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From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>,
	tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
	hpa@zytor.com, x86@kernel.org, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
	luto@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
	jroedel@suse.de
Cc: konrad.wilk@oracle.com, jan.setjeeilers@oracle.com,
	junaids@google.com, oweisse@google.com, rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com,
	graf@amazon.de, mgross@linux.intel.com, kuzuno@gmail.com
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 00/24] x86/pti: Defer CR3 switch to C code
Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2020 11:35:50 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <8d9b6f38-5d98-dc91-cecc-36c7ab829c96@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201109144425.270789-1-alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>

On 11/9/20 6:44 AM, Alexandre Chartre wrote:
>  - map more syscall, interrupt and exception entry code into the user
>    page-table (map all noinstr code);

This seems like the thing we'd want to tag explicitly rather than make
it implicit with 'noinstr' code.  Worst-case, shouldn't this be:

#define __entry_func	noinstr

or something?

I'd also like to see a lot more discussion about what the rules are for
the C code and the compiler.  We can't, for instance, do a normal
printk() in this entry functions.  Should we stick them in a special
section and have objtool look for suspect patterns or references?

I'm most worried about things like this:

	if (something_weird)
		pr_warn("this will oops the kernel\n");

  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-11-09 19:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-11-09 14:44 Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 14:44 ` [RFC][PATCH 01/24] x86/syscall: Add wrapper for invoking syscall function Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 14:44 ` [RFC][PATCH 02/24] x86/entry: Update asm_call_on_stack to support more function arguments Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 14:44 ` [RFC][PATCH 03/24] x86/entry: Consolidate IST entry from userspace Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 14:44 ` [RFC][PATCH 04/24] x86/sev-es: Define a setup stack function for the VC idtentry Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 14:44 ` [RFC][PATCH 05/24] x86/entry: Implement ret_from_fork body with C code Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 14:44 ` [RFC][PATCH 06/24] x86/pti: Provide C variants of PTI switch CR3 macros Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 14:44 ` [RFC][PATCH 07/24] x86/entry: Fill ESPFIX stack using C code Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 14:44 ` [RFC][PATCH 08/24] x86/entry: Add C version of SWAPGS and SWAPGS_UNSAFE_STACK Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 19:55   ` Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 14:44 ` [RFC][PATCH 09/24] x86/entry: Add C version of paranoid_entry/exit Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 14:44 ` [RFC][PATCH 10/24] x86/pti: Introduce per-task PTI trampoline stack Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 14:44 ` [RFC][PATCH 11/24] x86/pti: Function to clone page-table entries from a specified mm Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 14:44 ` [RFC][PATCH 12/24] x86/pti: Function to map per-cpu page-table entry Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 14:44 ` [RFC][PATCH 13/24] x86/pti: Extend PTI user mappings Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 19:56   ` Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-10 23:39     ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-11-11  8:55       ` Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 14:44 ` [RFC][PATCH 14/24] x86/pti: Use PTI stack instead of trampoline stack Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 14:44 ` [RFC][PATCH 15/24] x86/pti: Execute syscall functions on the kernel stack Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 14:44 ` [RFC][PATCH 16/24] x86/pti: Execute IDT handlers " Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 14:44 ` [RFC][PATCH 17/24] x86/pti: Execute IDT handlers with error code " Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 14:44 ` [RFC][PATCH 18/24] x86/pti: Execute system vector handlers " Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 14:44 ` [RFC][PATCH 19/24] x86/pti: Execute page fault handler " Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 14:44 ` [RFC][PATCH 20/24] x86/pti: Execute NMI " Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 14:44 ` [RFC][PATCH 21/24] x86/entry: Disable stack-protector for IST entry C handlers Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 14:44 ` [RFC][PATCH 22/24] x86/entry: Defer paranoid entry/exit to C code Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 14:44 ` [RFC][PATCH 23/24] x86/entry: Remove paranoid_entry and paranoid_exit Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 14:44 ` [RFC][PATCH 24/24] x86/pti: Defer CR3 switch to C code for non-IST and syscall entries Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 19:35 ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2020-11-09 19:53   ` [RFC][PATCH 00/24] x86/pti: Defer CR3 switch to C code Alexandre Chartre
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2020-11-09 11:22 Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 14:00 ` Alexandre Chartre

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