From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] x86/mm for 6.4
Date: Tue, 2 May 2023 17:53:33 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <f5983c42-82a5-1cd8-c717-67bfd72377dc@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHk-=wgN=GY2A0htYQQRmPaLCorWnFatY_XO0X2w_m9xXQDcPA@mail.gmail.com>
On 5/2/23 13:14, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> No, the problem is that probably *because* "access_ok()" has that
> warning, not all users use "access_ok()" at all. We have places that
> use "__access_ok()" instead. Like copy_from_nmi().
>
> So now copy_from_nmi() doesn't do the untagging, so if you were to use
> tagged pointers for the stack, you'd not get stack traces.
>
> End result: I think that
>
> (a) that WARN_ON_IN_IRQ() is actively detrimental and causes problems
>
> (b) the current "use untagged_addr() in access_ok()" model is also broken
Ugh, yes.
The fallout seems limited to (probably) perf and tracing poking at user
stack frames. But, yes, it definitely looks broken there.
While I bet we could shoehorn the existing tlbstate checks into the
__access_ok() sites, I also vastly prefer the high bit checks in
access_ok() instead. The less state we have to consult, the better.
Once the WARN_ON_IN_IRQ() is gone, it seems like it's just a matter of
collapsing __access_ok() into access_ok() and converting the (~3) callers.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-05-03 0:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-04-27 22:56 Dave Hansen
2023-04-28 17:23 ` pr-tracker-bot
2023-04-28 20:07 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-04-28 20:15 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-04-29 0:38 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-04-29 1:04 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-05-02 15:42 ` Dave Hansen
2023-05-02 16:00 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-05-02 20:14 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-05-03 0:53 ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2023-05-03 1:17 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-05-03 16:38 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-05-03 16:44 ` Dave Hansen
2023-05-03 16:51 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-05-03 17:54 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-05-03 19:01 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-05-03 19:19 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-05-05 19:56 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-05-05 20:59 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-05-04 6:28 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-05-04 15:25 ` Dave Hansen
2023-05-04 17:10 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-05-04 17:10 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-05-03 8:01 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-05-03 16:38 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-06-16 8:47 ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-06-16 16:22 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-06-19 12:03 ` Alexander Potapenko
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