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From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, svsm-devel@coconut-svsm.dev,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
	Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 02/13] x86/sev: Check for the presence of an SVSM in the SNP Secrets page
Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2024 16:17:07 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <952085da-d209-5144-19ef-26c5e7b03cfb@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240605193831.GYZmC-twcfjlArW3Hq@fat_crate.local>

On 6/5/24 14:38, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 05, 2024 at 10:18:45AM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> During early boot phases, check for the presence of an SVSM when running
>> as an SEV-SNP guest.
>>
>> An SVSM is present if not running at VMPL0 and the 64-bit value at offset
>> 0x148 into the secrets page is non-zero. If an SVSM is present, save the
>> SVSM Calling Area address (CAA), located at offset 0x150 into the secrets
>> page, and set the VMPL level of the guest, which should be non-zero, to
>> indicate the presence of an SVSM.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>> ---
>>   .../arch/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst        | 23 ++++++
>>   arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c                | 21 +++---
>>   arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h             |  4 ++
>>   arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h                    | 34 ++++++++-
>>   arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c                  | 71 +++++++++++++++++++
>>   arch/x86/kernel/sev.c                         |  7 ++
>>   6 files changed, 151 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
> 
> I did some touch-ups ontop:

Works for me, thanks!

Tom

> 

  reply	other threads:[~2024-06-05 21:17 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-06-05 15:18 [PATCH v5 00/13] Provide SEV-SNP support for running under an SVSM Tom Lendacky
2024-06-05 15:18 ` [PATCH v5 01/13] x86/irqflags: Provide native versions of the local_irq_save()/restore() Tom Lendacky
2024-06-05 15:18 ` [PATCH v5 02/13] x86/sev: Check for the presence of an SVSM in the SNP Secrets page Tom Lendacky
2024-06-05 19:38   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-06-05 21:17     ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2024-06-05 15:18 ` [PATCH v5 03/13] x86/sev: Use kernel provided SVSM Calling Areas Tom Lendacky
2024-06-06 12:36   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-06-05 15:18 ` [PATCH v5 04/13] x86/sev: Perform PVALIDATE using the SVSM when not at VMPL0 Tom Lendacky
2024-06-06 14:38   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-06-17 17:50   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-06-05 15:18 ` [PATCH v5 05/13] x86/sev: Use the SVSM to create a vCPU when not in VMPL0 Tom Lendacky
2024-06-05 15:18 ` [PATCH v5 06/13] x86/sev: Provide SVSM discovery support Tom Lendacky
2024-06-05 15:18 ` [PATCH v5 07/13] x86/sev: Provide guest VMPL level to userspace Tom Lendacky
2024-06-05 15:18 ` [PATCH v5 08/13] virt: sev-guest: Choose the VMPCK key based on executing VMPL Tom Lendacky
2024-06-05 15:18 ` [PATCH v5 09/13] configfs-tsm: Allow the privlevel_floor attribute to be updated Tom Lendacky
2024-06-14 20:47   ` Dan Williams
2024-06-05 15:18 ` [PATCH v5 10/13] fs/configfs: Add a callback to determine attribute visibility Tom Lendacky
2024-07-11 20:07   ` Christophe JAILLET
2024-06-05 15:18 ` [PATCH v5 11/13] x86/sev: Take advantage of configfs visibility support in TSM Tom Lendacky
2024-06-05 15:18 ` [PATCH v5 12/13] x86/sev: Extend the config-fs attestation support for an SVSM Tom Lendacky
2024-06-06 19:15   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-06-05 15:18 ` [PATCH v5 13/13] x86/sev: Allow non-VMPL0 execution when an SVSM is present Tom Lendacky

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