From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, bp@alien8.de,
thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Cc: tglx@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
hpa@zytor.com, xin@zytor.com, seanjc@google.com,
pbonzini@redhat.com, x86@kernel.org, jon.grimm@amd.com,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/fred: Fix early boot failures on SEV-ES/SNP guests
Date: Thu, 5 Feb 2026 08:10:14 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <9c8c2d69-5434-4416-ba37-897ce00e2b11@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260205051030.1225975-1-nikunj@amd.com>
On 2/4/26 21:10, Nikunj A Dadhania wrote:
...
> --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_fred.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_fred.c
> @@ -208,6 +208,11 @@ static noinstr void fred_hwexc(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET
> case X86_TRAP_CP: return exc_control_protection(regs, error_code);
> #endif
> + case X86_TRAP_VC:
> + if (user_mode(regs))
> + return user_exc_vmm_communication(regs, error_code);
> + else
> + return kernel_exc_vmm_communication(regs, error_code);
> default: return fred_bad_type(regs, error_code);
> }
Please look at the code in the ~20 lines above this hunk. It has a nice,
consistent form of:
case X86_TRAP_FOO: return exc_foo_action(...);
Could we keep that going, please?
Second, these functions are defined in arch/x86/coco/sev/vc-handle.c.
That looks suspiciously like CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT code and not
something that will compile everywhere. Also note the other features in
the switch() block. See all the #ifdefs on those?
Have you compiled this?
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fred.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fred.c
> index e736b19e18de..8cf4da546a8e 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fred.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fred.c
> @@ -27,9 +27,6 @@ EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(fred_rsp0);
>
> void cpu_init_fred_exceptions(void)
> {
> - /* When FRED is enabled by default, remove this log message */
> - pr_info("Initialize FRED on CPU%d\n", smp_processor_id());
> -
> /*
> * If a kernel event is delivered before a CPU goes to user level for
> * the first time, its SS is NULL thus NULL is pushed into the SS field
> @@ -70,6 +67,17 @@ void cpu_init_fred_exceptions(void)
> /* Use int $0x80 for 32-bit system calls in FRED mode */
> setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SYSFAST32);
> setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SYSCALL32);
> +
> + /*
> + * For secondary processors, FRED bit in CR4 gets enabled in cr4_init()
> + * and FRED MSRs are not configured till the end of this function. For
> + * SEV-ES and SNP guests, any console write before the FRED MSRs are
> + * setup will cause a #VC and cannot be handled. Move the pr_info to
> + * the end of this function.
> + *
> + * When FRED is enabled by default, remove this log message
> + */
> + pr_info("Initialized FRED on CPU%d\n", smp_processor_id());
> }
This seems really gross. Now there's a window where printk() doesn't
work. To fix it, we start moving printk()'s?
Please, no.
Shouldn't we flip the FRED CR4 bit _last_, once all the MSRs are set up?
Why is it backwards in the first place? Why can't it be fixed?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-02-05 16:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-02-05 5:10 Nikunj A Dadhania
2026-02-05 5:55 ` Greg KH
2026-02-05 6:10 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2026-02-05 6:20 ` Greg KH
2026-02-05 15:50 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-02-05 15:58 ` Dave Hansen
2026-02-05 16:00 ` Greg KH
2026-02-05 5:56 ` Greg KH
2026-02-05 6:24 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2026-02-05 7:11 ` Xin Li
2026-02-05 8:54 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2026-02-05 14:34 ` Xin Li
2026-02-05 10:41 ` kernel test robot
2026-02-06 3:31 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2026-02-06 9:34 ` Xin Li
2026-02-05 12:24 ` kernel test robot
2026-02-05 12:35 ` kernel test robot
2026-02-05 16:10 ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2026-02-05 17:20 ` Dave Hansen
2026-02-05 17:39 ` Tom Lendacky
2026-02-06 12:38 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2026-02-16 5:16 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2026-02-16 17:10 ` Dave Hansen
2026-02-19 19:27 ` Sohil Mehta
2026-02-19 20:22 ` Dave Hansen
2026-02-19 20:50 ` Sohil Mehta
2026-02-05 17:39 ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-02-06 12:12 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
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