From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] x86/mm for 6.4
Date: Wed, 3 May 2023 09:44:50 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <95f17f84-f172-417c-fe7e-ca0a07b205fb@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHk-=wj7q6Ng5uemZtrDnhtcfrgkzX5Z18eKZj94FY5d2quP6A@mail.gmail.com>
On 5/3/23 09:38, Linus Torvalds wrote:
>> Why does it do that "shift-by-63" game there, instead of making
>> tlbstate_untag_mask just have bit #63 always set?
> And it turns out that bit #63 really _is_ always set, so I think the
> solution to this all is to remove the sign games in untag_addr()
> entirely.
Yes, there are only two possible values right now, both of which have
bit 63 set:
LAM off: mm->context.untag_mask = -1UL;
LAM on: mm->context.untag_mask = ~GENMASK(62, 57);
> Untagging a kernel address will "corrupt" it, but it will stay a
> kernel address (well, it will stay a "high bit set" address), which is
> all we care about anyway.
>
> If somebody actually tries to untag a kernel address, that would be a
> bug anyway, as far as I can tell.
Is it a bug? The do_madvise() path, for instance, is passing a value in
there that came right from userspace.
> So I'm going to just remove the 'sign' games entirely. They are
> completely broken in 'untagged_addr_remote()', they _used_ to be
> completely broken in 'untagged_addr()', and it looks like it's all
> unnecessary.
Yes, it looks completely superfluous.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-05-03 16:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-04-27 22:56 Dave Hansen
2023-04-28 17:23 ` pr-tracker-bot
2023-04-28 20:07 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-04-28 20:15 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-04-29 0:38 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-04-29 1:04 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-05-02 15:42 ` Dave Hansen
2023-05-02 16:00 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-05-02 20:14 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-05-03 0:53 ` Dave Hansen
2023-05-03 1:17 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-05-03 16:38 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-05-03 16:44 ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2023-05-03 16:51 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-05-03 17:54 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-05-03 19:01 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-05-03 19:19 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-05-05 19:56 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-05-05 20:59 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-05-04 6:28 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-05-04 15:25 ` Dave Hansen
2023-05-04 17:10 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-05-04 17:10 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-05-03 8:01 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-05-03 16:38 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-06-16 8:47 ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-06-16 16:22 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-06-19 12:03 ` Alexander Potapenko
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