mirror of https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
To: Aleksandr Nogikh <nogikh@google.com>
Cc: tglx@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, x86@kernel.org,
	 linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
	 stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/kexec: Disable KCOV instrumentation after load_segments()
Date: Fri, 27 Feb 2026 14:25:57 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CACT4Y+b1UZpV_i68cSP3XOBsr9EfbX+SAbXRdL3btmAnSvmMBA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260216173716.2279847-1-nogikh@google.com>

On Mon, 16 Feb 2026 at 18:37, Aleksandr Nogikh <nogikh@google.com> wrote:
>
> The load_segments() function changes segment registers, invalidating
> GS base (which KCOV relies on for per-cpu data). When CONFIG_KCOV is
> enabled, any subsequent instrumented C code call (e.g.
> native_gdt_invalidate()) begins crashing the kernel in an
> endless loop.
>
> To reproduce the problem, it's sufficient to do kexec on a
> KCOV-instrumented kernel:
> $ kexec -l /boot/otherKernel
> $ kexec -e
>
> (additional problems arise when the kernel is booting into a crash
> kernel)
>
> Disabling instrumentation for the individual functions would be too
> fragile, so let's fix the bug by disabling KCOV instrumentation for
> the whole machine_kexec_64.c and physaddr.c.
>
> The problem is not relevant for 32 bit kernels as CONFIG_KCOV is not
> supported there.
>
> Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Nogikh <nogikh@google.com>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>

> ---
>  arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 4 ++++
>  arch/x86/mm/Makefile     | 4 ++++
>  2 files changed, 8 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
> index e9aeeeafad173..5703fa6027866 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
> @@ -43,6 +43,10 @@ KCOV_INSTRUMENT_dumpstack_$(BITS).o                  := n
>  KCOV_INSTRUMENT_unwind_orc.o                           := n
>  KCOV_INSTRUMENT_unwind_frame.o                         := n
>  KCOV_INSTRUMENT_unwind_guess.o                         := n
> +# When a kexec kernel is loaded, calling load_segments() breaks all
> +# subsequent KCOV instrumentation until new kernel takes control.
> +# Keep KCOV instrumentation disabled to prevent kernel crashes.
> +KCOV_INSTRUMENT_machine_kexec_64.o                     := n
>
>  CFLAGS_head32.o := -fno-stack-protector
>  CFLAGS_head64.o := -fno-stack-protector
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
> index 5b9908f13dcfd..a678a38a40266 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
> @@ -4,6 +4,10 @@ KCOV_INSTRUMENT_tlb.o                  := n
>  KCOV_INSTRUMENT_mem_encrypt.o          := n
>  KCOV_INSTRUMENT_mem_encrypt_amd.o      := n
>  KCOV_INSTRUMENT_pgprot.o               := n
> +# When a kexec kernel is loaded, calling load_segments() breaks all
> +# subsequent KCOV instrumentation until new kernel takes control.
> +# Keep KCOV instrumentation disabled to prevent kernel crashes.
> +KCOV_INSTRUMENT_physaddr.o             := n
>
>  KASAN_SANITIZE_mem_encrypt.o           := n
>  KASAN_SANITIZE_mem_encrypt_amd.o       := n
> --
> 2.53.0.273.g2a3d683680-goog
>

  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-02-27 13:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-02-16 17:37 Aleksandr Nogikh
2026-02-23 12:42 ` Aleksandr Nogikh
2026-02-27 13:25 ` Dmitry Vyukov [this message]
2026-03-11 21:27   ` Aleksandr Nogikh
2026-03-15 12:18 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-03-16 10:07   ` Aleksandr Nogikh
2026-03-16 10:31     ` Borislav Petkov

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=CACT4Y+b1UZpV_i68cSP3XOBsr9EfbX+SAbXRdL3btmAnSvmMBA@mail.gmail.com \
    --to=dvyukov@google.com \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=kasan-dev@googlegroups.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=nogikh@google.com \
    --cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=tglx@kernel.org \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox

all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®