From: Andrew Lutomirski <luto@mit.edu>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Jesper Juhl <jj@chaosbits.net>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>,
Jan Beulich <JBeulich@novell.com>,
richard -rw- weinberger <richard.weinberger@gmail.com>,
Mikael Pettersson <mikpe@it.uu.se>,
Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 09/10] x86-64: Randomize int 0xcc magic al values at boot
Date: Tue, 31 May 2011 11:56:30 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <BANLkTimGAtCPuvwvKfD6TLcabVzqKZhfGg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20110531154012.GB30353@elte.hu>
On Tue, May 31, 2011 at 11:40 AM, Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> wrote:
>
> * Andy Lutomirski <luto@MIT.EDU> wrote:
>
>> This is not a security feature. It's to prevent the int 0xcc
>> sequence from becoming ABI.
>
> Hm, what kind of ABI reliance could be built on it?
See:
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<BANLkTi=zxA3xzc0pR14rqwaOUXUAyF__MQ%40mail.gmail.com>
I was surprised, too.
>
>> +static void __init mangle_vsyscall_movb(void *mapping,
>> + unsigned long movb_addr, u8 initial)
>> +{
>> + u8 *imm8;
>> + BUG_ON(movb_addr >= 4095);
>
> Please put newlines after local variable definitions.
Yep.
>
>> static int __init vsyscall_init(void)
>> {
>> + extern char __vsyscall_0;
>
> Please don't put extern definitions in the middle of a .c file - if
> then it should be in a .h file. (even if only a single function uses
> it)
I thought the convention (and existing practice in vsyscall_64.c) was
that if the extern reference is to a magic linker symbol then it goes
in the function that uses it. But I can find it a header file.
>
>> + /*
>> + * Randomize the magic al values for int 0xcc invocation. This
>> + * isn't really a security feature; it's to make sure that
>> + * dynamic binary instrumentation tools don't start to think
>> + * that the int 0xcc magic incantation is ABI.
>> + */
>> + vsyscall_nr_offset = get_random_int() % 3;
>> + vsyscall_page = pfn_to_page(__pa_symbol(&__vsyscall_0) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
>> + mapping = kmap_atomic(vsyscall_page);
>> + /* It's easier to hardcode the addresses -- they're ABI. */
>> + mangle_vsyscall_movb(mapping, 0, 0xcc);
>
> what about filling it with zeroes?
Fill what with zeroes? I'm just patching one byte here.
>
>> +#ifndef CONFIG_UNSAFE_VSYSCALLS
>> + mangle_vsyscall_movb(mapping, 1024, 0xce);
>> +#endif
>> + mangle_vsyscall_movb(mapping, 2048, 0xf0);
>
> Dunno, this all looks rather ugly.
Agreed. Better ideas are welcome.
We could scrap int 0xcc entirely and emulate on page fault, but that
is slower and has other problems (like breaking anything that thinks
it can look at a call target in a binary and dereference that
address).
Here's a possibly dumb/evil idea:
Put real syscalls in the vsyscall page but mark the page NX. Then
emulate the vsyscalls on the PF_INSTR fault when userspace jumps to
the correct address but send SIGSEGV for the wrong address.
Down side: it's even more complexity for the same silly case.
--Andy
>
> Thanks,
>
> Ingo
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2011-05-31 15:56 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2011-05-31 14:13 [PATCH v4 00/10] Remove syscall instructions at fixed addresses Andy Lutomirski
2011-05-31 14:13 ` [PATCH v4 01/10] x86-64: Fix alignment of jiffies variable Andy Lutomirski
2011-05-31 14:14 ` [PATCH v4 02/10] x86-64: Document some of entry_64.S Andy Lutomirski
2011-05-31 14:14 ` [PATCH v4 03/10] x86-64: Give vvars their own page Andy Lutomirski
2011-05-31 17:17 ` Louis Rilling
2011-05-31 14:14 ` [PATCH v4 04/10] x86-64: Remove kernel.vsyscall64 sysctl Andy Lutomirski
2011-05-31 14:14 ` [PATCH v4 05/10] x86-64: Map the HPET NX Andy Lutomirski
2011-05-31 14:14 ` [PATCH v4 06/10] x86-64: Remove vsyscall number 3 (venosys) Andy Lutomirski
2011-05-31 14:14 ` [PATCH v4 07/10] x86-64: Fill unused parts of the vsyscall page with 0xcc Andy Lutomirski
2011-05-31 14:14 ` [PATCH v4 08/10] x86-64: Emulate legacy vsyscalls Andy Lutomirski
2011-05-31 15:35 ` Ingo Molnar
2011-05-31 14:14 ` [PATCH v4 09/10] x86-64: Randomize int 0xcc magic al values at boot Andy Lutomirski
2011-05-31 15:40 ` Ingo Molnar
2011-05-31 15:56 ` Andrew Lutomirski [this message]
2011-05-31 16:10 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2011-05-31 16:43 ` Ingo Molnar
2011-05-31 16:42 ` Ingo Molnar
2011-05-31 18:08 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2011-05-31 14:14 ` [PATCH v4 10/10] x86-64: Add CONFIG_UNSAFE_VSYSCALLS to feature-removal-schedule Andy Lutomirski
2011-05-31 18:34 ` Andi Kleen
2011-05-31 18:57 ` Thomas Gleixner
2011-05-31 18:59 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2011-05-31 19:28 ` Ingo Molnar
2011-05-31 19:36 ` Ingo Molnar
2011-05-31 20:05 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2011-05-31 20:24 ` Ingo Molnar
2011-08-06 20:18 ` [PATCH v3 " Andrew Lutomirski
2011-06-08 8:50 ` [PATCH v4 " Ingo Molnar
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