5/7] x86/cpu: Enable LASS (Linear Address Space Separation) Yian Chen
2023-01-11 22:22 ` Sohil Mehta
2023-01-12 17:56 ` Chen, Yian
2023-01-12 18:17 ` Dave Hansen
2023-01-13 1:17 ` Sohil Mehta
2023-01-13 19:39 ` Sohil Mehta
2023-01-10 5:52 ` [PATCH 6/7] x86/cpu: Set LASS as pinning sensitive CR4 bit Yian Chen
2023-01-10 5:52 ` [PATCH 7/7] x86/kvm: Expose LASS feature to VM guest Yian Chen
2023-02-07 3:21 ` Wang, Lei
2023-02-09 17:18 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-01-10 19:48 ` [PATCH 0/7] Enable LASS (Linear Address space Separation) Sohil Mehta
2023-01-10 22:57 ` Dave Hansen
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